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ABSTRACT 
 
Held Hostage: America and Its Allies Confront OPEC, 1973 – 1981. (May 2012) 
Kathleen Marie Barr, B.S.; M.A., Sam Houston State University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Terry H. Anderson  
 
 The oil shocks of the 1970s, initiated by the first Arab oil embargo in 1973, 
stunned the industrialized world. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) controlled a resource that was vital to the national well-being and national 
security of America and its allies. In the United States, gas lines formed as Americans 
waited for increasingly costly and scarce fuel. Europeans realized that the energy 
shortages, which they originally believed to be short-term, might permanently change 
their lives.  
  This dissertation places the historical debate about the effectiveness of domestic 
and foreign energy policy within the framework of the global transformations taking 
place at the end of the twentieth century. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 
1971 and the advent of petrodollars on world currency markets, the emergence of the 
Soviet Union as an oil exporter, the rise of OPEC as a regulator of oil prices and the 
consequent decline in the power of the seven major multinational oil companies, and the 
growth of a global environmental movement, all contributed to the shifting interplay of 
forces confronting the United States and its allies in the late twentieth century and 
shaped the debate over national and international energy policy. America‘s efforts to 
 iv 
work with its allies to develop a cohesive national and international energy policy fell 
victim to the struggle between political autonomy and interdependence in an era of 
globalization. The allied response to the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan highlighted these conflicts within the alliance. 
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 1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In 1960, the same year that Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela 
formed the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), U. S. Secretary of 
the Treasury Robert Anderson declared in a cabinet meeting, ―Middle East oil is as 
essential to mutual security as atomic warheads.‖1 After the first OPEC oil embargo 
thirteen years later, Henry Kissinger, Richard Nixon‘s National Security Adviser, 
proclaimed that the ability of the Middle East to use oil as a weapon ―altered irrevocably 
the world as it had grown up in the postwar period.‖ 2    
The embargo stunned the industrialized world. In the United States, gas lines 
formed as Americans waited for increasingly costly and scarce fuel. In the most difficult 
winter since World War II, Europeans realized that the energy shortages, which they 
originally believed to be short-term, might permanently change their lives. The crisis 
was worst in Britain, where it was combined with labor strife in the coal mining and 
railroad industries. In France, the principal concern was unemployment, particularly in 
the auto industry, while German officials instituted a ban on Sunday driving. Japan‘s 
                                               
This dissertation follows the style of The Chicago Manual of Style, 16th ed. 
1 Douglas Little, American Orientalism: the United States and the Middle East since 1945 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 61. 
2 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: the Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1990), 588.  
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leaders were forecasting a twenty percent decrease in fuel imports, leading to economic 
controls and restrictions on travel. 3   
Oil ministers from OPEC met periodically. By the early 1970s the organization 
was in control as industrialized countries around the world had to depend more on 
imports from the Middle East and Venezuela and less on oil produced domestically.  
Then, in 1979, a second energy crisis again paralyzed America. In some cities 
gas lines often stretched for blocks, while in other towns officials instituted gas 
rationing. In Detroit, automobile makers began to address fuel economy in auto 
production. Competition from Japanese automakers like Nissan, Honda, and Toyota 
forced American companies to make cars that could contend with the high gas mileage 
of the imports. American Motors Corporation bought the exclusive rights to a new two-
liter engine from the German company Volkswagen to be installed in AMC‘s ―top-of-
the-line‖ Gremlin that would allow the company to produce a car that would get thirty 
miles to the gallon.4  
Jimmy Carter, elected in 1976 in the wake of the Watergate scandal and 
America‘s demoralizing withdrawal from Vietnam, had campaigned as a Washington 
outsider who would concentrate on the countries‘ economic problems. Carter, as this 
study will examine, was unable to develop an effective policy that would provide a 
solution to OPEC domination.    
                                               
3 Terry Robards, ―Oil-Short Europe is Facing Hardest Winter Since War,‖ New York Times, December 11, 
1973, 1, Proquest Historical Newspapers, http://proquest.umi.com. Fox Butterfield, ―Japan Hails 
Decisions by Arabs: Will Keep Oil-Saving Measures‖ New York Times, December 26, 1973, 49, Proquest 
Historical Newspapers, http://proquest.umi.com. 
4 William K. Stevens, ―Rx for American Motors: Power from Abroad,‖ New York Times, February 6, 
1977, 1, Proquest Historical Newspapers, http://proquest.umi.com. 
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In Europe and in Japan, leaders also attempted to develop policies that would 
address the energy crises of the 1970s. French and German officials campaigned for 
office on platforms that vowed to decrease their countries‘ dependence on foreign oil. 
Throughout Europe and Japan, heads of state promoted the development of alternative 
energy sources, particularly nuclear power, and they built atomic power plants. Yet, like 
the U.S., those countries continued to rely on imported oil. As a result, OPEC‘s policy 
decisions in the late 1970s created conflict between the United States and its traditional 
allies. 
Leaders in the United States, Europe, and Japan held summit meetings that 
focused on coordinating efforts to put pressure on the oil exporting countries. In London 
in 1977, Bonn in 1978, Tokyo in 1979, and Venice in 1980, the seven leaders of the 
industrialized nations met to discuss economic issues, and energy questions always were 
on the agenda. In spite of these efforts, they could not devise a successful policy in 
response to OPEC. Thus, the Group of Seven, or G-7, missed an opportunity to lay the 
groundwork for an alliance that would be able to exert counterforce against the power of 
the oil ministers. As a result, America and its allies around the world were held hostage 
by OPEC. From the perspective of the Carter administration, this failure was a direct 
outcome of the allies‘ desire for a foreign and economic policy that was more 
independent of U.S. influence. This was evident in the allied response to the Iranian 
hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, both in 1979. 
The oil shocks of the 1970s were set against the backdrop of global 
transformations that forced a redefinition of America‘s relationship with its allies and its 
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adversaries. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 and the emergence of 
petrodollars on world currency markets, the rise of the Soviet Union as an oil producer, 
the emergence of OPEC as a regulator of oil prices and the consequent decline in the 
power of the multinationals, and the emergence of the environmental movement, all 
contributed to the shifting interplay of forces confronting the United States and its allies 
in the late 20th century. 
In 1971, Richard Nixon took the United States off the gold standard. With this, 
he effectively brought an end to the Bretton Woods system that had been the basis of the 
economic relationship between the United States and its allies in Western Europe and 
Japan in the post-World War II era. The dollar was no longer tied to gold but instead 
floated along with other currency on the world market. Fluctuations in currency 
worldwide affected and were affected by changes in the dollar.  
After the creation of OPEC in 1960 and the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system, the dollar became tied to the price of a barrel of oil. These came to be called 
petrodollars. Consumer nations bought oil from the OPEC cartel and paid for it in 
dollars. The revenue that producers received was returned to banks in the industrialized 
West and Asia as nations in the oil-producing cartel purchased goods from or invested in 
foreign assets in those countries. This placed the United States, Western Europe, and 
Japan in competition with each other. Each country wanted the petrodollars they paid for 
oil to be returned to their country.  
The growing power of the Soviet Union as an oil producer was another change 
confronting the United States and its allies. By the 1970s, the Soviet Union was a major 
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producer and exporter of petroleum. Much of this oil went to Eastern bloc nations under 
Moscow‘s control. The emergence of America‘s cold war adversary as an oil exporter 
had the potential to upset the traditional relationships that existed between the 
industrialized nations and the oil producers of the Middle East. 
With the signing of the Teheran and Tripoli agreements in 1971, OPEC‘s ability 
to control the price of oil increased considerably. In an effort to retain some control of 
production and price, the major oil companies attempted to influence policymaking 
related to energy legislation. They conducted ad campaigns aimed at consumers in an 
attempt to convince them that what was good for Exxon (and the other multinationals) 
was good for America. 
Another factor influencing the Carter administration and its allies around the 
world was the growing environmental movement. By the time Jimmy Carter took office, 
growing numbers were joining the movement. It had taken off in 1970 with the first 
Earth Day, and by 1976 ecologists in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan were 
making their voices heard about issues like the building of the Alaska pipeline and the 
development of nuclear power.  
It was within this framework that three American presidents faced a national and 
international problem. The opening chapter of this study will examine the first oil crisis 
in 1973 and the embargo that precipitated it. Henry Kissinger viewed the embargo 
within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. America‘s support of Israel in its war with 
the Arab states already had alienated U.S. allies in Europe, and the embargo further 
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alienated Europeans who were more willing to cooperate with the Arabs in order to 
secure oil imports. 
The Ford administration proposed a number of initiatives designed to deal with 
the crisis. A ―barrels-for-bushels‖ program with the Soviet Union ultimately fell through, 
as did Ford‘s plan for building nuclear power and synthetic fuel plants. The Ford 
administration did record a major achievement with legislation in 1975 that set fuel 
efficiency standards for the automobile industry. This legislation also established a 
strategic petroleum reserve. In spite of these successes, however, the administration was 
unable to develop a program that would put pressure on OPEC. 
Subsequent chapters will deal with attempts by the Carter administration and its 
allies in Europe and Japan to address the energy crisis and the effort to coordinate a 
collective response. The main focus of these chapters will be the four summit meetings 
held from 1977 to 1980 and the attempts to implement policies developed at these 
meetings as well as the reasons for the failure of those policies. 
The final chapter will deal with the increasing tension in the Middle East in the 
last years of the Carter administration. The American hostage crisis in Iran and the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, both in 1979, highlighted the failure to develop viable 
energy alternatives. These events also sounded an ominous warning for future 
administrations. The flow of oil out of the Middle East, for so long under the control of 
the American and European petroleum corporations, increasingly was linked to 
America‘s security concerns in the region. Instability presented a threat to American 
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hegemony as well as an American lifestyle that had become heavily dependent on 
imported fuel.  
 Since he left office in 1981, scholars have documented Carter‘s failures and 
achievements in the area of foreign policy. Most of the work in that area, however, has 
focused on two topics. The first is the U.S. relationship with the Soviet Union. One of 
the most well-known of these is Strobe Talbott‘s Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II. 
The studies that have examined U.S. relations with Europe have concentrated mainly on 
the NATO alliance within the framework of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Richard J. 
Payne‘s The West European Allies, the Third World, and U.S. Foreign Policy deals with 
NATO and attempts by the United States to develop stronger ties to the Third World as a 
defense against Soviet influence in underdeveloped regions. Another area of focus is 
Carter‘s human rights policy. Joshua Muravchik‘s The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy 
Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights and Lars Schoultz‘s Human Rights and U.S. 
Policy towards Latin America both examine the president‘s attempt to place human 
rights at the center of his foreign policy. One of the works based on archival research is 
John Dumbrell‘s The Carter Presidency, a Reevaluation. 5 Dumbrell claimed that 
Carter‘s foreign policy reflected a shift that placed emphasis on human rights, 
particularly in regard to the developing world, and away from a focus on the Soviet 
Union and the ideological fight against communism. From this perspective, Dumbrell 
sees the Carter presidency as ―keeping the faith‖ given the limitations within which he 
                                               
5 Strobe Talbott, Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II, (New York: Harper and Row, 1979). Richard J. 
Payne, The West European Allies, the Third World, and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Greenwood 
Press, 1991). John Dumbrell, The Carter Presidency:A Re-evaluation (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 
1995).   
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was operating, that is the constraints placed upon the presidency in the post-Vietnam, 
post-Watergate era.  
The studies that have dealt with the energy crisis have focused mainly on the 
president‘s attempt to develop a domestic policy to meet the crisis. In Jimmy Carter’s 
Economy: Policy in an Age of Limits, economist W. Carl Biven addressed the limitations 
placed on presidents and the impact they had on Carter‘s economic policy by discussing 
his energy policy within the broader framework of international economic policy. He 
believed that the Georgian‘s policies were a reasonable response to the economic crisis 
in an age of limited resources and restrictions placed on the executive branch in the post-
Watergate, post-Vietnam era. According to the author, Carter was constrained by 
economic limitations at home and abroad.6 
In his essay ―An Age of Limits: Jimmy Carter and the Quest for a National 
Energy Policy,‖ John C. Barrow assessed that presidency by looking at the development 
of his energy policy.7 The author mentions the Iranian revolution and its impact on crude 
prices as well as the December 17, 1978 decision by OPEC to raise crude oil prices, but 
generally he focused on the domestic response. According to the author, Carter‘s energy 
policy revealed both the strengths of his leadership and its weaknesses and contributed to 
his defeat in 1980. His conception of the office of the president as a trustee for the 
American people instilled in him a willingness to tackle difficult national problems 
without regard to political costs; however, his inability to rally his own party or inspire 
                                               
6 W. Carl Biven, Jimmy Carter’s Economy: Policy in an Age of Limits (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2002).  
7 John C. Barrow, ―An Age of Limits: Jimmy Carter and the Quest for a National Energy Policy‖ in The 
Carter Presidency: Policy Choices in the Post-New Deal Era, Gary M. Fink and Hugh Davis Graham, eds. 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998). 
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confidence among the American people were critical weaknesses that resulted in his 
1980 reelection defeat. 
One of the earliest books to deal with the Carter‘s foreign policy and the energy 
crisis was Gaddis Smith‘s Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the 
Carter Years.8 Smith argued that the four years of the administration were among the 
most significant in the history of American foreign policy in the twentieth century. To 
Smith, Carter constructed a foreign policy that was not shaped by an obsession with the 
Soviet Union and communism, yet the president‘s foreign policy objectives were forced 
to change with the events of 1979 in Iran and Afghanistan. The Iranian revolution led to 
a doubling of oil prices and the most acute phase of the energy crisis, which Carter 
considered more threatening than anything except nuclear war. By 1979, when the 
Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Carter perceived that fighting the energy crisis and 
confronting the Soviet Union were the same thing. It was imperative, the president 
stated, to equate energy security with America‘s military security. The two could not be 
separated. 
Richard J. Barnet wrote another important book, The Alliance: America, Europe, 
Japan, Makers of the Postwar World.9 He examined the administration and its 
international relations within the framework of the western alliance as it developed 
following World War II. He began with the immediate postwar era and concluded with 
the development of the alliance through the Reagan administration. During the Carter 
                                               
8 Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power:American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1986). 
9 Richard J. Barnet, The Alliance: America, Europe, Japan, Makers of the Postwar World (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1983). 
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administration, energy policy was only seen through the prism of pressing domestic 
concerns created by a new economic order that followed the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system. According to Barnet, those domestic concerns prevented the allies from 
developing an effective energy policy.  
A number of books have been written dealing with the oil crisis from a broad 
perspective. One of the earliest was The Seven Sisters: the Great Oil Companies and the 
World They Made by Anthony Sampson.10 He examined the creation of the cartel of 
multinational oil companies that came to be known as the Seven Sisters. The author 
looked at the growth of the international companies from the first discoveries of oil in 
Pennsylvania in the late 1800s to the aftermath of the 1973 oil embargo to show the 
attitudes and the psychological changes that lay behind one of the most extraordinary 
revolutions in the oil industry. Sampson concluded that the transformations that occurred 
in the industry were the result of emergent Arab nationalism but also liberal policies in 
the United States that gave a great deal of economic and political power to the oil 
companies. The Seven Sisters gave the producing countries the model for both 
controlling production and working together to control prices.  
Another of the early works was Raymond Vernon‘s edited volume, The Oil 
Crisis.11 In this book, the authors were trying to determine the larger meaning of the 
1973 oil crisis. The theme that tied the works together was that the energy crisis did not 
arrive full-blown in October 1973. The predicament resulted from structural changes in 
                                               
10 Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters: the Great Oil Companies and the World They Made (New York: 
The Viking Press, 1975). 
11 Raymond Vernon, ed., The Oil Crisis (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1976). 
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the oil industry in the years prior to the outbreak of the Yom Kippur war as well as rising 
demand among consumers during the same period.  
The Oil Price Revolution by Stephen Schneider examined the economic impact 
of the 1973 oil embargo and ensuing energy crises of the 1970s.12 Schneider primarily 
relied on secondary sources to support his argument that the oil-price revolution that 
occurred in the 1970s was the result of a number of contradictions that were built into 
the system created by the United States in the aftermath of World War II. Among these 
were the growing reliance of consuming countries on oil produced in a few states in the 
Middle East and North Africa; the profitability of the major oil companies that attracted 
smaller companies to the industry, weakening the control of the multinationals; the 
growing economic power of Western Europe and Japan following World War II that 
increased competition between the consumers; and nascent nationalism in the Middle 
East. Schneider concluded that these factors allowed the producing nations to take 
control of price and production and prevented the consumers from coming to any 
agreement on energy policies. 
Fiona Venn authored two books on the wider scope of the oil crisis. In 1986, she 
wrote Oil Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century.13 Venn looked at the energy crises of the 
1970s from the perspective of the development of the oil industry in the twentieth 
century. She began in 1900 with the early stages of oil diplomacy and brought the idea 
forward to the formation of OPEC. The author ended with a postscript in which she 
examined oil diplomacy since the embargo in 1973. Venn argued that the changes that 
                                               
12 Stephen Schneider, The Oil Price Revolution (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983) 
13 Fiona Venn, Oil Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 1986). 
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took place in the early part of the twentieth century revolutionized the role of oil in the 
industrialized world. It became more central to the industrialized West and, as it did, oil 
as a factor in international relations grew in importance as well. Oil came to have direct 
influence over intergovernmental relationships, and as a multinational enterprise that 
was affected by the foreign policies of the states in which they operated.  
Venn followed in 2002 with The Oil Crisis.14 The author argued that while 1973 
did represent a turning point in the oil industry, many of the conclusions and predictions 
of contemporaries with respect to the international political economy did not materialize. 
One prediction was that the use of the oil weapon would force Israel to comply with 
Arab demands regarding the territory the country occupied in 1967. It did not. Another 
was that OPEC‘s decision to take control of price and production would spell the end of 
the multinationals. The oil cartel‘s decisions did affect the position of the oil companies 
in the international oil industry, but it did little to affect their profitability. Venn 
concluded that while the oil crisis had an immediate impact on prices and the policies of 
the consumers, it also had a long-range impact. It represented a breaking point between 
the postwar era of economic growth and a stable economic structure and an era of 
successive economic disruptions and increasing globalization. 
One of the recent works dealing with the broad theme of oil policy was Stephen 
J. Randall‘s United States Foreign Oil Policy Since World War I: For Profits and 
Security.15 In this book, the author focused on the relationship between the state and the 
                                               
14 Fiona Venn, The Oil Crisis (London: Pearson Education/Longman, 2002). 
15 Stephen J. Randall, United States Foreign Oil Policy Since World War I: for Profits and Security, 2nd 
ed. (Montreal: McGill, Queens University Press, 2005). 
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private sector in the making of foreign oil policy. Randall argued that most of the 
histories that examined oil policy did so from a narrow geographic or chronological 
perspective. His work looked at the development of oil policy from the end of World 
War I through the intervention in Iraq by George W. Bush. He argued that narrow 
perspectives left a number of questions unanswered. The questions deal with the debate 
over energy policy between the public and private sector. He concluded that the 
evolution of U.S. foreign oil policy reflected the ongoing tension between the 
commitment to a reliance on market forces to set price and the efforts of the state to 
control those forces in the interests of consumers and national security. 
To date, one of the most comprehensive books dealing with the topic of energy is 
Daniel Yergin‘s The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power.16 He examined 
the development of the international oil industry in the twentieth century. The quest for 
the control of petroleum was the motivating factor in the major political and diplomatic 
events of the period. Few would disagree; yet Yergin‘s focus was not presidential 
administrations and the decisions they made about energy policy, but the actions of the 
major oil companies and their impact on political developments around the world. He 
does not address specific issues such as the attempt by the Carter administration and its 
allies to develop an effective strategy to cope with OPEC.  
This study is different – it places the historical debate about the effectiveness of 
domestic and foreign energy policy within the framework of the global transformations 
taking place at the end of the twentieth century. No author has examined the relationship 
                                               
16 Yergin, The Prize. 
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between the United States, Western Europe, and Japan in terms of both the domestic and 
international aspects of the energy crisis of the 1970s and the reasons for and 
ramifications of the failure to develop an effective policy toward OPEC. I argue that 
America‘s efforts to work with its allies to develop a cohesive national and international 
energy policy fell victim to the struggle between political autonomy and interdependence 
in an era of globalization. The response to the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan highlighted these conflicts within the alliance. My study will 
address the ways in which policymakers in the past attempted to deal with these complex 
issues.  
 In the early years of the new millennium, questions about energy policy continue 
to drive political debate. China and India, increasingly industrialized countries with large 
populations, are becoming more reliant on oil. The United States has not decreased its 
dependence on foreign oil, but has increased it since Carter left office in 1981; and it has 
struggled developing viable alternatives. As the price of oil and gasoline continue to rise 
and OPEC continues to exert influence in regard to those prices, the United States and 
governments around the world face the same difficult dilemmas faced by the Carter 
administration and its allies. In the present era of wildly fluctuating oil prices, can we 
learn anything from the conflicts over energy policy that figured so prominently in the 
decade of the 1970s?  
 As long as Americans and others around the world continue to depend on oil 
exported from the Middle East, national security concerns will be at the forefront of 
debates on the development of energy policy. In 1973, the shah of Iran sounded an 
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ominous alarm about reliance on cheap imported oil. He warned that the industrialized 
nations would have to realize that the ―era of their terrific progress is finished. They will 
have to find new sources of energy.‖ He went on to point out that ―all those children of 
well-to-do families who have plenty to eat at every meal, who have their cars, and who 
act almost as terrorists and throw bombs here and there, they will have to rethink all 
these aspects of the advanced industrial world.‖17   
For American presidents today, as for Jimmy Carter and his administration over 
thirty years ago, the question of energy will continue to define and shape the relationship 
between the United States and the rest of the world. As there has been little rethinking 
about energy sources since the 1970s, the question of energy continues to define the 
relationship between the United States and the rest of the world, and sadly, we still are 
held hostage by OPEC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
17 Yergin, The Prize, 626. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE OIL SHOCK OF 1973 
 
 At 6:15 a.m. on the morning of October 6, 1973, the phone rang in Henry 
Kissinger‘s suite at the Waldorf Towers in New York City, where he was headquartered 
for the annual meeting of the U.N. General Assembly. Joe Sisco, the Assistant Secretary 
of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, was on the other end. He was calling 
to inform the National Security Adviser that the State Department was getting reports 
that Israel was at war with two Arab neighbors, Egypt and Syria.1 Although Kissinger 
could not quite believe the reports, they were true. The Egyptians and Syrians launched a 
surprise attack on Israel in an effort to regain territory in the Sinai Peninsula, the West 
Bank of the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights.  
 Fighting between the Arabs and the Israelis had been sporadic since the creation 
of the state of Israel following World War II. Israel‘s Arab neighbors resented the fact 
that territory was taken from them and given to their enemies. American and Soviet 
support for the Jewish state had inflamed Arab nationalism and sparked a number of 
conflicts between the two sides. The Israelis lived ―unrecognized, ostracized, and bitterly 
resented by its neighbors.‖2   
A major source of conflict in the region revolved around territory taken from 
Syria and Egypt during the Six Day War in 1967. To end the hostilities, moderate Arab 
                                               
1 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 450. 
2 Henry Kissinger, Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2003), 7. 
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states in the region were willing to accept a settlement based on the 1967 borders but 
were only willing to grant an end to the state of belligerency, not a full peace. The 
radical Arab states wanted Israel to be dismantled completely.  
It appeared that a settlement was possible when Anwar Sadat became the 
Egyptian Prime Minister in 1970 following the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Sadat tried 
to secure the return of the lost territory through diplomatic means. Like Sadat, Henry 
Kissinger promoted the idea of an agreement between the Israelis and the Egyptians. 
Kissinger hoped that by forging a middle path between the two sides the United States 
could avoid openly having to support Israel and alienate moderate Arabs. Kissinger 
feared that alienating moderate voices in the unstable region could give the Soviet Union 
the opportunity to exert more influence in the area. With an agreement between the 
Israelis and the Egyptians, a key Arab player would be neutralized. Moscow would be 
deprived of a ―major asset in the Middle East,‖ weakening its overall position in the cold 
war.3 Kissinger‘s hope was that an agreement to return the territory would lead other 
Arab states to come to some accommodation with the Jewish state, leading to security. 
The Israelis, however, were unwilling to withdraw.  
The outbreak of war in October 1973 forced the Nixon administration to throw 
its support behind the Jewish state. Kissinger and others in the Nixon administration 
feared that a loss of Israeli territory to Egypt would lead to the ultimate dismantling of 
the country, piece by piece. As far as Kissinger was concerned, the United States had no 
                                               
3 Salim Yaqub, ―Henry Kissinger and the Arab-Israeli Conflict‖ in Nixon in the World: American Foreign 
Relations, 1969 – 1977, Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 228. 
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choice but to come to Israel‘s aid, in spite of repeated warnings from the Arabs not to 
interfere. As a result, Nixon initiated an airlift in which the United States supplied the 
Israelis with the military hardware they needed. This helped turn the tide for the Israeli 
forces. ―I tell you gentlemen,‖ declared the Israeli defense minister, ―the tanks and 
ammunition our forces are firing in Egypt three weeks ago were in the United States.‖4   
 In retaliation for U.S. support of their enemy, the Organization of Arab 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) initiated the first oil embargo of the 1970s 
against America and other Western industrialized countries. In October, the group 
agreed to reduce production by a minimum of 5 percent based on September‘s 
production of 20.6 million barrel per day, followed by monthly cuts along the same 
lines. A later decision by all the producing governments except Iraq but including Dubai 
and Oman, which were not OAPEC members, banned exports to the United States. Most 
of the producing governments took a similar action against the Netherlands, as well.5 
That country was the point of entry for oil imported to Western Europe, sometimes 
called Europe‘s ―oil giant.‖ In effect, reducing shipments to Rotterdam would cut off oil 
imports to all of Western Europe. The embargo was a reflection of a power shift that 
occurred between the oil producing countries and the oil consuming countries in the 
decades after World War II. 
 Multinational oil companies had controlled the production, distribution, and 
marketing of oil around the world since the early 1900s when the British first gained 
control of Persian oil concessions. American companies with large amounts of capital to 
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invest and the technological knowledge to get the oil out of the ground quickly followed 
the British into the Middle East, an area with oil riches beyond the wildest imagination. 
The British oil company, British Petroleum, and the American companies, Exxon 
(Standard of New Jersey), Mobil, Texaco, Chevron, and Gulf Oil, were joined by Royal 
Dutch Shell to form a loose cartel collectively known as the Seven Sisters. Together, the 
seven were the undisputed kings of the oil industry around the world. 
 By the 1970s, however, that control was being questioned. Middle Eastern 
leaders were witness to the wealth the oil companies were taking out of the ground at 
their expense. The postwar increase in free world crude production was ―gargantuan.‖6 It 
increased from 8.7 million barrels per day in 1948 to 42 million barrels per day in 1972. 
U.S. production grew from 5.5 million barrels per day to 9.5 million barrels per day. For 
the United States, the significant aspect of the growth in production was that the U.S. 
share of total world production decreased from 64 percent to 22 percent while Middle 
East production grew from 1.1 million barrels per day to 18.2 million barrels per day. 
Just as significant was the shift in proven oil reserves; in the noncommunist world they 
grew from 62 billion barrels in 1948 to 534 billion barrels in 1972. American reserves 
increased from 21 billion barrels in 1948 to 38 billion barrels by 1972, although the 
statistical significance shrank from 34 percent of total world reserves to 7 percent. By 
contrast, Middle East reserves increased from 28 billion barrels to 367 billion barrels 
during the same period.7 Producing countries began to recognize the power they held 
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over a commodity that was valued around the industrialized world. Without it, the 
engines of industry would grind to a halt. These heads of state wanted more control of 
the oil the companies were producing. They set about getting it by forcing the oil 
companies to renegotiate contracts that were more advantageous to the Middle Eastern 
countries.  
 A rapid increase in consumption from the early 1940s to the end of the 1960s 
accompanied the surge in world oil production during that period. Total world energy 
demand more than tripled between 1949 and 1972. Between 1948 and 1972 consumption 
in the United States tripled from 5.8 to 16.4 million barrels per day. Demand in Europe 
during the same period increased from 970,000 to 14.1 million barrels per day. Japanese 
use increased from 32,000 to 4.4 million barrels per day during those years.  
Rapid economic growth and rising incomes fueled the surge in demand. One 
sector of the industrial economy that grew rapidly was the automobile industry. The 
number of motor vehicles in the U.S. increased from 45 million in 1949 to 119 million in 
1972. Outside the U.S., the number of motor vehicles increased from 18 million to 161 
million during the same period.8 
 The increase in demand for oil was coupled with a decrease in domestic 
production. In 1950, petroleum provided about 40 percent of the total energy consumed 
in the U.S.9 In 1972, about 46 percent of the energy used in the United States was 
derived from petroleum. Imports of petroleum and refined products came from various 
oil producing regions around the world, including Canada, Latin America, and Asia. As 
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some of the refined products were derived from crude produced in the Middle East, 
about half the imported petroleum products came from that region.10      
 The formation of the OPEC in 1960 began to alter the relationship between the 
producers and the West. The organization had been formed as a way for the oil 
producing countries to negotiate with the oil companies. Between 1960 and 1970, 
however, OPEC had little real power because the Seven Sisters controlled all aspects of 
production, distribution, and marketing. The complicity of the Middle Eastern 
governments allowed this arrangement to continue as no producer government was 
willing to take a stand against the oil companies. The State Department indicated that the 
international oil industry had a positive effect on the U.S. balance of payments and it 
was in America‘s best interests for the oil companies to remain ―healthy and 
productive.‖ The United States government was as interested in the continuing 
involvement of the industry in exploration and production as were the companies 
themselves. The State Department was ―highly skeptical‖ of the chances of oil being 
found or developed if the international industry was ―removed from the production of oil 
or even if its role were severely curtailed.‖ Officials concluded that the ―industry and the 
government both wish to see a continuing major role for the U.S. industry in foreign oil 
production, as well as in transport, refining and marketing.‖11  
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 The multinational oil companies operating in the Middle East got concessions 
from the producers that gave them a great degree of power over exploration, drilling, 
production, and distribution of the rich oil reserves in the region. For example, in 1970 
the Iranian government requested an increase in production from the consortium of oil 
companies operating in that country. The U.S. government supported the idea because 
the shah played an important role in America‘s Middle East policy by acting as a 
regional policeman. The consortium, however, was unwilling to allow the increase in 
spite of the desires of either the Iranian or the U.S. government. White House officials 
were not happy about the consortium‘s decision and thought that Nixon and British 
Prime Minister Harold Wilson should direct the companies to work out an increase in 
production.12  
Ultimately, the Iranians and the oil consortium reached a satisfactory settlement. 
In return for a higher output and export of oil by the consortium, the group agreed to pay 
the Iranian government $1.1 billion for the 1970 – 71 fiscal year. During the 1969 – 70 
fiscal year, consortium output rose 14.7 percent, accounting for over 90 percent of total 
Iranian production. This was the highest rate of any Persian Gulf producer except Oman 
and Abu Dhabi, who were ―newcomers with relatively small total output.‖ The 
consortium also agreed to assist the Iranian government in negotiating an overseas loan 
from outside sources.13  
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The balance between the oil companies and the producers suited not only the oil 
companies, but Western governments as well. The governments received benefits in the 
form of tax revenue and employment opportunities for Americans in the U.S. and 
overseas. In the realm of international oil, what was good for the Seven Sisters was good 
for America. Because the oil company executives operating in the Middle East directly 
dealt with the Middle Eastern government officials, the oil companies became de facto 
diplomats, negotiating deals that benefited the government as well as the companies. 
Rawleigh Warner, Jr. of Mobil Corporation explained the role of multinational oil 
companies in negotiating with foreign governments. The companies, he said, ―negotiate 
with governments but not on behalf of governments.‖ They could ―fulfill their 
commercial role in a way no government, or government-owned company can.‖14    
 Libya played a major role in strengthening OPEC‘s bargaining power. The 
overthrow of the Libyan King Idris in 1969 in a military coup led by Col. Muammar al-
Qaddafi initiated the shift. After the ouster of the king, Qaddafi made a move to 
nationalize the oil industry. The colonel was dissatisfied with the fifty-fifty profit-
sharing arrangement between the Libyan government and the multinational oil 
companies. He warned the twenty-one major oil companies operating in Libya that he 
would shut down production if necessary to achieve his objectives. ―People who have 
lived without oil for 5,000 years,‖ he said, ―can live without it again for a few years in 
order to attain their legitimate rights.‖15 The major operators in Libya were the Oasis 
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Group, a combination of four oil companies, and Esso Standard Libya. It was estimated 
that the companies engaged in Libya took out half a billion dollars a year in profits, 80 
percent of that going to the United States. Qaddafi called a meeting with the 
representatives of the oil companies and told them that the posted price, a theoretical 
figure on which royalties and tax payments were based, was too low. The figure varied 
from country to country, but for Libya it was $2.21 a barrel. Of that, the Libyan 
government received $1.25. Raising the posted price would increase the amount the 
companies paid to the government in royalties and taxes.16   
 In order to remedy what Qaddafi saw as an unfair agreement, he confronted the 
oil companies operating in his country. Because the multinationals operated as a bloc, 
they were invulnerable to pressure to change the way things were being done. Instead, 
the Libyan leader approached the independents operating in Libya. The two major 
independent oil companies were Occidental Petroleum, owned by Dr. Armand Hammer, 
and Bunker Hunt, a partner of British Petroleum in Libya.17  Libyan officials ordered 
Occidental to cut production from 800,000 to 400,000 barrels per day. The cut was 
ordered ―in the name of conservation.‖ Although it was acknowledged that the company 
was overproducing one of its concessions, most regarded the move as a ploy in the war 
over prices between the majors and the Libyan government. Hammer did agree to cut 
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back production, thereby weakening the bargaining position of the other oil companies 
operating in the country.18   
 In 1972, the Libyan government again forced Occidental to cut its crude 
production, once again maintaining that it was for reasons of conservation. The company 
claimed that this was a clear violation of the 1970 agreement, which took conservation 
into account. Hammer was most concerned about the fact that the cut was ordered 
without prior notification or consultation. Because the company was in a very precarious 
financial circumstance and had no other sources of crude by which to meet its 
commitments to its customers, State Department officials speculated that Occidental 
might come to them to intervene; however, the State Department acknowledged that 
U.S. ability to influence Libya was ―very limited,‖ because of U. S. support for Israel. 
Additionally, the decision of the Libyan National Oil Company hinged on a technical 
question of good oil field practices and the U.S. government was reluctant to become 
involved. The State Department was limited to pointing out to the Libyan government 
that, while it had been calling for greater investment by the oil companies, its actions 
would ―hardly encourage it.‖19 
 Once the independent oil companies yielded to pressure from the Libyan 
government to cut production, the handwriting was on the wall. The major oil companies 
were forced to follow suit. The majors, however, were not willing meekly to follow the 
lead of the independents and give in to Libyan demands without consultation, and they 
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believed they had the support of the American government behind them. This was not 
necessarily the case, however. The State Department was concerned about the attitude of 
the majors should a confrontation arise with the Libyan government; officials were 
worried about the ramifications for U.S. interests in Libya and throughout the Middle 
East, as Qaddafi wanted to claim the mantle of the late Egyptian leader, Nasser, and  
pan-Arabism. As one embassy official remarked, ―The ‗fact of Arab unity‘ in Qaddafi‘s 
eyes is, like the Koran, immutably true. He is wedded to promote unity whenever and 
however he can.‖20 The U.S. embassy in Libya recommended that the secretary of state 
call in the top company managers for a ―frank, in-depth discussion‖ of the problem and 
to urge ―all negotiating flexibility‖ the companies could muster.21  
 American oil companies feared that the developments in Libya would spread to 
the rest of the Middle East, and they reinstituted a group known as the Front Uni. This 
group had formed originally in 1922 as a way to protect Western interests in Russia 
against the threat from the newly formed Soviet Union. The group pledged to fight the 
Soviet Union as a bloc and not allow each member to be ―picked off‖ individually.22 The 
group that formed in the 1970s engaged in negotiations with government officials about 
price and production, although oil company officials recognized that the negotiations 
were pro forma. Because of the State Department‘s lack of support and Occidental‘s 
surrender in Libya, they were left in a very weak bargaining position. After urging the 
companies to be as flexible as possible, Secretary of State William P. Rogers believed 
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that the time had come for the U.S. to ―step back and let negotiations take their course, 
in order minimize any impression that oil company positions and interests are identical‖ 
with those of the U.S. government, ―particularly since situations could arise when USG 
might have to consider involving itself further to try to avoid serious adverse 
developments.‖ 23   
 The leapfrogging they feared became reality when Iran, representing Abu Dhabi, 
Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, met with oil company officials to renegotiate the 
contracts they had with the oil companies. The shah made it clear that he was displeased 
that Libya received concessions that the companies did not give to the Persian Gulf 
producers. He took the occasion of the opening of the Iranian Parliament to ―make it 
clear that Iran was not going to be left behind‖ and warned that failure to meet Iran‘s 
expectations would be met by legislation, or in effect ―appropriation of part of the 
concession.‖24 Iran was more of a concern to the Nixon administration because that 
country, along with Saudi Arabia, played an important role in security in the Middle 
East. The government was willing to do much to support the shah and satisfy his 
demands. The oil companies recognized that national security would be best served by 
doing what they could for Iran.25 Shortly after the developments in Tripoli, the producers 
and the oil companies signed the Tehran agreement with Iran. Accordingly, payments by 
the companies to the producers increased over a five year to a total of $1.45 per barrel. 
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Total revenue would increase over the five-year period from $1.4 billion in 1971 to 
nearly $12 billion by 1975. In return, the oil producers agreed to maintain this level for 
five years.  
 In 1971, the oil companies met once again with the producers from Libya, Iraq, 
Saudi Arabia, and Algeria. The countries wanted the same deal for all of Mediterranean 
crude that Libya got for itself in 1970. The State Department was concerned about these 
negotiations because they had a direct impact on Western Europe, which received most 
of its crude exports from this group. The department wanted to assure U.S. allies that the 
United States shared their interest in ensuring the flow of oil to Western Europe. There 
was ―some grumbling‖ in Western Europe that they were ―hostage not only to the 
producing countries, but also to the American petroleum companies.‖26   
 The oil companies were frantic to find a way to fend off this leapfrogging that 
was pushing the prices higher and giving the producers more control. The expected five 
years of stability guaranteed the oil companies by the Tehran and Tripoli agreements 
seemed to be only a dream. This was reinforced in September 1971 when, following an 
OPEC meeting in Beirut, the producers demanded ―compensation to the producing 
countries for loss in income caused by recent changes in currency values‖ and 
―acquisition by producing countries of a participating share in the production activities 
of the concessionary companies.‖27  
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 Acquisition of a participating share, or participation, was a way for the oil 
producers to take advantage of higher prices without outright nationalization or having 
to compete with oil companies and each other for markets. While the Nixon 
administration recognized that the companies would have to be willing to show some 
flexibility in higher posted prices, the concept of participation would be more difficult. 
The company position was that participation was in contravention of the Tehran 
agreements; State Department officials agreed. Officials also believed that the 
department should give the companies diplomatic support in resisting the demand for 
participation. Stalling OPEC on participation and confiscation of properties would likely 
be successful but only if the companies were willing to begin discussion of new 
company-government relationships after 1976 when the Tehran agreements would end.28 
As far as the State Department was concerned, the oil companies had two choices: 
participation or nationalization. Neither choice appealed to the multinationals, but there 
was no going back. Because of the Tripoli and Tehran agreements, the relationship 
between the oil companies and the producers had changed forever. 
 The change in the nature of oil production and distribution that took place in the 
early 1970s had an impact on relations between the oil companies and the government in 
the United States. After the Tripoli and Tehran agreements were signed, the power of the 
multinationals diminished. One historian has suggested that Nixon‘s decision to support 
the Libyans at the expense of the multinationals was deliberate. Nixon and Kissinger felt 
that America‘s allies in Europe and Japan were becoming economically and politically 
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independent of the United States. This independence would have serious repercussions 
for American influence in those countries. To Nixon and Kissinger‘s way of thinking, 
―slower allied growth occurring within a restructured energy and monetary 
environment‖ would lead to a ―substantially strengthened American position in a more 
cohesive alliance system – one better able to withstand growing Soviet pressures.‖29 In 
order to curb their push for independence, Nixon and Kissinger sided with Libya and 
Iran over the multinationals, and therefore, their allies in Western Europe and Japan. 
Siding with Libya meant higher prices for crude, and it gave away the power over 
pricing to countries that may or may not have the allies‘ best interests at heart.  
 Even if the Nixon administration did not deliberately side with Libya and Iran 
over the issue of nationalization, both Qaddafi and the shah had leverage. The shah knew 
what his position was with regard to U.S. national security in the Middle East. He had 
been a good friend to the oil consuming countries through two closures of the Suez 
Canal and attempts by Arab countries to embargo their most valuable commodity.30 The 
shah knew he could appeal to the U.S. government to intervene with the oil companies, 
and the possibility of support was good. The U.S. government was also concerned about 
the Libyan position. First, Libyan crude was some of the best in the world. It was light 
with a low sulfur content. Second, the U.S. government feared pan-Arab unity being 
mobilized against Israel and its U.S. supporters. The White House acknowledged that 
giving in to Libyan demands would enhance Qaddafi‘s prestige in the Arab world, while 
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undermining the positions of the more moderate leaders in the region but would be less 
confrontational than refusing Libyan demands.31 Support for both Iran and Libya 
diminished the position and power of the oil companies.  
 In order to circumscribe the bargaining power of OPEC, governments filled the 
void left by the multinationals. Between 1971 and 1973, governments negotiated 
bilateral oil deals with the producing countries. The governments concluded deals that 
bartered oil for commodities such as munitions and armaments. They also negotiated 
deals that brought technical experts from the consuming countries into the producing 
countries. These bilateral deals, however, worked against the consumers because they 
prevented them working together to negotiate deals as a bloc. The U.N. Secretary 
General Kurt Waldheim told Kissinger that the deals between European countries and 
the producers would hurt  the consumers in the end, since the deals would set the price 
of oil so high that they would spend too much of their foreign exchange on it. This could 
lead to a world-wide depression and ―threaten the cohesion of the non-communist world 
we have worked so hard for.‖32 
 Nixon administration officials also recognized that new relationships would have 
to be developed between the multinational oil companies, the producers, and the U.S. 
government. A State Department report in March 1972 entitled ―The U.S. and the 
Impending Energy Crisis‖ detailed the nature of this new relationship. By 1975, and 
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possibly earlier, the world would enter a permanent seller‘s market. In order for there to 
be even short-lived success in dealing with OPEC, the oil companies would have to be 
willing to discuss with the producers some form of new relationship. It was time for the 
U.S. government to take immediate action, including ―efforts to reduce rates of growth 
of consumption and to raise domestic production and imports from secure sources,‖ 
which would be ―as unpopular as they will be costly,‖ and they would require ―a good 
deal of political courage.‖33 It was this transformation in the relationship between the 
producers, multinationals, and consumer governments that gave OPEC the power to 
unsheathe the oil weapon. 
  Western Europe and Japan were particularly hard hit by the embargo. Both had 
become increasingly dependent on oil from the Middle East. In the first half of 1973, 
over 70 percent of Western Europe‘s crude oil requirements came from that region. If 
the cuts announced by OPEC were sustained, that would mean an immediate loss of over 
one 500,000 barrels per day for each month.34 Japan was even more vulnerable to supply 
interruptions. That country depended on oil to supply 75 percent of its energy and it 
imported over 40 percent from Arab sources. Between April and September 1973, Japan 
imported over 900 million barrels of crude oil, about five million barrels per day.35   
 In response, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) 
devised a strategy to deal with the crisis. In an effort to reduce fuel consumption by ten 
to twelve percent, the government announced that all filling stations would be closed on 
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Sundays, the use of expressways for long-distance travel tightly controlled, and the 
direct burning of crude oil in power stations prevented. Powers to enforce these and 
other restrictions were included in an emergency bill due to go before the Diet in 
November.36  
 A major concern for both Western Europe and Japan was the effect the embargo 
would have on economic growth. Loss of petroleum supplies to industry would be a 
severe blow to manufacturing, resulting in higher unemployment. MITI forecast zero to 
negative economic growth from December onwards, reducing the expected Gross 
National Product from 9.5 to less than 5 percent for the 1973 fiscal year. German 
officials were projecting zero growth for 1974, France was expecting expansion to be 
halved from six percent to three percent, and Britain‘s was likely to be about 2.5 
percent.37 The outcome was that all of these countries intensified their search for 
alternative sources of energy, nuclear, solar, oil from shale, and reduced dependence on 
Arab sources, including the development of North Sea oil and oil in the waters off the 
coast of Japan.   
 The embargo and price increases were a double-edged sword for the Arabs. They 
could use the oil weapon to achieve their political goals. At the same time, however, that 
weapon could be used against them. The oil exporting countries were heavily dependent 
on goods imported from the West. They received things as varied as food, raw materials, 
and machinery. They also received loans and other financing from the American Export-
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Import Bank, the World Bank and various UN agencies, most of which originated in the 
United States and Western Europe. 38 Their actions could cause the importing countries 
to reduce the flow of goods and money to the region. 
 The Soviet Union stood to benefit from the embargo. Western Europe and Japan, 
in particular, would turn to the Soviets for their oil needs if the Arab embargo continued. 
In 1973, it would have been difficult for the Soviet Union to supply the industrialized 
countries with sufficient oil to offset the effects of the embargo. The USSR Planning 
Committee announced in that year that industrial progress would be slower as a result of 
delays in expanding capacity in the oil and gas industry. Crude oil production under the 
five-year plan covering 1970 to 1975 was scheduled to increase from 350 million tons in 
1970 to almost 500 million in 1975. This was a slightly lower growth rate than that 
during the period from 1965 to 1970. Production in 1972 reached about 394 million tons, 
indicating average annual increases of only 5.2 percent in that year and the previous 
one.39   
The idea of cooperation between the West and the Soviet Union appeared 
attractive, at least on the surface. The Soviets had large reserves in Siberia but did not 
have the technological capabilities or the capital to access it. The United States, Western 
Europe, and Japan had the available capital and expertise for energy development. Oil 
shortages in the West and Nixon‘s emphasis on détente made the possibility of 
cooperation with the Soviets on oil and gas production seem attractive. It could be 
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―mutually advantageous.‖40 The U.S. also was looking for opportunities to expand oil 
production outside the Middle East.41 
 Arab oil ministers agreed to end the embargo on March 18, 1974, after the Saudis  
opened the door for American and Syrian negotiations concerning disengagement on the 
Golan Heights. In spite of this, however, fears about dependence on foreign sources of 
oil lingered. How would the United States and its allies in Western Europe and Japan 
deal with a future embargo? How could it be avoided? The best way forward seemed to 
be developing effective international and domestic policies that could counter the 
bargaining power of OPEC. That, however, was easier said than done.  
 Henry Kissinger viewed the energy crisis within the framework of the crisis in 
the Middle East. He believed that the embargo grew out of political and geopolitical 
concerns that involved conflict between the Arabs and Israelis. If those concerns were 
addressed, the oil situation would take care of itself. Because of that, his focus remained 
on forging an agreement between the two sides. America‘s allies, however, had other 
interests. Western Europe and Japan imported more oil from the Middle East than did 
the United States. Because of that, they were less willing to alienate the Arab countries 
in the region. Over the course of the 1970s, the debate raged among the allies about how 
to accomplish the goal of energy independence. 
 
 
                                               
40 ―Should We Aid the Russians?‖ Petroleum Economist, Vol. 41, No. 1, January 1974, 4. ―Russian 
Headaches,‖ Petroleum Economist, Vol. 40, No. 3, March 1973, 87. 
41 ―Should We Aid the Russians?‖ Petroleum Economist, Vol. 41, No. 1, January 1974, 4. 
 36 
CHAPTER III 
 
TOWARD A STABLE PEACE AND EXPANDING PROSPERITY: 
 
THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION AND THE ENERGY CRISIS 
 
 ―At home and abroad, America is in a time of transition,‖ Richard Nixon 
proclaimed to Congress in April 1973. ―Old problems are yielding to new initiatives, but 
in their place new problems are arising which once again challenge our ingenuity and 
require vigorous action. Nowhere is this more clearly true than in the energy field.‖1 The 
embargo initiated by the Arab members of OPEC brought home to the industrialized 
world the truth of Nixon‘s message.  
The producers‘ actions sparked a dual response by the Nixon administration. The 
starting point of that effort, the Washington Energy Conference, was international in 
scope and attempted to address the problems associated with the oil embargo among 
America‘s allies in Western Europe and Japan. The second response was a domestic 
attempt to deal with the embargo: Project Independence. The Nixon administration‘s 
efforts to deal with the energy crisis reflected the belief that stability at home and abroad 
was a necessary first step in dealing with OPEC.  
In the United States, fears of a fuel shortage caused alarm. Nixon‘s mandatory 
allocation program, designed to share resources among the states, only increased those 
fears. Americans responded by panic buying. Gas lines formed in filling stations across 
the country. Lines at these stations often snaked around several blocks. In New York, 
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patrons sat for two hours waiting to get $2 worth of gas, the maximum allowed at some 
stations. At others, customers waited for several hours only to find that the station had no 
gasoline left. In California, where a study by The Los Angeles Times indicated that the 
state did not face fuel shortages but would if panic buying set in, Governor Ronald 
Reagan made a plea to his citizens, asking that they not go to the service station for 
refueling until their tanks were less than half full.2  
The fuel shortages also affected American industry. Airlines cut routes. The New 
York Times reported that three major airlines that offered competitive service cancelled 
forty flights on fifteen different routes.3 The president of Western Airlines, a Los 
Angeles-based carrier, claimed that ―we risk our entire economy grinding down to a 
pace that will make us not a second-rate nation, but a third-rate nation‖ unless the United 
States did not develop a program to find a solution to the shortage.4 
Reaction around the world varied, but all of the industrialized countries that 
relied on petroleum exports from the Middle East developed programs that anticipated 
shortages. The French announced price controls on basic foods like beef, fruits and 
vegetables, and cheese to hold down a skyrocketing cost of living exacerbated by the oil 
crisis. The French government conceded that the price controls were ―intended as much 
for their psychological impact on public opinion as their real impact on prices.‖5 The 
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Dutch and Belgian governments imposed restrictions on Sunday driving, and West 
Germany considered a similar move and announced a major effort to switch from oil to 
coal as a source of industrial energy in an attempt to offset the effects of the embargo.6 
Japan, more vulnerable to the ―political blackmail that is the aim of the Arab oil 
embargo,‖ also took measures aimed at alleviating the effects of the boycott. The 
Cabinet announced a petroleum supply law and a livelihood stabilization law, giving the 
government the power to fix prices on a variety of commodities and regulating the 
processing and supply of commodities like oil and steel. In addition, the Cabinet banned 
the sale of gasoline and use of private cars on Sundays and holidays and shortened the 
hours of restaurants, businesses, and theaters.7      
The Nixon administration‘s domestic response to the embargo was Project 
Independence. He wanted Americans to commit to conserving energy so that by the end 
of the decade the nation would be able to meet its own energy needs from its own 
sources. This effort involved administration and legislative actions on both a short-term 
and long-term basis. Accordingly, Americans were supposed to reduce the supply of 
heating oil for homes and businesses as well as for aircraft, preventing industries that 
used coal from converting to oil, reductions in energy consumption by the federal 
government, and asking governors to enforce these actions at the state and local level. 
Nixon also asked the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to speed up licensing and 
                                               
6 ―Saudi Arabia Warns U.S. Against Oil Countermoves,‖ New York Times, Nov. 23, 1973, 1, Proquest 
Historical Newspapers, http://proquest.umi.com. 
7 Fox Butterfield, ―Japanese Reduce Budget Increase,‖ New York Times, Dec. 23, 1973, 1, Proquest 
Historical Newspapers, http://proquest.umi.com.  
 39 
construction of nuclear power plants. Nixon demanded that Congress pass an emergency 
energy bill that would fill the void until more permanent action was put in place.8 
 Reaction to the president‘s initiative was mixed. Some claimed that the 
president‘s program would lead to savings in the number of barrels of oil used every 
day. Voluntary controls by Americans to conserve energy, things such as carpooling and 
lowering home thermostats, along with ―immediate and severe cutbacks‖ in energy use 
by the federal government would save 1.2 million barrels of oil per day. When added to 
other programs, such as reducing airline flights, converting to coal in some industries, 
and increasing domestic oil production, the total savings was projected at 2.3 million 
barrels a day.9 
 Others claimed that the plan would not be effective. Columnist Joseph Kraft 
wrote that Nixon ―defined an objective that, while rhetorically pleasing, does not make 
sense. He has not charted the way to achieve an objective that does make sense.‖ The 
concern was that in becoming independent of the Arab oil producing countries, an 
objective almost universally agreed upon, the Nixon administration wanted to pursue an 
isolationist policy that would cut the U.S. off from the rest of the world. It was in 
American interests to cooperate in the energy field with the non-Arab oil producers such 
as Iran as well as the nation‘s partners in Western Europe and Japan. U.S. self-
sufficiency would be detrimental to organizing joint research projects in order to develop 
alternatives to dependence on Arab oil. In addition, the objective of self-sufficiency by 
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1980 was unrealistic. The vice president of Shell Oil claimed that there were 
discrepancies in the administration‘s projections for self-sufficiency, specifically the 
time it would take to bring new energy sources into the system. Projections were ―over-
optimistic.‖10    
 Critics also questioned the effectiveness of the voluntary nature of the 
conservation efforts. A Gallup poll indicated that Americans were skeptical about the 
source of the crisis. Only seven per cent of the American people blamed the Arabs for 
the oil shortage and the resulting gas lines. Twenty-five percent blamed the oil 
companies, and twenty-three percent blamed the federal government. Nineteen percent 
of the American public held Nixon personally responsible, and sixteen percent thought 
American consumers were to blame.11 The government would have to convince 
Americans that the crisis was real if conservation efforts were to be effective. 
Additionally, most of the research and development programs aimed at creating 
alternatives to oil would not begin paying off until after 1980. During the ―crunch time‖ 
between 1973 and 1980, the government was not going to mandate any actions that 
would require conservation on the part of the American people. Critics doubted that a 
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voluntary program would work and claimed that it was ―Pollyanna-ish‖ to believe the 
administration could more than ―take a sizable nibble‖ by the end of the decade.  12 
 Part of Nixon‘s domestic agenda was to develop alternative sources of energy 
such as geothermal, cleaner coal, and nuclear energy. The administration planned to 
increase the effort to drill in areas previously off limits to oil companies, especially the 
Alaskan wilderness, which sparked a heated debate between the domestic oil industry 
and the growing environmental movement. 
 The environmental movement got a boost on April 22, 1970 with the first Earth 
Day, a day set aside to celebrate the world‘s natural resources and call attention to the 
environmental degradation brought about by pollution of the air and water by industrial 
development. Activists pointed to a number of industrial accidents involving oil slicks. 
Wells off the coast of Louisiana caught fire. A damaged Greek oil tanker in Tampa Bay 
spilled oil into the bay. The movement received a major boost in 1969 when an oil rig 
ruptured off the California coast, fouling the waters and beaches of Santa Barbara. Just 
the year prior, Secretary of the Interior Stuart Udall said that the record sale of oil and 
gas leases off the California coast ―shows the petroleum industry responds to the need 
for keeping capital investments at home.‖13 The leak from the well owned and operated 
by Union Oil Company poured 21,000 gallons of oil into the sea every day. By 
February, dead sea birds began washing up on the beaches. The fear among 
conservationists was that the oil slick would upset the ecological balance in the area, an 
                                               
12 Harry B. Ellis, ―U.S. Energy Independence by 1980? Nixon Project Called Unrealistic,‖ Christian 
Science Monitor, November 28, 1973, 1, Proquest Historical Newspapers, http://proquest.umi.com. 
13 Eric Malnic, ―Fight on Oil Slick Speeded,‖ Los Angeles Times, February 1, 1969, 1, Proquest Historical 
Newspapers, http://proquest.umi.com. ―Udall Lauds Oil Firms on Santa Barbara Bids,‖ Los Angeles 
Times, February 8, 1968, B13, Proquest Historical Newspapers, http://proquest.umi.com. 
 42 
area in which gray whales migrated at the time of year. The Sierra Club contacted 
Walter J. Hickel, Nixon‘s Secretary of the Interior, and suggested that until new 
safeguards were put into place, channel drilling should be halted. A local Santa Barbara 
conservation group, Get Oil Out or GOO, called for a permanent end to drilling in the 
Santa Barbara Channel. The divergent interests of the two sides set them against each 
other when it came to drilling in sensitive areas of the U.S.  
 The domestic environmental movement had the support of administration 
officials as well as members of Congress who worked together to create legislation 
designed to protect the environment. The National Wildlife Federation, the 
Environmental Defense Fund, and Friends of the Earth opposed the construction of 
nuclear power plants and the Alaska pipeline on the grounds that both of these would 
lead to environmental degradation. A letter initiated by Republican Senator Robert 
Griffin and supported by twelve others urged the Nixon administration to delay a 
decision on the pipeline route until the feasibility of an alternative route through Canada 
could be examined more closely. The senators pointed out that a cross-Canada route 
would offer, among other things, an environmental advantage over the proposed Alaska 
route. The pipeline system across the area would ―cause the least destruction to the 
natural environment.‖14  
The Canadian government considered the possibility of allowing construction of 
a pipeline, but before the two sides could come to an agreement the White House 
withdrew the offer. NSC officials claimed that a pipeline through that region would 
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constitute a national security risk. The director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, 
General G.A. Lincoln, advised the administration that the Canadian government may not 
view future crisis situations in exactly the same way as the U.S. Therefore, in a broad 
national context, there would ―in some possible scenarios be a national security 
advantage to having Alaskan oil move to the United States under U.S. control all the 
way.‖15  
 A major concern for environmentalists in the industrialized countries was oil 
pollution in coastal waters. The oil spills off the coast of the U.S. convinced 
conservationists that it was necessary to remove the threat that offshore drilling 
represented and that set them at odds with the Nixon administration‘s reluctance to 
regulate the oil industry at a time when the industry was suffering setbacks abroad. 
Nixon told Congress that his administration was committed to protecting the 
environment, but it would not come at the expense of social or economic progress.16 He 
was unwilling to regulate the oil industry at a time of economic uncertainty related to the 
actions of OPEC because that would constrain the industry when they needed more 
latitude. As the Chairman of the Board of Standard Oil (Indiana) declared, the United 
States was ―at war – not a shooting war but an economic war with nations comprising 
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Our country can have no economic 
or military security while we are dependent on others for one-third of our oil and one-
sixth of our total energy supply.‖ He advocated a program to assess the feasibility of 
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drilling on the continental shelf to solve our domestic energy problems. It would also 
demonstrate to the Europeans and the Japanese that we were ―serious about coming to 
grips with our energy problems.‖17   
 Nixon indicated his resistance to regulation of the oil industry in a 1971 special 
message to Congress on marine pollution from oil spills. The ―growing threat‖ from the 
oil spills could be contained, he said, ―not by stopping industrial progress but through a 
careful combination of international cooperation and national initiatives.‖ Conservatives 
at the Wall Street Journal agreed, declaring that ―price controls made the market an 
inefficient allocator of supply while environmental objections impede development of 
nuclear power and offshore oil.‖18       
 Several international conventions addressed this issue, and in 1970, Nixon 
submitted two to the Senate for its advice and consent. The first empowered the U.S. to 
take preventive action against vessels in the high seas that presented ―imminent pollution 
danger to our coasts.‖ The second imposed civil liability upon the owners of vessels 
responsible for pollution damage to coastal areas, regardless of the location of the vessel. 
In addition, the U.S. adopted amendments to the 1954 Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution of the Sea by Oil. They dealt with the discharge of oil or oily substances on the 
high seas and established new rules prohibiting the discharge of oil within fifty miles of 
the U.S. coastline. In 1977, additional amendments aimed to reduce ―materially the 
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discharge of persistent oils‖ into the sea, thereby providing more protection for beaches 
and coastal areas and the wildlife and marine resources there.19 
  In London in November 1972 an international convention addressed the need to 
regulate the dumping of wastes into the world‘s oceans. Some 80 governments attended 
the conference. The convention embodied the concepts of the international 
environmental movement and its views regarding protection of the ―marine environment 
and the living organisms which it supports‖ that are of ―vital importance to humanity.‖ 
The participants recognized that dumping of oil by ships at sea was a hazard to the 
marine environment and was included in the convention. It stated that the signatories 
pledged themselves to protect the marine environment against pollution caused by 
―hydrocarbons, including oil, and their wastes.‖ This included crude oil, fuel oil, heavy 
diesel oil, and any mixtures containing these, taken on board vessels for the purpose of 
dumping. The convention also covered radioactive pollutants from all sources, including 
vessels at sea.20   
 Another area of focus for the environmental movement was the drive to develop 
alternatives to oil. Coal continued to be an important energy source, and the government 
involved itself in trying to develop better ways to mine and process coal so that it would 
be more environmentally acceptable, including coal liquefication and gasification. 
Liquefication involved a process for conversion of coal to synthetic crude, and 
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gasification involved the conversion to methane-synthesis gas mixtures. The Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC) proposed that $25 million from the Department of Interior 
fund for energy research and development be set aside for specific projects that would be 
under its jurisdiction, including $4 million for synthetic fuels development, $2.15 
million for coal liquefication, and $1.85 million for gasification. A writer for Nucleonics 
Week in 1972 wrote that the ―men in AEC are in accord with basic White House 
thinking that the prime fuels for the U.S. future are uranium and coal‖ and that AEC was 
quietly lobbying for the project. 21   
 One problem with the development of cleaner coal was that the coal gasification 
program was under the management of the Department of the Interior. That department 
claimed that giving over the coal gasification to AEC would make that organization the 
policeman of the industry it was intended to regulate. AEC claimed that the Interior 
Department, as the keeper of the nation‘s lands, would represent a much more blatant 
conflict of interest.22 The end result of this organizational dispute, along with the lack of 
a cabinet-level department dealing specifically with energy questions, hindered the 
development of coal gasification.    
 Moreover, there were disputes between the AEC and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA). A dispute arose over the question of standards for permissible 
levels of radiation for nuclear installations; one agency set general and one set specific 
standards, raising the question why one agency should not have the responsibility of 
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setting both standards.23 The administration claimed that there was never any ambiguity. 
The EPA set standards for radiation in the general environment while the AEC set 
standards governing emissions in nuclear facilities. In spite of the administration‘s 
explanation, however, there was clearly confusion about the overlapping nature of the 
two agencies, so much so that the matter was sent to the White House for the president‘s 
decision. Ultimately, Congress passed legislation that abolished the Atomic Energy 
Commission and created an Energy Research and Development Administration and a 
separate Nuclear Energy Commission. The latter was concerned with the regulation of 
nuclear energy and acquired the function of establishing emission standards.24   
 Throughout the 1970s, officials in Washington focused their efforts on 
developing new sources of energy which were neither coal- nor petroleum-based. A 
number of alternatives were sought. The Nixon administration called for solar and 
geothermal power as well as expanding drilling in the United States, particularly on the 
Outer Continental Shelf. Even the recycling of municipal trash was considered as an 
alternative energy source, but the alternative that seemed to offer the most promise was 
nuclear power.25   
 Nuclear energy was touted as a clean and efficient source of power that would 
solve the energy problems of the industrialized world. Nuclear energy could solve the 
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problem of the ―nearly hysterical ravaging‖ of the land for energy production. As one 
expert claimed, once the ―automatic chill‖ that the word ―nuclear‖ provoked passed, the 
―objective fact‖ was that nuclear power was the ―cleanest, least destructive and safest 
way‖ to meet America‘s energy needs.26 Even before American officials began to press 
for the use of nuclear power for civilian use, other countries in the industrialized world 
had supported the idea. In Europe, government officials in both France and Germany 
were beginning to build nuclear plants during the early 1970s. One of the first countries 
to develop nuclear power for civilian use was Japan, the only country to have 
experienced the devastation of a nuclear bomb.  
 In spite of the apparent promise of nuclear power, many in the United States and 
around the world opposed its development because of environmental concerns. Disposal 
of atomic waste and potential accidents caused concern among opponents. The Sierra 
Club worried about the accumulated effects of radioactive emissions.27 The Price – 
Anderson Act, passed in 1957, was an early piece of legislation that addressed concerns 
about the industry. This act was designed to ensure that adequate funds would be 
available to satisfy claims for personal injury or property damage that resulted from a 
nuclear accident involving a commercial power plant. Then, in 1969 the Nixon 
administration passed the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), considered by 
some to be the ―most important single piece of modern environmental law now on the 
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statute book,‖ which required all nuclear power plants constructed have environmental 
impact statements.28 
At the state level, some officials lobbied their legislatures to prevent the 
construction of sites in their states. In 1972, Governor Robert Docking of Kansas opened 
the legislature asking for a ban on radioactive waste disposal in Kansas. Nixon 
administration officials claimed that pressing for the Lyons, Kansas site was a ―liability‖ 
because it guaranteed the Democrat Docking ―an issue on which to build his reelection 
campaign.‖ The administration believed that Docking‘s objections were only politically 
motivated and aimed at getting him reelected rather than real concerns about the safety 
of the citizens of his state, in spite of the fact that one of the Kansas sites chosen as a 
repository for nuclear waste, Lyons, was considered by the Kansas Geological Survey to 
be the ―poorest choice‖ of seven sites in Kansas.29 
 One concern for opponents of nuclear power was the water pollution. A case 
involving the state of Illinois demonstrated that NEPA could be and was skirted by the 
government in terms of environmental impact statements. The AEC wanted to go ahead 
with the construction of the Quad Cities nuclear plant on the boundary of Illinois and 
Iowa, in spite of the fact that the environmental impact statement had not been 
completed. The AEC claimed that the level of limited operation of the facility did not 
fall under the guidelines of the NEPA and so no environmental impact statement was 
required. The Attorney General of Illinois, together with the Illinois Chapter of the 
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United Auto Workers and the Isaak Walton League, challenged the limited operation 
procedure and sought and obtained an injunction against AEC‘s licensing of Quad Cities 
without completing the NEPA review. The AEC was aware that the plant had 
―significant thermal pollution problems‖ but hoped that the Court of Appeals would 
overturn the decision on procedural grounds; the plaintiffs failed to follow proper 
procedure in bringing the suit in the first place, and the courts should disregard the 
functional aspects of the case such as the pollution problems associated with building the 
plant.30  
 Another problem associated with nuclear power was the problem of the disposal 
of nuclear waste. A preliminary AEC report on the management of nuclear wastes 
compared the storage of fossil wastes with the storage of nuclear wastes and found that 
management problems and potential hazard to man and his environment for nuclear 
waste were vastly reduced because of the smaller quantity of nuclear waste. The report 
used as an example a 1000 megawatt electric power plant which could supply energy to 
a city of over half a million people. The conclusion of the report was that the 
―comparative problem is the handling of approximately 200,000 tons of relatively 
innocuous, but highly unsightly, ashes plus approximately 187,000 tons of air pollutants 
for fossil plants versus the permanent isolation from man‘s environment of less than two 
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tons of highly hazardous solid radioactive waste.‖31 What the report neglected to 
mention in its conclusion was that, should the radioactive waste somehow find its way 
into man‘s environment, it was, without question, lethal.  
 In 1972, the AEC conducted research to determine the best way to deal with 
radioactive waste. This program was aimed at ―isolation of the hazardous materials from 
man and his environment until the process of radioactive decay‖ rendered them 
―harmless.‖ A report recommended two ways, based on the current state of technological 
affairs. One was storage ―under careful conditions of surveillance and maintenance in 
man-made structures engineered to assure integrity of containment.‖ The other was 
geological structures such as salt mines which were ―compatible with the waste and 
which have sufficient integrity to prevent migration of the waste to man‘s 
environment.‖32   
 Concerns were raised in 1973 about the harmful effects of radioactive waste. The 
Shippingport nuclear power station in Pennsylvania was the first operating commercial 
scale nuclear power plant. It was built in 1957 and owned by the AEC and operated by 
Duquesne Power and Light. Citizens living in the area of the plant claimed that 
radioactive waste from the reactor was causing an increase in infant mortality and cancer 
rates. The governor of Pennsylvania appointed a fact-finding committee to investigate 
the allegations. The group held public hearings and urged that the AEC ―recognize its 
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public responsibilities in this matter‖ and send representatives to testify at the hearings. 
The EPA, at the request of the AEC, conducted an independent study of the situation 
while the AEC conducted its own. Both studies concluded that the data on radioactive 
releases used by the citizens making the charges was faulty. According to a Nixon 
administration official, the organization collecting the data admitted it was faulty. The 
AEC and EPA studies claimed that the statistical approach Dr. Sternglass, the doctor 
making the charges, used was also faulty. The charge was ―all wet.‖ The AEC decided 
not to appear because ―it was a ‗no-win‘ arena‖ for them. The commission felt the 
hearing procedures were stacked against them.33  
 Environmentalists also were concerned about the safety of nuclear reactors. In 
1972, Congressman Donald Fraser (D-Minn) sent a letter to the president asking him to 
give priority to the completion of an environmental impact statement on the Northern 
States Power Company plant in Monticello, Minnesota. The congressman was writing on 
behalf of his constituents and claimed that the ―questions of radioactive discharge and of 
plant safety are of grave concern to the State and people of Minnesota.‖34 According to 
an internal AEC memo, studies predicted ―monumental risks of damage to people in the 
environment from major nuclear power reactor accident.‖35   
 Many in the environmental movement feared nuclear accidents. Consumer 
advocate Ralph Nader was a vocal opponent, claiming that nuclear power plants posed 
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an ―enormous hazard to public safety and health.‖36 A film sponsored by Nader, the 
Center for Science in the Public Interest, Friends of the Earth, and the Sierra Club, 
claimed that the cooling system in a nuclear reactor could fail, safeguards could fail and 
the result could be a ‗melt-down‘ that would release radioactivity over a widespread 
area.‖37   
 Though the Nixon administration emphasized the need to develop alternative 
energy sources, the problems and obstacles associated with these sources proved 
insurmountable – the most viable option was oil. The fact that American oil companies 
were marginalized in the Middle East meant that domestic drilling became more 
important. This pitted the oil industry against environmental groups that tried to prevent 
drilling in areas they considered ecologically sensitive. 
 The showdown between environmentalists and the oil industry came in Alaska 
over the proposed Alaska pipeline. The pipeline was proposed in 1969 as a way to 
reduce dependence on imported oil. Gulf Oil originally expressed interest in searching 
for oil, but company officials believed that the amount of oil that might be available 
would not be worth the cost of exploratory drilling. ―It would cost $5 a barrel,‖ one 
senior executive flatly declared, ―and oil will never get to $5 a barrel in our lifetime.‖38   
 Eventually, a consortium of companies including multinationals such as Exxon 
and Mobil as well as smaller companies such as Atlantic Richfield and Amerada Hess, 
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banded together to form the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS). The group agreed to 
share the costs of exploration, drilling, and transport of oil from the North Slope in 
northern Alaska to Prudhoe Bay, where the oil would be loaded on tankers and 
transported to the West Coast of the United States. Completion was originally planned 
for 1972. The pipeline was to be 789 miles long and 48 inches in diameter. The initial 
flow was expected to be 600,000 barrels per day, increasing within months to more than 
one million barrels per day. Total capacity was estimated at two million barrels per day, 
offsetting pre-embargo U.S. oil consumption of about 17 million barrels per day. A 373-
mile highway from the Yukon River to Prudhoe Bay was to be built by the oil 
companies during construction of the pipeline, which would be turned over to the State 
when pipeline construction was completed.39   
  The project ran into snags and obstacles from the start. An official at Jersey 
Standard, the company that originally planned to build the pipeline in partnership with 
Atlantic Richfield, outlined the problems – the ―extreme cold, remoteness of the area, 
absence of transportation facilities, impassibility of the tundra during the summer thaw, 
and icing of the Arctic Sea most of the year.‖ In spite of that, they decided to go ahead, 
pointing out that it would take ―inventiveness, experimentation, and large expenditures‖ 
to accomplish the task. For example, Jersey Standard planned to outfit a tanker, the S.S. 
Manhattan with a reinforced hull, an icebreaker bow, and special equipment to test the 
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feasibility of transporting oil from Alaska through the Northwest Passage to East Coast 
markets.40    
 Technical issues also had to be resolved. The first issue dealt with the question of 
jurisdiction. Did the federal government have the authority to grant oil companies rights-
of-way across federal land to build the pipeline? The Wilderness Society, the Friends of 
the Earth, and the Environmental Defense Fund filed a lawsuit in 1970, charging that the 
plan for a 300-foot-wide right-of-way exceeded the 54-foot limit imposed by the Mineral 
Leasing Act. Additionally, the groups claimed that Interior Secretary Walter Hickel 
failed to comply with the National Environmental Protection Act, which required 
environmental impact statements as well as the development of alternatives.41 In 
February, 1973, the Secretary of the Interior called on the Justice Department to ask the 
Supreme Court to review the case and to decide on the merits both of the Mineral 
Leasing Act issue and whether the environmental impact statement complied with the 
provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act.42 The case went to the Circuit 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in 1973. The court ruled that the Secretary 
of the Interior lacked authority under the Mineral Leasing Act to grant rights-of-way 
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across federal lands in order to build an oil pipeline, so Congress eventually passed the 
Alaska Pipeline Bill, designed to provide the pipeline right-of-way authority.43 
 After the Senate and House both approved bills amended to give the government 
right-of-way, there were further delays. Before any permits could be issued, several 
agencies had to approve the project, including the Departments of Interior, 
Transportation, and Agriculture, the Corps of Engineers, the Coast Guard, the National 
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, and the Environmental Protection 
Agency. There also were outside forces that might prevent the completion of the project, 
such as Native Americans who felt they were not getting fair compensation for their 
land.  
The pipeline had diverse opponents and proponents. Those that supported the 
construction believed that America‘s national security interests would be served by 
reducing dependence on imported oil, and that the project would bring much-needed job 
opportunities to a state with a habitually high unemployment rate. Opponents looked at 
the environmental degradation that they believed would result and worked with 
environmental organizations to try to prevent the project. 
Some Americans opposed plans to ship the oil from the pipeline to Japan at a 
time when Americans in the East were suffering through harsh winters with insufficient 
supplies of heating oil. At a press conference in California in 1973, Secretary of the 
Interior Rogers Morton was asked whether all of the oil from the North Slope would be 
consumed domestically or imported to Japan. His response was there was ―no reason to 
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export any of it. Here we are, a country that is already importing some 20 percent to 22 
percent of our oil; by 1985 perhaps as much as 30 percent to 35 percent. There is no 
reason to export it to Japan.‖ The 
only reason you might trade some oil is that if Japan had some African  
oil that was closer to our Eastern Seaboard we might pick up some oil  
in trade for some oil there. But we have pretty tough stipulations on the  
kind of ships that can be loaded at Valdez and one of the stipulations is  
that they have to be tankers with double bottoms so the ballast do not  
contain oil, so when they are flushed, they are flushed through with water 
to avoid any discharge of oil into the sea. So they would be American  
tankers and it would be uneconomical for American tankers to go abroad.44 
Naturally, the environmental movement opposed the pipeline. To them, the 
trucks, tractors, and other equipment necessary to build the pipeline would tear the 
tundra, exposing the permafrost to damage and erosion. Hot oil moving through the 
pipes would melt the permafrost and create ―muddy bogs.‖ When the oil companies 
offered to lay down a layer of gravel, environmentalists complained that the gravel 
would have to be cut from hills or river beds and that salmon and other fish that lay their 
eggs in those river beds would be wiped out, destroying a major industry for the state.45   
The National Wildlife Federation, the Environmental Defense Fund, Friends of 
the Earth, and the Wilderness Society, filed a suit in federal court to halt construction of 
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the pipeline on the grounds that it would ―trigger irreversible degradation of the Alaskan 
environment.‖46 The groups also were concerned about the possibility of an earthquake. 
A 1964 quake in Valdez, where the pipeline would terminate, virtually wiped out the 
small fishing village. A similar event could cause the pipeline to break, flooding the 
landscape with a ―frozen black blob.‖ The damage to the landscape could last for 
years.47  
The administration believed that completion of the pipeline was essential for 
national security. Following the Tehran and Tripoli agreements in 1971 and the oil 
embargo in 1973, Washington officials understood that the relationship between the 
producers and consumers had changed. The producers had the power successfully to 
employ the oil weapon. Oil flowing from Alaska to the lower 48 would give Americans 
a reliable supply of petroleum that OPEC could not appropriate. In 1971, the 
Departments of State, Defense, and Interior conducted a study of the national security 
aspects of Alaskan oil. The group determined that the oil was essential in providing the 
potential to keep U.S. dependence on insecure foreign sources within ―reasonable 
bounds‖ and that ―early completion of the Alaskan pipeline must be considered an 
important national security objective.‖48 Nixon‘s address in November 1973, just a 
month after the Yom Kippur war and the oil embargo, underscored his administration‘s 
belief that America‘s national security was at stake if oil did not begin flowing through 
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the pipeline. The president warned that America‘s energy requirements had so outpaced 
its ability to supply them that it created a ―dangerous condition of reliance on foreign 
energy sources which could have a profound effect on this Nation‘s ability to play an 
independent role in the international arena.‖49 
 Alaska‘s governor, William Egan, and the Alaskan congressional delegation 
supported construction because it would provide 1600 jobs in a state with an annual 
unemployment rate of 9 percent – twice the national average.50 Unfortunately, the job 
opportunities did not go to unemployed Alaskans only, for people from the lower 48 
flocked to Alaska. So many made their way to the state that the commissioner of the 
Alaska Department of Labor felt compelled to send out a warning that the workforce in 
Alaska was sufficient to handle the job needs of TAPS. Further, he indicated that as of 
May 1, 1970, there were 6100 unemployed persons in Fairbanks, a city of 45,000. Court 
challenges to construction of the pipeline system also would increase unemployment in 
business centers like Anchorage.51 Small businesses in Fairbanks took out loans on 
speculation that once roads and pipelines were built by TAPS, revenue would flow into 
their town. While waiting for the two sides (environmentalists and oil companies) to 
settle their differences, however, the town was going broke. The vice president of the 
Alaska National Bank of Fairbanks estimated that businesses in the city borrowed $12 
million to $15 million in local capital in anticipation of the boom. Businessmen 
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―borrowed what they could and gambled it on an oil boom.‖ On June 12, the residents of 
Fairbanks found out the bad news. TAPS would not agree to construction of an access 
road because of delays in the Interior Department approval for construction of the 
pipeline. The anticipated boom was becoming a bust.52    
 The Nixon administration‘s support of the proposed pipeline was one indication 
that it intended to attack the energy crisis. Domestically, the president undertook efforts 
to make the United States energy independent. The White House also addressed the 
international dimensions of the crisis. The changing structure of the world oil economy 
was creating conflict between the multinational oil companies and the Arab producers. 
The predominance of the Seven Sisters in setting world prices had given way and the 
power to set prices now belonged to the producers. This conflict threatened to destabilize 
the Middle East. Another aspect of the tension in the Middle East involved America‘s 
cold war adversary, the Soviet Union. Kissinger was concerned that the Soviet Union 
would take advantage of the instability and gain the upper hand in the region. The stable 
world order which the administration believed was so necessary to the security of the oil 
supply to the industrialized nations in the West and Japan seemed very precarious 
following the shock of the oil embargo. 
In Washington, Henry Kissinger lectured his audience that difficulties around the 
world, unforeseen a generation ago, had arrived, and those problems required a 
rejuvenated and strengthened partnership between America and Western Europe. ―We 
are prepared,‖ he claimed ―to work cooperatively on new common problems we face.‖ 
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Energy was one of those concerns which Kissinger noted ―raises the challenging issues 
of assurance of supply, impact of oil revenues on international currency stability, the 
nature of common political and strategic interests, and long-range relations of oil-
consuming to oil-producing countries.‖53  
The United States was prepared to work with Western Europe and Japan to solve 
problems collectively. Kissinger claimed that working cooperatively was the only way to 
approach problems in a new era characterized not by postwar problems of reconstruction 
and rebuilding but by opportunities to solve problems before they became crises. 
―Perhaps the greatest danger lurking in the worldwide energy crisis,‖ he said, ―is the 
possible re-emergence of narrow nationalism inspired by the belief that there really is 
such a thing as self-sufficiency for individual nations.‖54 He specifically mentioned 
ensuring the supply of energy upon which the industrialized world relied. In this speech 
declaring that 1973 was the ―Year of Europe,‖ Kissinger pointed out that the United 
States had global responsibilities while Europeans sometimes addressed problems on a 
regional basis. Kissinger claimed that this tendency to work in their own self-interest 
rather that in the collective interest of the alliance was obstructionist and would no 
longer be effective in dealing with global problems.55  
 Europe‘s response was lukewarm. It seemed to some Europeans arrogant and 
condescending. ―Every year in Europe,‖ one British official remarked, ―is the Year of 
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Europe.‖ The French were also less than enthusiastic about Kissinger‘s proclamation. 
Paris viewed with suspicion any alliance ―which may appear like that between the wolf 
and the lamb because of the specific weight of the principal partner.‖56 Many European 
officials questioned the motives of the Nixon administration. Was the United States 
prepared to give up leadership within the alliance and work with the Europeans and the 
Japanese on an equal footing? Whatever the answer to that question, the events of that 
year underscored the need for greater cooperation among the allies. 
 The 1973 oil embargo made government officials in the consuming countries 
aware that, in order to deal effectively with OPEC, bilateral deals would have to be 
replaced by deals negotiated with the consumers as a bloc. NSC officials urged ―creation 
of a multilateral union of the major oil consumer nations to present the producer 
countries with a united front and coordinate policies to counter the OPEC cartel. To be 
successful, this would require a high degree of unity,‖ and Kissinger suggested that the 
consuming countries come together in Washington to discuss their mutual concerns.57 
The main effort to develop cohesive energy policies was the Washington, D.C. 
Energy Conference, convened in February 1974. This conference called together 
representatives from thirteen oil consuming countries as well as senior officials from the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the European 
Economic Community (EEC). One of the main reasons for a conference was the concern 
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among Nixon administration officials that nations would make bilateral deals with the 
producers. Both the Americans and the British were concerned about the long-term 
effects of short-term gains that would result from bilateral deals. Sir Alec Douglas-
Home, U.K. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, was in 
agreement with Kissinger on this issue. In a meeting, Douglas-Home remarked that he 
thought that bilateral deals were dangerous and Kissinger agreed, saying that bilateral 
deals made countries susceptible to political pressure. The U.S. secretary went on to note 
that if American officials got involved, as they would if there was unrestricted 
competition, they would bid up the price.58 Kissinger implied that the U.S. would pay 
whatever price was necessary for access to oil, but that would also make the U.S. more 
vulnerable to political pressure from both inside and outside Washington.  
 The ministers met in order to develop international policies to deal not just with 
the immediate crisis but with OPEC on a long-term basis, especially as the power of 
OPEC increased. They sought to ―establish new, mutually beneficial arrangements for 
international energy and related economic matters.‖ Kissinger wrote Nixon that the 
conference 
 takes place against a background of intense concern that the energy crisis  
could plunge the world into a period of economic, and potentially political, 
instability. A ―go-it-alone‖ response to those concerns by major consumers 
seeking bilateral arrangements with producers could snowball into a ruinous 
competition for oil among consumers which would create economic  
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tensions and severely strain alliance relationships.59 
 In addition to strengthening the cohesion of the alliance, the conference aimed to 
demonstrate to OPEC that the cartel would have to deal with the consumers as a bloc 
and would not be subject to the whims of the producers. Kissinger commented that, in 
order to avoid economic tensions and strains on the alliance, the consumers needed to 
demonstrate that the energy crisis was manageable through multilateral cooperation. He 
also believed that the conference would bind the participants in ―a continuing 
obligation‖ to cooperate in ―restraining demand and developing new energy sources.‖ 60   
 One of the issues under discussion at the conference was the approach that 
should be taken in dealing with the producers. Should the consumers come to some 
agreement among themselves and then approach the producers, or should the producers 
be brought into the discussion from the beginning? There was some concern among 
government officials in Western Europe and Japan; they did not want to appear 
confrontational because they were much more vulnerable to embargoes than the United 
States.  Representatives from outside the U.S. wanted to make their positions clear. 
British Prime Minister Heath echoed Kissinger‘s intentions about cooperation between 
OPEC and the industrialized world but added that he saw the conference as a way for 
consumers and producers to work together to achieve the cooperation that was essential 
to weathering the crisis. He declared that ―close and early association among consumers, 
producers and the developing countries‖ was an important aspect of any dialogue 
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between the two sides. Chancellor Willy Brandt of Germany also emphasized that the 
conference should be a ―first step towards a more comprehensive dialogue with the oil 
producing countries.‖61 These leaders were willing to participate in a discussion about 
the need for cooperation but were unwilling to be bound by any punitive measures that 
would come out of the conference.  
 Other participants were more direct in indicating to Kissinger their concerns 
about actions that would appear confrontational. Prime Minister Mariano Rumor of Italy 
stated that the conferees should avoid making the ―impressions that the conference itself 
might result in the building of a bloc of oil consumer countries determined to confront 
antagonistically the producer countries.‖ The Japanese Prime Minister, Kakuei Tanaka, 
emphasized his hope that the conference would be the ―first step towards establishing 
harmonious relations between oil producer and consumer countries.‖ Brent Scowcroft, a 
member of the NSC, understood that the prime minister‘s statement was a reflection of 
Japan‘s ―current sensitivity to its relations with the Arab states.‖62   
 Even the choice of conference chairman was discussed within the framework of 
avoiding confrontation with OPEC. Many in the group wanted to avoid the appearance 
of ―forming a rich man‘s club.‖ The representatives chose Foreign Minister Knut 
Frydenlund of Norway as conference chair. Since Norway was self-sufficient in North 
Sea oil, they hoped he would play the role of a somewhat disinterested third party who 
could take a position of neutrality in discussions about the proper way to approach the 
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oil producing states. They believed he would work to avoid the impression that the 
consumers were ―ganging up on the producers‖ and the positions he would take would 
allow Norway to play a ―bridgebuilding role between consumers and producers.63‖   
 Not all governments were supportive of the idea of an energy conference 
convened by and held in Washington. The French, in particular, were leery of American 
leadership. Kissinger and French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert had opposing 
viewpoints. Kissinger claimed that the fundamental choice was ―whether the nations of 
the world cooperate or consume ourselves in nationalistic rivalry over energy supplies 
that could duplicate the collapse of world order in the ‗30s.‖ Jobert‘s position was that 
the real danger lay in establishing or imposing a ―new world energy order.‖64 U.N. 
Secretary General Kurt Waldheim met with Kissinger and said that the French were 
calling for talks to be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. Waldheim 
was not interested in the French proposal, feeling that a U.N. energy conference would 
―produce chaos.‖65  
 Kissinger opened the conference stating that the energy situation posed economic 
and political challenges for all nations and the way forward must involve cooperation 
with the producing nations rather than conflict. The communiqué that was issued at the 
close of the conference stated that the countries would work together to promote 
conservation and demand restraint, research and development of alternative energy 
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sources, and an emergency allocation program. Kissinger believed that bringing the 
consumers together to create a cooperative framework was important because a policy of 
―jockeying for national advantage in the hope of riding out the immediate crisis was 
bound to fail – weakening confidence in democratic institutions, demoralizing 
governments, and eroding political ties on which Western security depended.‖66 The 
representatives recognized, however, that there was no international institution equipped 
to implement this program. As a result, the consuming nations formed the International 
Energy Agency (IEA). 
 The IEA was founded as an autonomous organization, linked to the OECD. 
Among the original members were the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Japan. France did not become a member until 1992. The objective of 
the IEA was to act as policy advisor on energy questions, to coordinate an organized 
international response to the embargo, and to address any other actions that would have 
adverse effects on the member countries and their use of oil. 
 One of the major problems with the creation of the IEA was that France 
remained outside the organization. The French justification for this was that they 
believed that the only solution to the energy crisis lay in a consumer-producer meeting. 
Developing bilateral contacts with the producers and working out agreements in trade 
and aid that were mutually beneficial for the consumers would avoid economic 
confrontation and coercion.67 The Nixon administration and other consumers maintained 
that the consumers needed to develop coherent policies and then approach the producers 
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with a comprehensive plan. This was a problem because while the French maintained 
support for the U.S. in their initiatives, it gave them some latitude in dealing bilaterally 
with the producers.  
 When the conference ended on February 13, there was some criticism in the U.S. 
about the outcome. Some dismissed it as a failure because there was little ―tangible 
progress.‖68 Most, however, claimed it a victory. American officials asserted that the 
meeting ―got off to a good start‖ in spite of complaints by the participants that there was 
inadequate time for preparation. The real victory for American officials, however, was 
the fact that U.S. strategy to convene and carry on the conference prevailed over French 
strategy to disband the conference and take up the matter in the OECD where Paris had 
veto power. Because Foreign Minister Jobert was unwilling to make any compromise, 
those countries that might have supported France were forced to choose between a 
―French lead and an American lead‖ with the U.S. willing to make some compromises.69 
 The Washington Energy Conference was one way for Kissinger to bring order 
from disorder. It was part of his ongoing strategy to reorient the relationships between 
the two superpowers and their proxies around the world. The cold war conflict between 
the U.S. and the Soviet Union, Kissinger believed, could easily escalate in regions where 
instability upset the political and economic order. In Vietnam, in Africa, and in the 
Middle East, instability could have disastrous consequences. Even if the possibility of 
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nuclear war had diminished by the 1970s, the actions of the Arab states in the Middle 
East following the outbreak of the Yom Kippur war demonstrated the adverse effects 
disorder could have on the United States.  
The effort to bring stability to an unstable world had begun in the 1960s and was 
an outgrowth of the conflicts between East and West in the immediate postwar decades. 
Crises in Berlin and Cuba brought Americans to the brink of nuclear war with the Soviet 
Union, American involvement in Vietnam deepened, and the civil rights era gave birth to 
a protest movement that found expression on college campuses across the country. When 
Richard Nixon became president in 1969, he claimed he was the spokesman of the great 
―silent majority‖ whose voice was drowned out by protesters and on both the left and the 
right. He would bring peace and order to the world.  
 By the late 1960s, Kissinger felt that superpower conflict had to be replaced, and 
in his inaugural address in 1969, the incoming president announced a new direction in 
U.S. foreign policy. ―Let us take as our goal: Where peace is unknown, make it 
welcome; where peace is fragile, make it strong; where peace is temporary, make it 
permanent. After a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiation.‖ He 
continued, ―Those who would be our adversaries, we invite to peaceful competition – 
not in conquering territory or extending dominion, but in enriching the life of man.‖70 
Nixon declared détente an attempt to find stability in a world divided by conflict and 
confrontation. Kissinger gave shape to the ideas Nixon expressed and underscored the 
idea that détente did not mean that the United States would allow adversaries to 
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undertake unchecked expansionism. He indicated that the Nixon administration was 
prepared to make three types of agreements with the Soviet Union: those that eased 
tensions in danger spots like Berlin, where the Nixon and Kissinger felt that the overall 
benefit was on the U.S. side; those that were in the mutual general interest, such as arms 
limitations; and those that were technically useful but had no political implications, such 
as technological and scientific exchanges. Kissinger believed that through this policy 
―we are gaining the freedom of maneuver we need to resist in those places which are 
most likely points of attack or pressure.‖71  
 A Policy Review Group prepared a report promoting a limited adversary 
relationship. This approach was based on the belief that there would continue to be 
underlying hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union, but there would 
also be areas of mutual concern which would make possible ―certain kinds of 
accommodation,‖ although the report did not mention specifics. This option favored a 
strong U.S. nuclear deterrent and a continuing strong NATO. Kissinger combined 
several of these elements to develop a policy in which agreements reached about one 
area of the world allowed the Nixon administration to press the Soviets to American 
advantage in trouble spots around the world.72  
 Détente was intended to provide stability, and it had an impact on the 
relationship between the United States and its allies in Western Europe and Japan. 
―Western cohesion,‖ Nixon said in his annual report to Congress in 1972, ―must be the 
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bedrock of our pursuit of détente. We and our allies have a responsibility to consult 
together in sufficient depth to ensure that our efforts are complementary and that our 
priorities and broad purposes are essentially the same.‖73   
  The foundations of détente were laid in the decades after World War II as 
Europeans attempted to develop policies that would protect them from competition 
between the superpowers. After the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic weapon in 
1949, nuclear war became a real possibility. Repressions of rebellions in Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia, in the 1950s and 1960s respectively, indicated that the Soviet Union 
was unwilling to allow their satellites in Eastern Europe to assert their independence and 
would repress rebellion by military means if necessary. As justification for the invasion 
of Czechoslovakia in 1968 Brezhnev developed what become known as the Brezhnev 
Doctrine, which asserted the right of the Soviet Union to intervene in the affairs of other 
Communist countries. A National Security Council memorandum indicated that, as the 
1970s began and ―memories of Czechoslovakia recede, both halves of divided Europe 
increasingly are inclined to pursue a more active dialogue that could lead to reduce 
tensions.‖ There were few indications, however, that the Soviets would agree to 
proposals settling the central issues of European security. They ―still seek to consolidate 
and obtain recognition of their substantial political and security gains from World War 
II.‖74     
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In the early months of 1973, the Nixon administration was not as focused on 
détente as it was on bringing the remaining troops home from Vietnam and resolving the 
ongoing conflict in the Middle East. A National Security Council memorandum prepared 
for Kissinger prior to a trip to Europe in December identified one area in which the 
Europeans could help the United States – resisting Arab pressures on Israel. Nixon and 
Kissinger saw the Middle East as an area ripe for Soviet expansionism. As far as they 
were concerned, the ―emergence of a permanent Soviet presence in the Middle East 
would constitute a permanent crisis.‖75 The administration feared that if the United 
States and its allies did not support Israel, the Soviet-supported Arab countries in the 
region, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, would allow Soviet influence to expand. A second 
area in which the U.S. expected European help, although marked as ―much less 
pressing,‖ was the effort to lay the groundwork for future cooperation on energy 
questions.76   
 The 1973 Yom Kippur war and the ensuing embargo placed the alliance at the 
center of the conflict. In spite of Kissinger‘s protestations about solving problems 
collectively, however, the Nixon administration viewed the oil embargo within the larger 
framework of the cold war that was being played out in the Middle East. One strategy 
upon which the administration settled involved reliance on partners in the region, Iran 
and Saudi Arabia. As a result, the National Security Adviser failed to perceive the 
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impact of the socioeconomic changes taking place in Iran, one of America‘s staunchest 
allies in the area, and how those transformations shaped the debate over energy policy.  
In the immediate post-World War II era, Iran had become a strategically 
important ally for the United States and the other industrialized countries. The United 
States had supported the young shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, during the 1950s when 
he returned to the throne after the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh, Iran‘s anti-
Western prime minister. The shah‘s pro-Western position made him an important ally 
against Iranian concerns that were counter to U.S. interests in the region and against 
what the United States perceived to be the expansionist tendencies of the Soviet Union. 
The concern among officials in the Eisenhower administration was that the leftist and 
nationalist groups Mossadegh brought together could prove so powerful that Iran could 
be lost to Moscow.77    
The Kennedy administration saw reform and modernization as the best defense 
against revolutionary nationalism. Soviet radio had begun attacks on the shah in 1959 
and initiated appeals to the Iranian people to rebel and oust the shah on the grounds that 
he was a ―tool of Western imperialism.‖ Economic and military aid began to flow into 
Iran from the United States in order to quell unrest. On a visit to the United States in 
1961, the shah met with the president of the World Bank to discuss the possibility of 
forming a consortium of the Bank, the United States, France, West Germany, Great 
Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Japan to supply assistance. The shah 
considered himself a key ally of the United States and was reportedly irritated that his 
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regime was under ―strong and constant pressure‖ from the Soviet Union, and the U.S. 
had been unwilling to provide the economic and military assistance the shah claimed he 
required.78     
In the 1970s, with the further development of the Iranian oil industry, the United 
States continued to support the shah in his efforts to modernize his country with the oil 
wealth he had accrued. In 1969, the Iranian Ambassador Hushang Ansary said that he 
believed that the U.S. and Iran should build on good relations between them in ―joint 
ventures, economic development and trade.‖ Ansary believed that U.S. investment in 
Iran had been ―rather negligible‖ but he was working on ways to stimulate investment 
because this was a field with which the Shah was ―deeply concerned.‖ Ansary suggested 
that U.S. businesses should invest in Iran as a ―special pilot project so that when 
conditions improve in neighboring states, ventures in Iran could serve as models.‖79 In 
January 1974, the shah doubled the amount planned for economic development, from 
$35 billion to $70 billion. The money went into the building of port facilities, refineries, 
and petrochemical plants.80 
As with previous administrations, Nixon and Kissinger understood the 
importance of the U.S. relationship with Iran and other friendly countries in a region 
where America did not necessarily have many friends. The importance of the 
relationship was evident in the application of the Nixon Doctrine to Iran. The doctrine 
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was originally intended to address American involvement in Vietnam. When Nixon 
campaigned for president he did so on the promise that he would reduce American 
involvement in Southeast Asia. It was promoted by the administration as a redefinition 
of America‘s role in the world ―in the light of new realities around the globe and new 
attitudes at home.‖ The main idea behind the doctrine was that the United States would 
remain committed to its partners around the world but would do so in a way that would 
encourage the involvement of other nations with American support.81   
Application of the Nixon Doctrine in the Middle East meant that the ―twin 
pillars‖ of Iran and Saudi Arabia would serve as America‘s surrogates in the region. 
Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson wrote that of all of America‘s geographic 
regions, the Middle East was ―probably the most diverse and problem-ridden.‖82 Giving 
Iran and Saudi Arabia more of the responsibility for the security of the region, the 
United States could focus on other areas, including a resolution to the war in Vietnam as 
well as a settlement between the Israelis and the Arabs. ―The US is an old friend of the 
Saudis,‖ wrote Kissinger. ―Even if oil supplies were not at issue, the stabilizing 
influence of the Saudis in the Middle East is valuable.‖83 There was a general consensus 
among American officials that ―Iran represents the main pillar of strength‖ in the region. 
This was especially true when the British, the major power in the region until their 
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defeat in the crisis over Nasser‘s nationalization of the Suez canal in 1956, lost their 
political influence and began pulling troops out of the Middle East. This left a power 
vacuum that many in Washington were concerned the Soviets would fill. Kissinger 
wrote that he had always believed that it was essential to reduce Soviet expansionist 
tendencies in the Middle East. He viewed the U.S. performance after the Suez crisis as 
―deplorable‖ and ―shortsighted.‖ Manhandling France and Great Britain would not earn 
Nasser‘s gratitude; on the contrary, he would be ―confirmed in a course inimical to 
Western interests‖ and the ―realities of power would then impel us to fill the resulting 
vacuum‖ and take on the ―moral onus of difficult geopolitical decisions.‖84  
The Nixon Doctrine had a dual purpose with respect to Iran. It bound the Shah 
closer to the U.S. while at the same time allowing the U.S. to redirect its security forces 
to other troubled regions around the world. In return the shah‘s willingness to assume the 
role of policeman of the region, and a generous policy of weapons sales to his country, 
the shah served as the industrialized West‘s ally with OPEC. In 1970, the U.S. 
Ambassador in Tehran indicated that the President and Secretary of State should know 
that, while he did not wish to sound alarmist, he believed that ―we are headed for some 
kind of crisis‖ because of the shah‘s ―absolute conviction – or obsession – that unless he 
substantially strengthens his military posture, the Arab side of the Gulf will, after British 
withdrawal, fall before a massive radical Arab campaign of subversion encouraged by 
Soviets with Iran left standing alone.‖ The crisis also could result from the U.S. inability 
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to make special arrangements with Iran for oil, or to extend more than $100 million of 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit per year to the shah, when Iran‘s financial resources 
would be stretched to the limit as a result of modernization projects.85 During the 1973 
oil embargo, Iran chose to side with the United States against OPEC and that commodity 
continued to flow from Iran.  
 While the United States was courting the shah, unrest was growing in Iran. A 
rising gross domestic product seemed to be an indicator of a growing economy, but with 
a population of 30 million people extravagant parties such as the one put on by the shah 
to celebrate the 2500th anniversary of the founding of the Persian empire highlighted the 
social disparities in the country.86 In the early years of his rule, the shah centralized 
power by eliminating all existing political parties and created one party, the National 
Resurrection party. He called on ―all Iranians who believe in the royal regime, the 
Iranian constitution, and the Iranian revolution‖ to join the new organization. The shah 
dominated this organization through control of the prime ministership and the Majlis, the 
Iranian parliament. In his decree, the shah announced that 99 percent of all government 
owned factories were to be sold to their workers and to the public. The shah‘s generosity 
was tempered, however, by the fact that key industries such as oil were to be 
exempted.87 Dissatisfaction was demonstrated in an attempted plot in 1973 to assassinate 
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or kidnap the shah and other members of his family. SAVAK, the shah‘s secret police, 
arrested twelve radicals in October, whom the government labeled Marxist Communists, 
members of the banned Tudeh Party.88   
 Dissatisfaction arose in part from the fact that the shah was not using oil revenue 
to improve the lives of ordinary Iranians. The new wealth in Iran was not being 
distributed evenly; the gap in living standards between the towns and the countryside 
was growing wider, and so was the gap inside the towns between those who had already 
―latched onto the new wealth and those who have poured in from the villages‖ in hopes 
of getting a share of that wealth. There were the makings of a ―genuine new political 
problem.‖ Unless the shah‘s government could put down deeper roots, this kind of 
dissatisfaction about social and economic dislocation could cause ―would-be 
revolutionaries‖ to gain oppositional footing.89      
 The shah‘s control was questioned. His success at centralizing power created 
opposition outside the halls of government in Tehran. These ―dormant appetites for 
power outside the court‖ existed in the armed forces, the police, business, and polit ics. 
The Economist called the Iranian economy ―volcanic‖ and claimed that ―residual power 
to create chaos exists‖ because ―it is hard to see how the Shah can loosen up except at 
enormous risk.‖90 A columnist for the New York Times noted that opposition to the shah 
existed during the early years of the second Nixon administration. The military buildup 
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in Iran was the result of threats arising from ―conflicting national interests and 
Communist subversion.‖ The Iranians saw the major threats coming from Iraq, but they 
were directed at Arabic minorities within Iran. Western intelligence analysts did not see 
any serious threats from the ―minority movements and isolated cases of internal guerrilla 
actions by opponents of the Shah‖ because SAVAK was ―ruthless in suppressing 
political subversion.‖91  
 Anti-shah movements were led by Iran‘s religious community. When the young 
shah succeeded his father during World War II, he perceived a threat from the mullahs, 
the religious leaders in Iran. In 1951, a group of religious fanatics, the Fadayam Islam 
(Crusaders of Islam), assassinated the American-supported premier of Iran, Ali Razmara, 
partly because he was unwilling to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Shortly 
thereafter, Iranian officials uncovered a plot by the same group to assassinate the shah. 
Following the discovery of the plot, the leader of the sect claimed that there were those 
in Iran ―who must be pushed down the incline to hell‖ because they had sold Iran to the 
oil companies.92 In 1952, Ayatollah Kashani, a fanatical anti-Western mullah whom 
many considered to be the ―real behind-the-scenes strongman in Iran,‖ was elected as 
speaker of the Majlis. He boasted he could ―summon an army of a million martyrs for 
any cause.‖ Kashani had been exiled to Syria on charges that he had plotted the 
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assassination of the shah.93 Thus the Iranian leader conducted a war of persecution 
against the religious chiefs, which earned their enmity.  
 Another of the mullahs was the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The shah‘s 
government exiled him to Turkey in 1963 because of his ―instigations against the 
nation‘s interests, security, independence and territorial integrity.‖ His arrest precipitated 
three days of rioting.94 He continued to get his message back to Iran. He labeled the 
shah‘s rule a ―satanical regime‖ and claimed that the U.S. government was ―world-
devouring.‖95 After Khomeini‘s exile, most Westerners assumed the shah was in control 
of a stable country; however, indications of a rising sense of dissatisfaction continued 
from big landowners, populist nationalism, and the religious right. One magazine 
claimed Islamic fundamentalism was not an ―extinct volcano.‖96  
 The pro-Western shah and his American advisers working in Iran became the 
target of anti-western attacks. While the shah welcomed U.S. enterprise, some Iranians 
expressed their dissatisfaction with Western influence in their country.97 In 1970, 
radicals attempted to kidnap the American ambassador Douglas MacArthur II and his 
wife. Three years later, gunmen who were believed to be members of a radical leftist 
guerrilla group shot and killed a U.S. officer assigned as an adviser to the Iranian 
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military. The officer was the first American reported killed in a three year campaign of 
terror targeting the pro-American government of the shah.98   
 Kissinger claimed that the shah was one America‘s strongest allies in the region, 
and so the Secretary turned his attention to solving the Arab – Israeli conflict. He 
believed that a peace settlement between the two sides would bring lasting stability and 
marginalize an expansive Soviet Union.  
 America‘s position regarding a settlement forced U.S. allies in Western Europe 
and Japan to choose sides. The idea of interdependence and working with America‘s 
allies to solve global problems seemed to be less important to Kissinger than solving the 
Mideast crisis in a fashion that he believed would bring lasting results. The allies 
disagreed throughout Kissinger‘s tenure in Washington on how best to bring peace. 
France, especially, declined to take America‘s lead in the troubled region.  
The Nixon administration believed the oil embargo was a corollary to the cold 
war, so the oil crisis had a political component. In responding to the crisis, Kissinger 
claimed that the U.S. ―must persevere in the Arab – Israeli negotiations. To the extent 
that those negotiations are linked to oil they become insoluble. Even if producers see 
them as linked, we cannot proceed. We will continue to make efforts toward peace in the 
Middle East, and we welcome assistance from others.‖99 Kissinger saw the energy crisis 
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as an outgrowth of the instability between the Arabs and the Israelis. If that conflict 
could be solved, the energy crisis would solve itself.    
The United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain held talks to 
develop a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. U.N. Secretary General U Thant 
originally suggested that the four foreign ministers meet and discuss common problems 
such as a Middle East peace settlement. He felt that such a meeting would help to halt 
the growing feeling of insecurity in the world and ―provide some antidote to the feeling 
of pessimism about the future of international peace and security‖ that was so 
widespread. The Secretary General acknowledged, however, that there was a risk 
involved in such a meeting; his concern was that it might raise unrealistic 
expectations.100 As far as Kissinger was concerned, the talks were to ―hold the line in 
order to let the pressures of the situation build up on others, particularly the UAR and the 
Soviets, who realize that in the final analysis we are key to a settlement.101     
 In 1971, the United States put the brakes on the talks because they disagreed with 
the French approach; the French attempted to move Israel closer to the Arab position. 
French President Georges Pompidou took the position that Israel‘s intransigence was the 
major sticking point to peace in the Middle East and that the U.S. should do more to 
convince the Israelis to move closer to the Arab position. Pompidou also believed that 
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the only way to bridge the gap between the two sides was with intervention from the 
major powers and U.N. involvement.102   
 Kissinger called for a new Atlantic Declaration in May 1973. The secretary 
aimed at putting U.S – Western European relations on a new footing. Kissinger felt the 
declaration contained a statement of how Washington saw the evolution of European-
American relations. It reaffirmed a European identity and European autonomy. It 
emphasized issues such as Atlantic security, common interests in an orderly international 
economic system, and the common problems facing advanced countries, such as 
environment and energy. Kissinger hoped that a declaration based on commonalities 
would tie the allies to the U.S. position on the economic and political issues, such as the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and the oil crisis that was a corollary to it.103    
The Atlantic Declaration was a part of Kissinger‘s Year of Europe initiative. The 
Secretary claimed that unity among the United States and Western Europe was essential 
in an unstable world. The new realities facing the allies in the 1970s, the development of 
Japan as a major power, the emergence of national identities and national rivalries, and 
problems requiring cooperative action, such as ensuring the supply of energy for 
industrialized nations, ―produced a dramatic transformation of the psychological climate 
of the West – a change which is the most profound challenge to Western 
statesmanship.‖104 Kissinger believed that solving the conflict between the Arabs and the 
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Israelis, and getting America‘s allies to see that cooperative action on the energy crisis 
could not happen until that issue was solved, required that the allies talk with one voice. 
Speaking out against U.S. initiatives could only be detrimental to the peace process, 
which would ensure that the industrialized West remained vulnerable to the oil weapon.   
 The U.S. – French relationship had been trying since the end of World War II. 
The Suez crisis in 1956, the Vietnam War, and NATO were issues that divided the two 
nations. Relations between the two countries continued to deteriorate when Nixon 
became president in 1968. De Gaulle resigned on April 27, 1969 and was replaced by 
Georges Pompidou, who inherited the Gaullist view of U.S. – French relations and 
continued to resist attempts at unity between the allies. The State Department 
acknowledged France‘s independent vision. The French would be the most difficult to 
convince of the necessity of establishing a ―unifying framework for the conduct of 
relations among the allies.105  
 The French ambassador, Jacques Koscuisko – Morizet told Kissinger that the 
French never had any intention of being obstructionist when it came to the Arab – Israeli 
peace process. The U.S. was under the wrong impression. The French were not moving 
to counter American actions in the Middle East and the notion that French Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Michel Jobert was ―encouraging the Arabs to harden their position‖ was 
wrong. Koscuisko claimed that he did not know where this impression could have come 
from because Jobert had demonstrated that France supported Kissinger‘s efforts. The 
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minister had said nothing to undermine what the Nixon administration was trying to do 
in the Middle East. Kissinger countered by claiming that he and Nixon had never taken 
the position that they could not work with France. French actions among the Arab 
countries demonstrated to the pair that French officials wanted to conduct their policies 
in a way that ―indicates that they are aloof from or even unfriendly to what the US is 
trying to accomplish.‖ The U.S., according to the secretary, was willing to work with 
France, but French policies were ―symptomatic of a systematic of movement away from 
the US.‖ 106   
 America‘s allies feared that too close an identification with the U.S. position 
endangered their access to Persian Gulf oil. Up to the point that the Arabs initiated the 
embargo, the United States attempted to convince the Europeans and Japanese that 
consumer cooperation on developing effective policies was essential. The U.S. position 
with regard to cooperative energy policy covered three aspects of the problem. The first 
area involved demand restraints. Kissinger told a gathering of foreign ministers that it 
would be difficult to negotiate with the producers if consumption remained high and the 
―ability to demonstrate restraint will at the same time demonstrate solidarity.‖ The 
second area was financial solidarity. In order to maintain economic growth in the face of 
rising oil prices, it was necessary for the allies to arrange borrowing and lending among 
themselves so that the flow of petrodollars would be more flexible. This was necessary 
because petrodollar recycling from the producers to the consumers was uneven. At any 
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given time, petrodollars flowed to one country more than another based on the economic 
decisions made by the oil producers. The third area of cooperation involved deciding if 
economic policies in the allied countries worked to the benefit of the group when it came 
to a dialogue between OPEC and the allies. If OPEC did not want a dialogue with the 
consumers and they chose another embargo, allied economic policies must be in place to 
overcome the economic difficulties associated with an embargo.107   
The State Department indicated that there was some movement among the allies 
toward the U.S. position. The Europeans and Japanese expressed interest in cooperation 
but ―real problems and obstacles of interpretation and individual national interests and 
need exist.‖ The Japanese feared any action among the group that would antagonize the 
producing countries; the French would clearly have to be convinced of the need for 
cooperation because they had long felt ―unhappily dependent on the Anglo-Saxon 
combine.‖ 108 The French were concerned about taking a position that would endanger 
their access to oil from the Middle East. French foreign policy operated on the reality 
that Arab oil, particularly from the Middle East, kept French industry moving. This was 
evident in French attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli dispute and by continuing French 
efforts to gain a ―favored position in Iraq and other Arab producing countries capable of 
supplying a significant portion of future French petroleum requirements.‖109 
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 The French purpose in pursuing an independent oil policy was to prevent any 
action by the Arabs that would endanger their access to oil. Prior to the embargo in late 
1973, the Arabs wanted a gesture from the Europeans who had economic interests in the 
region to demonstrate that they were not neglecting the Arabs and to show that the 
Europeans would not take a position which would embarrass them.110 The French were 
willing to fulfill this desire. Between 1963 and 1973 Western Europe‘s dependence on 
Middle Eastern and North African oil had increased from 32 to 54 percent of its total 
energy consumption; in Japan, it increased from 44 to 65 percent.111  
With Arab countries supplying more and more of the oil that was in increasing 
demand, and with few short- or medium-term alternatives to petroleum as an energy 
source, America‘s allies could not afford to take steps that would antagonize the oil 
exporters and run the risk of having that supply cut off. At the time of the embargo, 
Western Europe as a whole was dependent on Arab sources of petroleum for over 70 
percent of its crude oil requirements. In France, the proportion was closer to 80 percent. 
Arab producers gave a ―vague promise‖ in October 1973 that ―friendly countries‖ would 
not be affected by the embargo.112 Early on the Arab countries did exempt France and 
Britain from their export restrictions. In January 1974, France signed a long-term supply 
protocol with Saudi Arabia for 800 million tons of oil over twenty years. Giscard 
d‘Estaing said that ―producing countries were interested in getting as much as possible 
for their industrialization and that this called for cooperation between the producing and 
                                               
110 Memorandum of Conversation; Roberto Gaja to Henry Kissinger; July 17, 1973; Kissinger Transcripts; 
Digital National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com. 
111 Steven A. Schneider, The Oil Price Revolution , 105. 
112 ―Europe‘s Imports Threatened,‖ Petroleum Press Service, Vol. 41, No. 11, November 1973, 411. 
 88 
consuming countries.‖113 This ran counter to Kissinger‘s desire that the consumers 
develop a plan to cooperate amongst themselves before agreeing to a producer-consumer 
dialogue.  
The energy crisis dominated the discussion at a conference of the European 
Community heads of state in Copenhagen in December 1973. This was partly because of 
the embargo, but partly the result of the fact that they were joined by four foreign 
ministers acting as emissaries of the Arab League. The ministers stressed their desire for 
closer Arab-European economic ties. Their real intent, however, was to press for 
European action against Israel. The Europeans rejected that notion but did affirm their 
―united stand‖ in favor of Israel‘s withdrawal from the territory they occupied in 1967 
and for a settlement of the Palestinian question.114   
 Since de Gaulle‘s presidency, the French had been developing policies 
independent of the United States. Pompidou was a Gaullist and his constituency in 
France supported his position. This coincided with the increasing power of the European 
Community in European politics. The EC had a nascent political framework in which 
each country had voting rights; the leadership of the group revolved on a yearly basis. 
The French, while understanding the necessity of the U.S. nuclear umbrella for Europe‘s 
safety, believed that too close an identification with the superpower ―weakened the drive 
for European integration and Europe‘s independence as a major world power.‖115 France 
attempted to play a major role in coordinating policy; they urged European countries to 
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move towards ―greater independence from American oil companies and US Mideastern 
policies considered inimical to French and European interests.‖116 The Nixon 
administration should strive to convince the French that, however difficult the Israelis 
might be, the French pursuit of their ―one-sided pro-Arab policy only makes the 
achievement of a settlement more remote.‖117 In America‘s view, an Arab – Israeli peace 
agreement was more important for the collective security of the alliance than individual 
policies that promoted national interests.   
 The U.S. implication was that France‘s pro-Arab policy promoted instability in 
the region, which threatened American and allied interests, and tilted the scales of power 
in favor of the Arabs. Kissinger claimed that bilateral negotiations to deal with the 
economic dimensions could only be accomplished by the United States. His larger 
concern, however, was for the political implications associated with proceeding 
bilaterally, writing ―political weakness among us that would result would destroy the 
cohesion of the Western world.‖118   
 Kissinger believed that the stakes involved were even higher than the impact of 
oil prices on allied economies. Political weakness ―involved the whole framework of 
future political relations.‖ If consumers could not develop effective responses, the 
revenues gained by the producers would be converted into command over resources, 
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which in turn would be translated into political power. This would have key political 
ramifications, the most worrisome of which was the effect on the unity and strength of 
the allies. This unity had served as the basis for their ability to resist threats from Soviet 
power throughout the years. Kissinger speculated that vulnerable European countries 
such as Italy could ―become a supplicant to the Middle East, and be subject to influence 
from radical left and right wing political forces.‖119 The embargo in 1973, though not 
directed specifically at the Europeans or the Japanese, demonstrated their vulnerability 
to supply interruptions and clearly illustrated that taking a position that was too close to 
that of the U.S. would put them in serious jeopardy. 
Any international effort on the part of Washington was clearly part of a broader 
strategy. The objective for Kissinger and Nixon was to ensure European cooperation in 
U.S. efforts to reduce Arab-Israeli tensions and end the embargo. The two saw the oil 
embargo as leverage to use to assure European cooperation. A National Security Council 
memorandum claimed that the oil crisis and the longer-term oil situation gave the U.S. 
some leverage over the Europeans. The Nixon administration had ―the power to make 
their oil situation better or worse.‖ The leverage derived from a number of political, 
economic, and technical factors, including pressuring the Israelis to accept a satisfactory 
peace settlement and the fact that Europeans would need U.S. help if the situation 
worsened.120   
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The fear among European governments was that U.S. support of Israel would 
cause the Arab countries to impose increasingly harsh sanctions against the United 
States and any government that appeared to support U.S. policies in the Middle East. 
America‘s allies had to walk a fine line between the traditional Atlantic alliance and the 
ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict.     
In spite of various efforts on the part of the Nixon administration and the allies, 
the group was not able to come up with strategies to challenge OPEC. Two factors 
contributed to this failure. The first was opposition in the United States to efforts to 
make the country energy independent. The environmental movement ―hit the energy 
industries like a blitzkrieg‖ and succeeded in delaying the process of development, 
whether it was the pipeline or nuclear facilities.121 The environmental movement 
complicated efforts to complete the Alaskan oil pipeline and reduce America‘s 
independence on imported oil.  
Second was the Nixon administration‘s emphasis on an Arab-Israeli peace 
settlement. Because the Nixon administration saw the crisis within the framework of the 
conflict in the Middle East, and therefore an aspect of the Cold War, their attention was 
not focused on the issues peripheral to that conflict, such as the growing discontent in oil 
producing countries upon which the United States depended for maintaining security in 
the region. The administration ignored the shah‘s heavy-handed tactics in silencing 
opposition to his regime and the growing popularity of Islamic religious leaders.    
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Arab oil ministers agreed to end the embargo on March 18, 1974 after the Saudis 
opened the door for American and Syrian negotiations concerning disengagement on the 
Golan Heights. The dire consequences that Nixon and Kissinger predicted did not 
materialize. For most Americans, as well as their counterparts in Europe and Japan, the 
end of the embargo in the spring of 1974 meant that the energy crisis had passed, and 
their lives could return to normal. Oil consumption returned to near pre-crisis levels. In 
1973 oil consumption as a share of U.S. energy consumption stood at 47.2 percent. In 
1975, it was 43.9 percent, and in 1978, the figure had risen to 46.7 percent.122 In spite of 
this, however, fears about dependence on foreign sources of oil to grease the engines of 
industry lingered. How would the United States and its allies in Western Europe and 
Japan deal with a future embargo? How could it be avoided? The best way forward 
seemed to be to follow up on the efforts made at the Washington Energy Conference and 
Project Independence, developing effective international and domestic policies that 
could counter the bargaining power of OPEC. That, however, was easier said than done. 
The energy crisis seemed to fade into the past as the nation became fascinated 
with the unfolding events surrounding the break-in of the Watergate Hotel. The fact that 
Congress was scrutinizing Nixon‘s involvement meant that issues like the Middle East 
peace initiatives and the energy crisis that was such an important corollary to that 
situation remained peripheral to the Watergate investigation in the minds of most 
Americans.  
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In spite of Nixon‘s domestic difficulties, Kissinger continued to press for policies 
that would promote stability. His efforts, however, were in vain. Détente with the Soviet 
Union was not proving to be the solution to all of the crises around the world. The Soviet 
Union maintained strict control of its satellites in Eastern Europe, the situation in 
Vietnam was unresolved, and communist groups were making inroads in Latin America. 
America‘s allies were not buying the notion that the ―Year of Europe‖ meant anything of 
significance for the U.S. – allied relationship, and the Arab-Israeli conflict continued. 
Prior to 1973, Kissinger had little to do with policymaking for the Middle East. That 
responsibility had fallen primarily to the State Department. As the instability grew with 
the use of the oil weapon in 1973, and with Kissinger‘s ascendency in the policymaking 
establishment, the Secretary of State focused his attention on efforts to bring peace to the 
Middle East. With peace in the region, he believed, the energy crisis would be resolved.
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CHAPTER IV 
 
A FORD IN THE WHITE HOUSE: 
 
THE FORD ADMINISTRATION AND THE ENERGY CRISIS 
 
The dramatic developments unfolding in Washington eclipsed fears over the 
energy crisis. Americans turned their attention to the events surrounding the break-in of 
the Watergate Hotel. In April 1973, five men pleaded guilty to charges of theft and 
wiretapping. One of the men, James McCord, admitted that high-ranking officials in the 
White House were involved in planning the break-in. Initially, Nixon denied any 
involvement in the affair. Over the course of the summer of 1973 and into 1974, 
Congress conducted an investigation. White House tapes revealed that Nixon had been 
involved in covering up the matter. The Watergate affair brought an end to Nixon‘s 
presidency. When Nixon resigned in August of 1974 rather than face impeachment, the 
energy question became the responsibility of the man that inherited the presidency, 
Gerald Ford. 
Before becoming president, Ford had served in the U.S. Congress, representing 
his home state of Michigan. He was first elected to the House of Representatives in 1949 
and two years later became a member of the House Appropriations Committee. In 1965, 
the congressman became minority leader, a position he held for eight years. When Spiro 
Agnew resigned as Vice President late in 1973, after pleading no contest to a charge of 
bribery, President Nixon chose Ford to replace him. The minority leader was confirmed 
and sworn in on December 6, 1973. 
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 When Ford assumed the presidency he continued Nixon‘s policies both 
domestically and internationally, even retaining Kissinger as Secretary of State. This 
continuity meant that the focus of Ford‘s administration continued to be stopping Soviet 
expansion, pushing the creation of a framework for exerting counterforce against OPEC 
far down the agenda. The Ford administration‘s efforts to develop effective energy 
policies were frustrated by political and economic instability that resulted from the Arab 
oil embargo as well as by limitations on American power at home and abroad  
 Détente in Europe continued under the new president, a fact that was 
demonstrated with a meeting in Helsinki in 1975. The two sides moved closer together 
over some important issues that had previously hindered the development of strong 
economic ties. The Helsinki participants came up with groups of proposals that were put 
in three ―baskets.‖ Basket I laid out ten principles on interstate relations; Basket II dealt 
with cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and the 
environment; and Basket III addressed issues such as the free movement of people and 
ideas across borders. 
 The Final Act accepted de facto if not de jure recognition of the political status 
quo in Eastern Europe. The reunification that many Europeans sought and many 
Americans hoped for fell by the wayside for the act recognized the inviolability of 
frontiers and territorial integrity. The Eastern nations considered this the most important 
section of the Final Act.1 In a prescient speech before Congress in 1971, Nixon claimed 
that the Soviets too often interpreted détente to mean Western ratification of the status 
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quo. He voiced his administration‘s dissatisfaction with a ―differentiated détente, limited 
to the USSR and certain Western allies but not others.‖ He claimed that this kind of 
détente ―would be illusory‖ and ―would cause strains among allies. It would turn the 
desire for détente into an instrument of political warfare. Far from contributing to 
reconciliation in Europe, it would postpone it indefinitely.‖2  
As Europeans were moving closer, however, it appeared that the United States 
and the Soviet Union were moving farther apart, a development that completely 
undermined détente between Eastern and Western Europe. One purpose for détente was 
to allay the fears of Western Europeans that a superpower showdown would place 
Europeans directly in the middle of the conflict. Actions between the two superpowers in 
Angola and the Middle East, as will be explained, demonstrated that perhaps Europeans 
were not as safe as they hoped to be.  
The limits of détente were tested in Angola by the involvement of both the 
United States and the Soviet Union in what began as an internal conflict between a leftist 
group and two anti-communist groups. The conflict began in April 1974 when the 
remnants of Portugal‘s colonies in Africa and East Asia initiated a revolt against the 
ruling Portuguese. The rebellion was short and the citizens of Angola, along with Macao 
and East Timor in Asia, received their independence. In Angola, the real conflict began 
when several competing groups began vying for power in an effort to determine which 
group would rule the newly independent country. The three main groups contending for 
power were the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the Front for 
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the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA). Each group had supporters within Angola, but each 
group also received support from various groups at various times. Although official U.S. 
policy toward the conflict was one of noninvolvement, the FNLA initially received 
modest financial backing from the CIA, but it also received support from Zaire.3 
UNITA, which had broken off from FNLA, was the most anti-western of the factions. Its 
chief support came from the Bakongo tribe along the border between Angola and Zaire. 
The MPLA received support from Cuba.  
 In the initial stages of the conflict the Soviet Union, the United States, and China, 
remained on the periphery as interested observers. It was the Portuguese who initially 
worked toward a settlement between the three groups following the ending of all military 
actions against the opposition in May 1974. Following this, the government in Portugal 
began to work toward establishing a transitional government. The Portuguese were 
joined in their efforts by the Organization of African Unity. The members of the OAU 
convinced the three groups to meet in Alvor, Portugal in January 1975 where the three 
sides agreed to a tripartite collaboration with the Portuguese in a transitional 
government.   
 In the early months of 1975, the situation began to change with the increasing 
involvement of outside powers. In early January, the Ford administration authorized 
substantial CIA financial assistance to the FNLA. CIA director William Colby told 
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members of a secret Congressional hearing that increased financial support was 
necessary in order to ―match increased Soviet activity.‖4  
Because the Ford administration believed that the MPLA was only a minority 
group with support from less than 30% of the Angolan population, it was convinced that 
the MPLA would have to take control of the government by force of arms. That 
necessarily would mean that the group would require Soviet financial and military 
assistance. Washington officials also believed that the Soviet Union would support the 
MPLA in order to keep out the Chinese. One report indicated that the goal of the United 
States was to ensure the withdrawal of all foreign forces in order to allow Angolans to 
govern themselves. This could only happen, however, if a coalition government 
representing all three groups was stable enough to do without foreign military support. 
The administration believed, particularly in light of the recent situation in Vietnam, that 
it was essential to the credibility of American policies around the world not to permit the 
―power play by the Soviet Union to go totally unchallenged.‖ At the same time, the 
administration acknowledged the lessons learned from Vietnam and claimed that aid 
would not include sending American troops into Angola.5   
This perception that the Soviet Union was using the instability in Angola to gain 
a foothold in the region provided the justification for increased and overt U.S. support in 
the early months of 1975. The administration claimed that the purpose in providing 
financial and military support to the FNLA, a ―limited commitment,‖ had two objectives. 
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The first was to prevent the MPLA and its Soviet and Cuban supporters from achieving a 
military take-over of Angola, and the other was to achieve a balance among the 
competing groups in Angola in order to allow for a political solution.6   
 The increase in U.S. aid came in response to what the administration claimed was 
a buildup of Soviet arms prior to January 1975. The Soviets had been sending arms and 
financial support to the MPLA since its creation in 1956. Soviet interest in the region 
diminished somewhat over the 1960s, but by the time of decolonization, U.S. 
intelligence indicated that Soviet shipments of arms and money had resumed. Henry 
Kissinger claimed that the one hundred tons of arms that had been landed by Soviet 
planes in southern Angola was evidence that since late 1974 the Soviets had been 
increasing aid.7 
With the infusion of Soviet aid, the forces of the MPLA were beginning to push 
back the FNLA and UNITA forces and take control of the capital, Luanda. By the first 
week in October, U.S. intelligence reported the arrival of Cuban combat forces in 
Angola.8 These developments sparked the response by the American secret intelligence 
and covert operations committee, known as the 40 Committee, to increase American aid 
to the FNLA. Nathaniel Davis, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, voiced 
his concern. When the 40 Committee committed the U.S. to support the FNLA and 
UNITA, Davis resigned, arguing that more U.S. aid would be perceived by the Soviets 
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as escalation and would prompt a similar escalation by the Kremlin. When the new U.S. 
support allowed the FNLA and UNITA forces to begin to push back the MPLA forces, 
the Soviets began airlifting arms and Cuban soldiers in October 1975.  
 Soviet and American behavior in Angola had implications for efforts to bring 
stability to the Middle East. It gave ammunition to the anti-détente group in the U.S. 
Henry Jackson and Ronald Reagan, both campaigning for their party‘s nomination, used 
the issue of Angola as a weapon. Both were critical of détente, and they saw Russian 
activities in Angola as reflective of a failed policy. To them, détente was giving away 
power to the Soviets. The Russians were taking advantage of U.S. efforts at cooperation 
to enhance their own power in unstable areas around the world. Jackson claimed that 
U.S. national security was not at stake in Angola and he opposed American intervention. 
―The Soviet Union‘s efforts,‖ he said ―are obviously inconsistent with its stated policy of 
lessening tensions between the superpowers.‖9 Reagan also claimed that the Soviets 
were using détente to further their efforts at ―world conquest. . . . ―It‘s time for us to 
straighten up and eyeball them and say, ‗Hey fellas, let‘s get this back on the track where 
it‘s something for something, not all one way.‘ And that could begin with the situation in 
Angola right now.‖10    
Soviet behavior in Angola convinced some State Department officials that 
―under the umbrella of détente,‖ Russia could ―expand its zone of influence into the 
southern tier of African states. . . . If both sides do not practice mutual restraint, détente 
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can have no meaning.‖ If the U.S. conceded to the Soviets in Angola, they would see 
that as a sign that the U.S. was not prepared to resist Soviet moves in the future. They 
would ―continue to probe and to grab and we would ultimately have to resort to stronger 
action than our minor effort in Angola can forestall.‖11   
 The United States and the Soviet Union also continued to disagree over the 
course of a Middle East peace settlement. The Ford administration, like the Nixon 
administration before it, emphasized a step-by-step approach to the Arab – Israeli 
conflict. Ford told French Foreign Minister Jean Victor Sauvagnargues that he and 
Kissinger believed that ―only by moving a step at a time can the negotiating parties 
break the issues down to a scale that they can manage politically.‖ Ford pointed to the 
two agreements, Sinai I and II, that had been negotiated to that point to indicate that the 
administration‘s approach was working.12 The Sinai Accords consisted of two 
agreements between Egypt and Israel. signed in 1974 and 1975. As a result of these 
agreements, Israel and Egypt agreed to settle the disputes that existed between them by 
peaceful means. Israel also agreed to withdraw from the Mitla and Giddi passes and the 
oil fields at Abu Rudeis and Ras Suder, on the west coast of the Sinai peninsula. In 
return for these pledges, the United States agreed to provide Israel with roughly $2 
billion worth of defense equipment each year for the next ten years. Washington also 
agreed to compensate Israel for its increased oil costs that resulted from the return of the 
oil fields and to supply Israel with oil for five years. Additionally, the U.S. agreed to 
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refuse to negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) until it recognized 
Israel‘s right to exist and recognized U.N. Resolution 242, which called for an end to the 
state of belligerency between the two sides in exchange for the return of the territory 
Israel occupied in 1967. Finally, for the first time in twenty years, the United States 
agreed to sell arms to Egypt.13  
 While marginalizing the role of the Soviet Union in the peace process, Kissinger 
used the fear of Soviet expansionism in the Middle East to encourage America‘s partners 
in the region to act in ways which furthered U.S. interests. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia 
was concerned about the possibility of Soviet activity and subversion in his kingdom. He 
attributed any incident of a radical nature to Communist influence.  
 Faisal expressed his concern about Communist influence to Kissinger in a 1974 
meeting. Kissinger indicated that he wanted to lay out the strategy for U.S. – Saudi 
relations, ―where we stand and where we think we are going.‖ He addressed the 
Watergate situation and claimed that this was ―used by those who oppose the peace 
negotiations to organize a general attack on the authority and prestige of President Ford 
and myself.‖ Kissinger told the king that Saudi Arabia was America‘s ―oldest and 
closest friend in the Arab world. No matter what the magazines and newspapers may 
say, our relations are based only on friendship, not self-interest.‖14 Détente was not 
intended to disrupt that friendship; however, any agreement between the United States 
and the Soviet Union regarding the Middle East concerned the king because he was 
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―suspicious‖ of the U.S. – Soviet relationship.15 Kissinger played on Faisal‘s fears and 
made clear to the king that support of U.S. positions would provide protection from 
Soviet expansionism in the Middle East.        
The Ford administration continued to support America‘s Middle East surrogates, 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, as a way to maintain stability in the Middle East. Kissinger 
carried on the policies initiated under the Nixon Doctrine, believing that the anti-
communist position taken by the leaders of the two Middle Eastern countries made them 
valuable allies in a region that continued to be volatile. 
From Tehran in 1975, Ambassador Richard Helms reported to Kissinger on an 
audience with the shah. The shah was concerned about Soviet ambitions in South Asia 
and the Indian Ocean, and discussed the Indian threat to Pakistan, claiming that he saw a 
―Soviet hand‖ behind this threat, recalling Moscow‘s historical push toward the Indian 
Ocean and that Pakistan and Afghanistan provided the ―most vulnerable channel‖ for 
this thrust. Prophetically, he claimed that Afghanistan provided the most tempting target 
because Afghan communists were the only group which could take over when 
Mohammed Daoud, the Afghan leader, died or fell from power. The shah continued that 
détente had frozen Soviet expansionism in Europe and so the new target was the Middle 
East. He was certain that the Russians were behind subversive elements in Iran. ―Every 
time we scratch a dissident,‖ he claimed, ―we find evidence of Soviet influence.‖16 
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In order to help the shah build a stable country, the United States continued to 
supply the shah with weapons systems. It is important to note, however, that while Ford 
administration officials were willing to supply the shah, they had no reluctance in 
turning down requests that they felt jeopardized American interests. For example, the 
shah was interested in the co-production of defense systems, but the Ford administration 
was reluctant to allow that, in spite of the shah‘s assertions that Iran‘s participation 
amounted to not much more that ―putting a few screens in place.‖17  
In return for U.S. military support, the shah worked to prevent OPEC price 
increases. President Ford sent a telegram to the Iranian leader shortly after an OPEC 
meeting in Bali, applauding him for his efforts and expressing his ―deep concern, which 
I bring to your attention in the spirit of our close relationship,‖ that economic recovery in 
the importing countries would be reversed if there were new increases in the price of oil. 
Ford wrote that the shah‘s decision not to insist upon a price increase was an act of 
―statesmanship‖ that allowed the global economic recovery that was underway to 
continue. Ford also noted that this was at great sacrifice to the development of the shah‘s 
own economy but that increased economic activity in the importing countries could only 
be a positive development for financing Iran‘s economic development and defense 
plans.18 
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The administration also worked with Iranian officials to open communications 
between oil producers and consumers. French president Giscard d‘Estaing favored a 
consumer/producer dialogue, but Kissinger was unwilling to agree to this until the 
consumers agreed upon a unified policy. Administration officials in Iran consulted the 
shah‘s Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance, Hushang Ansary, on alternatives 
when negotiations among the consumers broke down at the preparatory conference held 
in Paris in 1975. Ambassador Helms and Minister Ansary reached preliminary 
agreement on a bilateral consideration of alternative approaches to include discussions of 
both energy and other commodity issues that would lead to the resumption of 
multilateral discussions.19     
 Saudi Arabia‘s importance as a bulwark against Communist aggression 
increasingly was coupled with its role as a moderate in OPEC. The kingdom‘s ability to 
raise and lower its production between three and twelve million barrels per day, wrote 
Brent Scowcroft, made it the ―virtual dictator of oil supply conditions and therefore the 
future of the cartel.‖20 With the U.S. and world economy reeling from the effects of 
recession, Ford indicated to the king the importance Washington placed on Saudi 
Arabia‘s moderating influence. Ford clearly believed that economic stability, aided by 
Saudi Arabia‘s willingness to hold the line on a price increase, would prevent the growth 
and influence of Communist parties in areas of the world where the ―political fabric and 
orientation‖ was already strained by economic difficulties. These effects could 
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―contribute to a process of political radicalization in crucial areas where stability is 
essential to the kind of world order I believe we both seek.‖ Ford told the king that his 
commitment to preventing an OPEC price increase would be of ―substantial benefit to 
global political stability as well as economic well-being.‖21    
 Ford‘s support for selling military equipment to Saudi Arabia was tied to 
economic concerns. Saudi Arabia provided the U.S. with 160,000,000 barrels of oil in 
1974, meaning that American dollars were being sent to that country. 22 Arms sales 
allowed a portion of those petrodollars to return to the United States at a time of high 
U.S. inflation. 
 In spite of Kissinger‘s efforts at détente and support of Middle East surrogates to 
maintain stability, economic disruptions associated with the oil embargo hindered 
development of an effective energy policy. During Ford‘s administration, he and 
Kissinger were forced to deal with the fallout over the energy crisis and the disruptions 
to détente. The new president wrote that he inherited the ―worst inflation in the country‘s 
peacetime history‖ and ―the highest interest rates in a century.‖ In addition, he faced a 
―stagnant economy, with large-scale unemployment in prospect and a worsening 
international trade and payments position.‖23 The economic difficulties arose, in part, 
from energy prices that had increased four-fold following the embargo in 1973, from $3 
to $12 per barrel. The administration acknowledged that monetary policy would have to 
change because an energy-shortage recession was different than an ordinary recession. 
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In an energy-shortage recession, the limitation on output came not from lack of demand 
but from an inability to produce. The function of monetary policy would be to prevent 
the recession from becoming more intense.24   
 In an economic meeting with Congressional leaders, Ford spelled out the 
elements of his economic policy. Inflation was the major problem and the weapons of 
his ―anti-inflationary arsenal‖ were aimed at solving troublesome sectors of the economy 
such as energy through increased productivity and efficiency, conservation, and 
international cooperation.25 The economic difficulties experienced by America‘s allies in 
Western Europe and Japan would certainly impact the U.S. economy. The Trilateral 
Task Force report indicated that the rise in the price of oil was more complex than the 
question of imports. The expansion of demand for imported oil could be dealt with by 
conservation, increased efficiency, increased domestic production, and import 
substitution. The rise in prices, on the other hand, ―upset the economic equilibrium of the 
consuming countries and foreordained a massive transfer of financial assets, and thus 
economic power,‖ from the oil consumers to the oil producers. The anticipated oil bill 
for 1974 would be about $40 to $50 billion for the industrialized world and $10 billion 
for the developing countries. The report suggested that the effects on the international 
monetary system, on currency values, rates of inflation, and on living standards were 
impossible to calculate but were ―bound to impose strains of an unprecedented 
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character.‖26 Ford developed policies to address both the domestic and international 
concerns of the economic crisis, trying to sell an energy program and relations with the 
Soviets to a Congress that was tiring of détente and desperate for a solution to the energy 
crisis and spiraling inflation.  
 Ford‘s domestic policies to deal with the energy crisis revolved around his 
strategy to Whip Inflation Now (WIN). This program was designed as an anti-inflation, 
energy conservation program. It called for Americans to reduce gasoline consumption by 
five percent originally; that amount increased to ten percent. Ford also committed federal 
workers to reduce their gasoline consumption when traveling in government vehicles. 
More specifically, he wanted imposition of higher taxes on both imported and domestic 
oil to encourage conservation, a one-year moratorium on federal spending (excluding 
defense and energy producing measures), a five percent limit on federal pay increases, 
and new incentives to spur production of domestic coal, oil and alternative energy 
sources such as nuclear and solar power.27    
 The WIN strategy ran into a number of roadblocks. One of the major problems 
was the fact that many saw the program as feeble, doing nothing to address the inflation 
and energy crisis that were plaguing the country. At a speech at the national convention 
of the Future Farmers of America, Ford declared that a ―great citizens mobilization‖ 
against inflation was underway. Critics, however, claimed that Ford‘s program was a 
―collection of cautious, uncontroversial admonitions‖ that included things like balancing 
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the family budget, turning down the thermostat, and trying not to get sick because illness 
strained family budgets and cut productivity. After seeing the text of the speech, national 
networks did not even want to cover the event; the White House had to make a formal 
request for coverage.28   
 America‘s allies in Western Europe were also suffering from the economic 
dislocation associated with the embargo. OPEC successfully increased their 
governments‘ price for exports of oil from approximately $2 per barrel in mid-1973 to 
$10 per barrel in 1975. OPEC nations reported a surplus profit of over $60 billion in 
1974. Oil price increases created serious problems for the world economy. Domestic 
economies were disrupted and inflation increased. Consuming nations were reluctant to 
borrow to finance their oil purchases because of balance of payments risks and the 
burdens of future interest costs and the repayment of massive debts. The Federal Reserve 
Chairman Arthur Burns declared that international economic relations were ―distorted by 
the large flows of capital and uncertainties about the future.‖29   
 The economic difficulties associated with the oil embargo were plaguing 
America‘s partners around the world, making it increasingly difficult for the world 
economy to rebound. In Japan, industrial production in June 1974 fell to one percent 
below the level of 1973. Employment was suffering as well. The ratio of job vacancies 
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to unemployed fell from 1.3 in May 1974 to 1.25 in June of that same year and from 1.9 
the same month of the previous year.30  
European governments also had to deal with economic concerns associated with 
the energy crisis. Great Britain had a severe balance-of-payments problem as a result of 
the higher oil prices. In March 1974, the deficit soared to a new record, increasing by 
£24 million to £371 million. The oil deficit deteriorated from a monthly average of £78 
million in the third quarter of 1973 prior to the OPEC price rises, to £236 million a 
month in the first quarter of the following year.31 Germany was in a somewhat better 
position because of its export potential and large monetary reserves, but there was some 
concern that Germany might experience economic difficulties if its trading partners 
established policies designed to protect their own industries. In spite of these balance-of-
payments difficulties, its long-term prospects were more favorable because of North Sea 
oil and gas.32 In France, Giscard‘s government was absorbed with an austerity program 
designed to curb an inflation rate of about sixteen percent per year and turn around a 
projected trade deficit of $6.5 billion, largely oil-induced.33 On September 4, 1975, the 
French president announced a $7.5 billion economic stimulus program to offset 
declining production and record unemployment.34 By 1977, the economic situation in 
France had worsened. The French government‘s program included emergency price 
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freezes and wage guidelines, substantial cuts in the growth of the money supply and a 
balanced budget for 1977, measures to stabilize the franc, and measures restricting 
energy imports to $11 billion for the year.35    
 The concept of interdependence that had shaped foreign policy during the Nixon 
administration continued to guide U.S. relations with its allies under Gerald Ford. The 
Ford administration believed in a multilateral approach to solving the economic crisis 
associated with the embargo. The allies attempted to work together to develop policies to 
both control the economic uncertainties and develop energy policies that would diminish 
the power of the producing countries in the Middle East. For example, the administration 
acknowledged that the fullest possible French cooperation was a ―key objective‖ in the 
effort to develop a coordinated, multilateral approach to the problems of inflation and 
―oil-induced balance of payments deficits.‖36 Ford told Italian President Giovanni Leone 
that economic problems in Europe affect the United States and economic problems in the 
United States affect Europe. He reminded Leone that Kissinger was continuing to work 
to get international cooperation on energy meetings through the International Energy 
Agency. He also reminded the Italian that consumer cooperation was essential to 
working out arrangements with producers.37    
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  The Ford administration proposed a number of initiatives designed to deal with 
the crisis, and one was the ―barrels-for-bushels‖ program, a plan to exchange Soviet oil 
for American wheat. Preliminary discussions between the two nations began in 
September 1975. The president aimed for an agreement lasting up to five years in which 
the Russians would commit themselves to certain minimum grain purchases on a regular 
basis. The purpose of the deal was to avoid the ups and downs in American grain prices 
associated with irregular purchases. When their own harvest was good, they did not need 
American grain, while they did in years of bad harvests. This caused large fluctuations in 
prices of grain in the American market and made it difficult on American farmers. In 
return for American grain, the administration planned to trade for Soviet oil. In addition 
to the economic benefits to American farmers, a successful deal would be a victory for 
Kissinger and American – Soviet détente, which according to one historian, was ―under 
mounting domestic criticism‖ and could ―use some victories.‖38 The Senate passed a 
resolution favoring a grain – oil deal in the Senate on October 2.      
 The grain deal ultimately fell through. Buying oil from the Soviet Union was 
controversial in the United States. This, coupled with the idea of the U.S. government 
going into the oil business, was opposed by conservatives. The Soviets were reluctant to 
break with OPEC and give the United States a more favorable deal than they would get 
from the oil cartel. Sources within the administration indicated that the Soviets were 
even offered ―various discount and kickback proposals‖ so they could undersell the other 
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exporters without the fact becoming known.39 Charles Robinson, the lead negotiator in 
Moscow, indicated that the Soviets were unwilling to make the deal because it would 
―signal to the world that they have succumbed to U.S. application of agro-power, which 
was a most difficult concession for them to make.‖40 Robinson was concerned that the 
recent negotiations with the Soviet Union had ―seriously weakened the fabric of détente. 
There is growing bitterness generated by our effort to ‗out OPEC OPEC‘. The Soviets 
see our pressures as an undisguised application of political power to achieve ends which 
are neither justified nor consistent with market economics – and which would humiliate 
them internally and with other countries.‖41   
 Many Americans were tiring of détente, in part because they believed that the 
Soviet Union was gaining at the expense of the United States. A Gallup poll in January 
1976 asked Americans if they thought American power would increase or decline. 
Nationwide, 42 percent felt it would increase compared to 44 percent who believed it 
would decline. Conversely, Americans were asked if Soviet power would increase or 
decline, and 63 percent felt it would increase and only 18 percent believed it would 
decline.42 If the power relationship between the Soviet Union and the U.S. was an 
indication of the efficacy of the policy of détente, the U.S. was not gaining. Détente was 
not a balanced policy, they believed, in which the compromises were equal. Americans 
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could look around the world and see that détente had not brought an end to the cold war. 
The arms race continued, the Soviet Union still controlled governments in Eastern 
Europe, there was Soviet adventurism in Africa and the Middle East, and Berlin was still 
a divided city. A French journalist declared that ―détente is the cold war pursued by 
other means – and sometimes by the same.43 If the cold war was a zero-sum game in 
which one side won at the expense of the other, détente was giving away American 
power and prestige and the United States was losing. The criticism of the ―barrel for 
bushels‖ program was the manifestation of that fear.  
 Given the precarious economic situation among the allies, there was fear about 
the impact of the oil situation on international monetary policy. The oil producing 
countries were amassing large amounts of petrodollars that would be returned to the 
international currency market. By 1976 Saudi Arabia had accumulated foreign exchange 
assets valued at over $31 billion, $7 billion of which were held in U.S. government 
instruments. Administration officials and members of Congress were concerned that 
these large assets could be used against America and its allies. Brent Scowcroft wrote 
that the Saudis were committed to improving the domestic infrastructure of the economy 
and to industrializing the country. For that purpose, the Saudi government allocated $90 
billion for social and economic development. Scowcroft believed that the Saudis would 
turn to the United States for help with that development. A positive relationship would 
be essential in assuring that those dollars would come back to the U.S.44  
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Members of Congress were not as certain about the large influx of petrodollars 
on the international economy. Congressman Henry B. Gonzalez, chairman of the 
Subcommittee on International Finance, voiced his fears, writing to the president that he 
was increasingly concerned about the lack of action by the White House and other 
consuming governments against the price increases imposed by OPEC. He continued 
that he was not certain how the international economy would hold up under the ―strains 
of the approaching petrodollar glut‖ and how it could accommodate the fact of the 
OPEC countries owning 70 percent of total world monetary reserves by 1980. He also 
indicated his doubts about the viability of the various petrodollar recycling schemes that 
were being discussed.45    
 With the growing economic difficulties in the industrialized world, the allies 
recognized the need to work together to overcome the propensity to make decisions in 
national self-interest. The energy crisis had the potential to set the allies against each 
other. It had already ―done more to disrupt the European Community than pull it 
together‖ and energy questions ―strained Europe‘s and Japan‘s relations with the United 
States.‖ Unless the three could establish some foundation for political cooperation as 
well as economic cooperation, they would never be able to deal effectively with the 
producing nations.46 
One political concern for the Ford administration, and their counterparts in 
Europe, was the growth of communist parties. The concern was that the success of 
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Communist parties in Southern Europe would make communist parties ―more palatable 
and attractive‖ to the citizens of Western Europe.47 President Leone of Italy asked Ford 
if the Soviet Union supported the rising popularity of the Italian Communist Party and 
what that meant for détente. Ford responded that détente would not solve all problems. 
Ideological aggression on the part of the Soviet Union had to be dealt with by ―forthright 
challenges by the peoples and by the governments of each country.‖ He also pointed out 
to the Italian president that the ―we can‘t tolerate Communist influence within NATO 
members,‖ for that would ―create a serious undermining of the Alliance.‖48 Kissinger 
expressed his concern that, should the Communist party take control in Italy, it would 
have ―major consequences in France and would isolate Germany.‖49   
 Ford and Kissinger were concerned about the loosening of ties between the 
United States and France and Germany. Détente between the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
made Europeans wonder whether troop reductions would follow in Europe and Japan. A 
Christian Democratic Union specialist on European security related a story from his 
childhood in Germany after World War II, stating that to the great relief of the people of 
his town, U.S. troops beat the Soviet forces into the town ―in the nick of time.‖ The 
townspeople were assured by the U.S. commanding officer that U.S. troops were there to 
stay. Two days later the town was turned over to the Soviet army and his town had been 
in East Germany ever since. He dismissed the unhappy experience as part of the fortunes 
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of war. ―Now, 30 years later,‖ he continued, ―I am convinced they would not go to war if 
the Soviets decided to straighten out what they would doubtless call a ‗cold war 
abnormality‘ and made an overnight grab for West Berlin.‖50 In a period of economic 
recession, asking the Europeans to commit more of their budgets to their own defense 
was seen by many in Europe as abandonment by the U.S. Détente was not a way to 
strengthen economic and political ties between East and West but a way for the United 
States, during difficult economic times, to disentangle itself from the burdens of 
providing for the security of its allies in Europe.   
 The Germans and the French also were concerned about the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Treaty (SALT) talks and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) 
talks with the Soviet Union. Kissinger indicated to French Foreign Minister 
Sauvagnargues, that he understood that the allies‘ fears. Kissinger claimed that the U.S. 
had kept the Allies ―generally informed‖ about the status of the SALT negotiations and 
―have sought to reassure them that we will not jeopardize their interests.‖ The French 
were interested in the inclusion of nuclear weapons in the negotiations, fearing the 
creation of a ―special zone of armaments limitations which would have repercussions for 
Allied defense options and provide a basis for Soviet intervention in Western security 
arrangements.‖51   
Europeans also had misgivings about the role of the United States in the Arab-
Israeli conflict. The fear among European governments was that U.S. support of Israel 
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would cause the Arab countries to impose increasingly harsh sanctions against the 
United States and any government that appeared to support U.S. policies in the Middle 
East. In an interview in Business Week in 1975, Kissinger seemed to confirm Europeans‘ 
fears. When the interviewer questioned the secretary about the charge in Europe that 
Kissinger had ―sold out Western civilization for 18 months of peace in the Middle East,‖ 
Kissinger did not answer the question directly but asked, instead, what Europeans would 
have had them do. He continued that the difficulty in the Middle East was caused by a 
lack of cooperation for any sort of action that would end the embargo. He pointed out 
that even when the U.S. went on military alert for just one day during the embargo, the 
administration was accused of having done it for political reasons, as a way to deflect 
attention from Nixon‘s troubles during the Watergate scandal. He concluded that the 
sense of impotence Europeans feel ―produces a certain peevishness which always stops 
just short of policy actions.‖52 America‘s allies had to walk a fine line between the 
traditional Atlantic alliance and the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict.  
  One important aspect of Ford‘s attempts to work with America‘s allies on the 
energy crisis and the worldwide economic recession was summits. Ford first met with 
his European counterparts at Rambouillet in France in 1975 and the next year the heads 
of state convened in Puerto Rico. Prior to the conference in France, Robert Hormats of 
the National Security Council staff acknowledged the problems facing the group, 
including Japanese Diet resistance to IEA programs, French resistance to the joining the 
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organization, and British and Canadian sensitivity about allowing allied access to their 
energy sources. He suggested that the president should appeal for ―greater solidarity of 
commitment‖ in solving the problem of the high cost of oil and OPEC manipulation of 
price and supply. 53 In a conversation with his counterparts, Ford did just that. He told 
the assembled group:  
This summit is designed to deal with economic questions but in a more 
fundamental sense it springs from the enormous interdependence of our  
societies and the common values which we share. It can enable us to  
consolidate our unity in an important moment in our history—to convey  
to our people that we are working together with goodwill and common  
purpose, and that our countries are politically committed to our mutual  
well-being.  
British Prime Minister Wilson responded that he was heartened by what Ford had said, 
but he questioned America‘s commitment to dealing with the energy crisis in a collective 
way. He told Ford that he was struck by the latest figures on automobile production in 
Detroit. ―All of us know,‖ he said, ―the impact of autos on the economies of 
industrialized nations."54 
Because the summit in France was the first of its kind not much was 
accomplished. Kissinger optimistically claimed that the conference ―provided a kind of 
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political directoire of the industrial democracies, and that was its greatest contribution.‖ 
In a speech a few days before the summit, Kissinger ―stressed that unity of the 
democracies (and not détente with the Soviet Union) was the centerpiece of Ford 
Administration foreign policy.‖ This was Kissinger‘s way of trying to deflect criticism in 
the United States from Nixon‘s foreign policy objectives, which had become rather 
unpopular in the U.S. following Nixon‘s resignation. According to Kissinger, 
Rambouillet ―launched a new era of institutionalized economic and political cooperation 
among the democracies.‖ 55 
The economic and political disorder associated with the oil embargo and ensuing 
energy crisis had its domestic counterpart. Instability at home revolved around the 
growing environmental movement and its efforts to halt construction of the Alaska 
pipeline. There were debates about where the pipeline should be laid, the impact the hot 
oil would have on the delicate Alaskan ecosystem, and how the oil should get to the 
people that were most in need of it. Other aspects of Ford‘s domestic program to deal 
with the energy crisis also came under attack. The people that supported the 
development of nuclear power as a clean and safe alternative to dependence on foreign 
oil were opposed by those that believed the nuclear power was too unstable and 
dangerous an energy source. Energy independence in the United States seemed to be a 
goal that American presidents could never quite achieve.   
 During Ford‘s presidency, one of the issues associated with the development of 
nuclear power for civilian purposes involved questions of national security. The 
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increased use of nuclear energy for domestic purposes around the world increased 
concerns about nuclear proliferation for military purposes. Government officials were 
concerned about the sale of breeder reactor technology to foreign countries, and a debate 
arose about the export of nuclear material to India. The Sierra Club, the Natural 
Resources Defense Council, and the Union of Concerned Scientists, all opposed this and 
in 1976 these groups served the Nuclear Regulatory Commission with petitions 
requesting that the agency intervene in the licensing process for the export of nuclear 
material to India. According to the FCC Commissioner, any agreement the U.S. had with 
India was ―nullified in 1974 when they used the other nuclear stuff we sent them for 
peaceful purposes and went ahead and built themselves a bomb.‖ The commissioner 
pointed out that this was no time for the Ford administration to be ―tagged with lax 
handling of fissionable materials‖ since it was an election year.56 
As was the case with Nixon‘s efforts to complete the Alaska pipeline, Ford ran 
into the roadblock of the environmental movement. Before oil began flowing from the 
North Slope, a disagreement arose between the state of California and Washington. The 
original plan was for the oil to be shipped to California and then delivered by pipeline to 
Texas and the Midwest. California officials opposed the plan. The issue concerned the 
amount of oil, the so-called West Coast surplus, that could not be used by California 
refineries. California officials claimed that shipping and unloading up to 1.6 million 
barrels of oil per day by 1980 could add hydrocarbons to southern California‘s already 
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dirty air. The possibility of another oil spill like the one that soiled the waters and 
beaches of Santa Barbara also was on their minds.  
California‘s opposition stunned Washington inasmuch as there was no hint of it 
in the long bitter debate that preceded Congressional approval of the pipeline. 
California‘s solution, to ship the surplus to Japan in return for Persian Gulf oil diverted 
from Japan, had the support of the Standard Oil Company of Ohio (Sohio), which had 
the largest single interest in Prudhoe Bay‘s proven reserves.57 This plan had been 
formulated for several years, even before the completion of the pipeline. In 1973, when 
the pipeline bill was under consideration, there was suspicion among some in Congress 
that the oil companies involved in the pipeline wanted to be able to export the oil to 
Japan; oil company officials denied this.58 Jack Robertson, Regional Administrator of 
the Federal Energy Office, claimed that ―a large portion of oil transported through the 
Trans-Alaska pipeline will be exported, probably to Japan, during the line‘s early years 
of operation,‖ adding that the West Coast markets that were originally earmarked to 
receive as many as two million barrels of the oil could not absorb that quantity until 
about 1985. Additionally, the logistics of transporting that amount of oil to the Midwest 
and the East Coast would make it too difficult since pipeline grids ran north and south 
rather than east and west. He concluded that because there would be ―an awful lot of 
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swapping‖ of oil between nations, most of the Alaskan oil traded away would probably 
wind up back in the domestic market.59    
When Americans discovered the plan to export oil, they complained. While there 
was an oil shortage, claimed one American, ―not one drop of oil from Alaska should be 
exported to Japan or any other foreign country.‖60 The debate among Americans was 
reflected in Congress. Senator Ted Stevenson, the Republican senator from Alaska, 
supported the idea of shipping the oil to Japan in return for Persian Gulf oil. The 
exchange, he claimed, would be advantageous because both countries would benefit 
from lower transportation costs. Senator Henry M. Jackson, (D-Wash), chairman of the 
Senate Interior Committee, said that the surplus meant that the United States ―faced the 
specter of possible exports to Japan while most of the nation remains dependent on 
expensive and uncertain oil imports.‖61 
 The pipeline was completed over ongoing concerns of the environmental 
movement. The federal government followed the letter of the NEPA by developing 
environmental impact statements. Washington officials were unwilling to go further in 
limiting the scope of the TAPS. For example, the conservation groups and their 
supporters in Congress wanted federal inspectors assigned to watch the construction. 
Washington officials were unwilling to do this, largely because Ford believed that 
government regulations hindered free enterprise. While he was willing to support 
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initiatives to promote energy independence, he was not willing to place regulations on 
industry in order to do it. He stated that the United States ―must achieve a balance 
between our efforts to preserve the environment and our need for energy.‖62 Government 
regulations and the red tape associated with it ―surrounded and almost smothered us; we 
as a nation were about to suffocate.‖63  
The oil companies had the resources to overcome efforts to delay construction. 
They had ―both financial and political muscle.‖ With a consortium as large as the TAPS 
consortium, they controlled huge financial assets. According to one oil company official, 
from the outset the oil companies‘ policy was to ―design the structure and provide an 
operational control system that will afford maximum protection of the environment.‖64 
This may have been the case, but one has to believe that concern for the environment 
was well and good, but if push came to shove profits would trump the environment.   
Ultimately, Ford‘s efforts at home and abroad to deal with economic recession 
and the energy crisis were unsuccessful. Much of his domestic program was shot down 
by Congress and his ―barrels for bushels‖ program with the Soviet Union fell through. 
The Ford administration did record a major achievement with legislation in 1975 that set 
fuel efficiency standards for the automobile industry, legislation that also established a 
strategic petroleum reserve. Ford‘s unsuccessful presidential campaign in 1976, of 
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course, put an end to his efforts to develop policies that would put the United States back 
on the right economic track.   
 The decline in the relationship between the United States, their allies in Western 
Europe and Japan, and the Soviet Union was an outcome of the economic and political 
instability brought about by the energy crises. Fear that the Soviets would take 
advantage of the instability drove the U.S. and the Soviet Union apart, but it also drove a 
wedge between the United States and its allies. This chasm prevented the group from 
developing energy policies that would have given the allies some leverage with OPEC. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
JIMMY CARTER INHERITS THE ENERGY CRISIS 
  
 On a cold January day in 1977, Jimmy Carter prepared to be sworn in as the 39th 
president of the United States. Following the inauguration, the new commander-in-chief 
walked down Pennsylvania Avenue, forgoing the traditional limousine ride in a display 
of the folksy charm that had gotten him elected. The former peanut farmer-turned 
governor had campaigned throughout 1976 as an outsider who was going to restore 
America‘s confidence after the devastating defeat in Vietnam and the demoralizing 
effects of the Watergate investigation. 
 One of the most pressing problems facing the new president was the ongoing 
energy crisis. Two presidents before him had tried without much success to develop 
international and domestic policies to deal with the crisis. Richard Nixon, president 
during the oil embargo of 1973, promoted policies that stressed conservation, but his 
shortened presidency prevented the full implementation of his policies. His successor, 
Gerald Ford, pushed Congress to pass legislation that would make the United States 
energy independent. Congress did pass two pieces of legislation that dealt with energy 
conservation, but the American people were skeptical about the role the government and 
the multinational oil companies played in the origins of the crisis. In addition to 
domestic policies, Ford‘s Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, worked with the 
international community to create the International Energy Agency and develop 
programs designed to resist the power OPEC exerted. By 1976, however, there was no 
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real agreement or cooperation on energy policies in the United States or among 
America‘s allies in Europe and Japan. 
 The Carter administration inherited the economic and political instability that had 
bedeviled the Nixon and Ford administrations in the aftermath of the October 1973 war 
and oil embargo. While less willing to pursue détente with the Soviet Union than his 
predecessors, Carter‘s foreign policy was based on the notion that with collective action, 
the industrialized nations could address the concerns of both the developed and the 
developing world. The energy crisis once again became tied to issues of stability and the 
Cold War. Instability in the developing world meant that these areas were ripe for Soviet 
expansionism. Carter‘s energy program reflected his belief that stability required solving 
the energy crisis at the national level while at the same time cooperating with America‘s 
allies to address the issue on a global level. 
 When Carter took office, his objective was to pass an energy policy within his 
first ninety days. In order to achieve his goals, Carter believed that it was necessary to 
bring all of the various agencies that dealt with energy policy under the umbrella of one 
coordinating department. The administration‘s efforts resulted in the creation of a 
Department of Energy. The first secretary of the new Department was Secretary of 
Defense for Nixon and Ford, James Schlesinger, a man for whom the president had a 
great deal of respect. Carter wrote that he already had working with him as a senior 
White House assistant the ―best-qualified man we could find to develop this new 
program and help me sell it to Congress.‖1     
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 The most immediate problem for the new president was a natural gas shortage. 
The winter of 1977 was particularly harsh in the northeastern part of the country, while 
the region experienced a shortage of natural gas. The United States produced a sufficient 
amount of natural gas, but the problem was that it could not get to the parts of the 
country that needed it the most, which was addressed by Carter‘s initial energy 
legislation. Congress passed an emergency natural gas bill less than two weeks after 
Inauguration Day.  
 The comprehensive energy bill that the administration drafted next faced 
opposition from its inception. James Schlesinger asked Carter to allow him more time to 
come up with an effective bill, but the president was adamant that the ninety-day 
timeframe would be met. As a result, the legislation Schlesinger created was rather 
confusing. Even Carter, upon reading the bill, wrote to the secretary, ―It is extremely 
complicated (I can‘t understand it). . . . A crucial element is simplicity. Even perfect 
equity can‘t be sold if Americans can‘t understand it. Their distrust is exacerbated by 
complexity.‖2 He sent Schlesinger back to the drawing board. The secretary finally came 
up with a bill that was acceptable to the president.  
 The fight in the House and Senate for passage was a bit of a surprise to Carter. 
He believed that the problem was so pervasive that an energy bill that relieved the crisis 
would quickly pass in Congress. But that was not the case. Entrenched interests from 
many states opposed the bill. Oil-producing states were in conflict with states that 
needed oil but did not have it. The energy industry lobbies were protective of their 
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clients‘ interests, and environmental lobbies and consumer groups worked to protect the 
interests of their constituents. Before the plan was even announced, the petroleum 
industry and its representatives in Congress were gearing up for a fight; they were not 
receptive of the proposal to remove the power to set goals and production rates on oil, 
gas, and coal leases from the Department of Interior. One industry insider claimed that 
there was little in the president‘s program to remind Americans that the ―self-inflicted 
wounds of overlapping governmental jurisdictions, excessive bureaucratic, regulatory 
delays and incessant litigation‖ would be subjected to ―vigorous reform.‖3 As soon as 
the president announced his plan, the special interests began to lobby their 
representatives in Washington. The auto industry decried the damage that would be done 
to their industry and the gas-guzzlers they were turning out. The oil industry called for 
higher prices and insisted that the world market price, presumably set by OPEC, should 
be paid by the American consumer.4     
The passage of the bill was easier in the House of Representatives, where Carter 
had the support of the very powerful Speaker of the House, Tip O‘Neill (D-Mass). The 
fight in the Senate was more contentious. The president had the support of Henry 
Jackson (D-Wash), chairman of the Energy and Natural Resources committee. Russell 
Long (D-La) chaired the Finance committee that would eventually decide the fate of the 
legislation and Long was from Louisiana, where oil interests dominated the economy. 
Carter‘s frustration with the opponents of the bill was evident in a mass letter he sent to 
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all 100 senators. He wrote that the natural gas conference report his administration sent 
out was of ―overriding national importance. . . . Senate opponents argue that producers 
are not given enough incentives, while others maintain that the legislation excessively 
benefits producers to the detriment of the consumers. However, opponents of the bill 
cannot agree on an alternative which would improve the existing system.‖ They were 
―united only in their opposition.‖5   
An important aspect of the administration‘s proposed energy policy was 
conservation. In a major address on energy just three months after taking office, Carter 
laid out the fundamental principles guiding his energy policy. The ―cornerstone of our 
policy is to reduce demand through conservation‖ continuing that conservation was the 
―quickest, cheapest, most practical source of energy.‖6 The President believed that the 
major obstacle to conservation was the belief among the American people that there was 
no energy crisis. New York Times columnist Tom Wicker agreed, writing that the energy 
crisis was not going to go away, was not the product of an ―oil company conspiracy,‖ 
and that the first and most basic step for President Carter was convincing the American 
people that ―there is an unavoidable energy crisis that is going to require change, 
sacrifice and hard choices from all of them.‖ A Gallup poll taken in 1976 supported the 
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idea that many Americans believed that the worst of the international energy crisis, 
sparked by the Arab boycott of 1973 – 74, had passed.7   
The administration also introduced legislation that would reduce dependence on 
foreign oil by encouraging domestic production. In order to do this it was necessary to 
raise the price of domestic petroleum because low oil prices discourage the search for 
new oil. Carter could not control the price OPEC was charging for a barrel of imported 
petroleum, but he did have some control over the price of a barrel of oil produced in the 
United States. The legislation was designed to eliminate price controls and entitlement 
programs. In 1971, with inflation running at almost five percent, Richard Nixon imposed 
price controls on the entire economy. Most of the controls were allowed to expire in 
1974, but those on oil continued. It would have been politically difficult for Nixon or 
any president after him to decontrol the price of oil. Entitlements and allocations for the 
oil industry and low prices for the consumer became sacred cows. Carter and 
Schlesinger were convinced that their number one priority had to be finding a way to let 
domestic oil prices rise to world market prices. It was a politically sensitive issue. ―Duty 
demanded that I act,‖ Carter said, ―but political expediency cried out against it.‖8   
 Carter was committed to preventing the oil companies from capturing windfall 
profits associated with elimination of price controls. He believed that the revenues 
producers collected should be returned to the American consumer, but he also 
understood that the oil companies would fight to retain a large portion of the profits. He 
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did not accept the argument of the oil and gas companies that they should be given 
incentives for wells drilled in 1971 or 1972 or earlier when oil prices were lower. The 
companies should not be able to capture windfall profits for efforts producers already 
made and for oil that was already discovered.9  
The president was surprised at the amount of opposition to his policies. He 
believed his program was a measured, thoughtful response to a crisis. The American 
people would rally around the president in his efforts to break the grip of OPEC, but 
people did not believe that there was a crisis. Many Americans believed that the price 
rises and shortages were attempts by big oil to get more money from them. They 
trumped up a crisis and the administration was in cahoots with them. When asked about 
how serious the energy situation in the U.S. was, 82 percent of Americans responded 
that it was fairly serious or very serious. Two reasons were given by respondents to 
explain the seriousness of the situation. The first was that Americans did not see any 
evidence of an energy shortage. The second reason was that it was a phony crisis, 
manufactured by the oil industry to raise prices and profits.10 If Carter could not 
convince the American people that there was an energy crisis, it would be more than his 
energy program that would suffer. Gerald Rafshoon, Assistant to the President for 
Communications, wrote that the administration ―must show the world that the United 
States can deal with a complex issue, debate it fully and agree on reasonable actions. We 
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must demonstrate to our allies that we have the strength of will as a nation to make hard 
decisions.‖11 
Carter‘s efforts to develop an effective energy policy met with opposition from 
almost every corner. Congressional opposition undermined the administration‘s 
advertising program to support conservation. Charles Duncan succeeded James 
Schlesinger, who resigned in July 1979. The new secretary wrote that there was strong 
feeling in Congress that the legislation to promote conservation was related to Carter‘s 
reelection campaign.12 Oil company interests, consumer advocates, environmentalists, 
along with many other groups, also opposed various aspects of Carter‘s energy program. 
In his diary he wrote that the ―influence of the special interest lobbies is almost 
unbelievable, particularly from the automobile and oil industries.‖13          
 Carter‘s position on nuclear power came into conflict with environmentalists. In 
1974, the Federal Energy Administration (FEA) counted 209 plants on the drawing 
boards. That figure had dropped to 170 in mid-1976 due to safety, environmental, and 
financial concerns. At that time, 58 nuclear power plants were in operation and FEA 
expected more cancellations of plans to construct nuclear plants.14 While Ford had 
promoted the development of nuclear power, and America‘s allies built nuclear power 
stations, candidate Jimmy Carter hesitated to promote those power plants.   
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 Carter‘s administration recognized the resistance to nuclear power. Opponents 
became known as NIMBYs, which stood for Not In My Backyard. In 1976, nearly 45 
percent of Americans said they would object to having a nuclear power plant built within 
five miles of their homes.15  In May 1977, over 2,000 people staged a sit-in on land 
owned by the New Hampshire Public Service Company, to protest the building of a 
nuclear plant in Seabrook, New Hampshire. The demonstration was organized by a 
group known as the Clamshell Alliance. They refused to leave when officials ordered 
them to do so, and about 1400 were arrested. The director of the Governor‘s 
Commission on Crime and Delinquency in Concord called the crowd ―a well-organized, 
tightly controlled, disciplined, trained group who were determined to impose mob 
control of a portion of the state.‖16   
 Journalists began to make comparisons between the anti-nuclear movement and 
the anti-war movement of Vietnam and in May 1978, a columnist for The Boston Globe 
claimed that nuclear power could be ―Carter‘s Vietnam.‖17 In July, protesters staged a 
rally for disarmament in New York. The rally was sponsored by Leaders of the 
Mobilization for Survival, an umbrella of local groups, and one of their stated goals was 
the banning of nuclear power plants. The organizers called the gathering ―the biggest 
peace demonstration since the Vietnam war.‖ David Dellinger, one of the Chicago Seven 
who was indicted for inciting violence in the streets of Chicago at the 1968 Democratic 
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National Convention, was part of the group, as was Pete Seeger, leading the crowd in the 
singing of anti-war songs like ―If I Had a Hammer‖ and ―We Shall Overcome.‖18    
 As a presidential candidate Carter had indicated his reservations about nuclear 
power, calling the energy source a ―last resort.‖19 Carter explained his energy position to 
the Edison Electric Institute, stating, ―U.S. dependence on nuclear power should be kept 
to the minimum necessary to meet our needs. We should apply strict safety standards as 
we regulate use, and we must be honest with our people about its problems and 
dangers.‖20 Following the election, the Council on Environmental Quality told the 
president that environmental leaders, the media, and representatives of the energy 
industry were becoming more vocal about the fact that they believed that administration 
policy on domestic nuclear power was moving in a direction ―substantially different‖ 
from that which Carter adopted during the campaign.21   
 While the environmental movement was urging Carter to slow development of 
nuclear power, several other groups urged developing that power. The National 
Academy of Sciences, the Joint Committee on Nuclear Energy, and the American 
Nuclear Energy Council, all argued that nuclear power was a safe and reliable source 
that would reduce American dependence on OPEC oil. A panel sponsored by the Ford 
Foundation and made up of scientists, economists, resource specialists, biologists, and 
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political scientists wrote a report, ―Nuclear Power – Issues and Choices.‖ The panel 
urged the president to speed development of nuclear power, and the AFL – CIO 
endorsed the development of nuclear energy; in 1977 the leadership passed a resolution 
endorsing the development and use of nuclear power. Their support was based on jobs, 
the ability of the U.S. to be competitive in world trade, and the continuing assurance of 
strong defense capabilities.22  
 State and local officials were often at odds with the federal government over 
issues involving nuclear facilities, especially the dumping of hazardous waste. In 
Arizona, the Department of Health Services, in an effort to have some control of waste 
dumps in that state, were anxious to establish a waste dump on a remote site in northern 
Yuma County. County officials sent a telegram to Washington in an effort to forestall 
the action. They were ―convinced the residue from their proposed site will, through both 
percolation and ground flow, find its way to the Colorado River thereby contaminating 
water used by thousands of Arizonans for drinking and farming.‖23  
 Many of those fears were realized in 1979 when the nuclear facility at Three 
Mile Island in Pennsylvania experienced a meltdown. At about 4 a.m. on March 28, a 
failure occurred in the secondary, non-nuclear section of the plant. The main feedwater 
pumps stopped working, caused either by an electrical or mechanical failure, which 
prevented the steam generators from removing heat. The reactor shut down, increasing 
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pressure in the nuclear portion of the plant. In order to prevent the pressure from 
becoming excessive, an operator opened a relief valve. The valve should have closed 
when the pressure decreased, but it did not. Signals failed to indicate that the valve was 
still open, and cooling water poured out of the stuck-open valve, causing the core of the 
reactor to overheat. Because adequate cooling was not available, the nuclear fuel 
overheated to the point where long metal tubes containing nuclear fuel pellets ruptured 
and the pellets began to melt. In spite of the severe core meltdown, the nuclear fuel did 
not breach the walls of the containment building, which would have released massive 
quantities of radiation into the environment. Carter rushed to the scene, and with the 
plant in the background, he assured the American people that there was no danger. 
Everyone knew, however, that the accident was the ―most serious in U.S. commercial 
nuclear power plant operating history,‖ even though it led to no deaths or injuries to 
plant workers or members of the surrounding community.24   
 The Three Mile Island accident proved for many that the development of more 
nuclear plants was not feasible and it heightened the public‘s concern. A Harris poll in 
1978 showed that Americans favored the development of nuclear power by a margin of 
2 to 1, but after the incident at Three Mile Island, opinion was about evenly divided. A 
majority believed that a similar accident was possible at another nuclear power plant, 
and about one-third feared that a ―Hiroshima-type explosion could result.‖25  
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 Meanwhile, as the Carter administration was working to reduce U.S. dependence 
on foreign oil, it also put pressure on countries in OPEC that it considered allies, which 
again meant Iran and Saudi Arabia. Beginning in 1977, the State Department and the 
National Security Council were urging these two allies to resist calls among other OPEC 
countries for price increases. The Saudis and the Iranians agreed to honor their 
commitment to at least a limited price freeze at an OPEC meeting in Caracas in 
December of 1977. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski warned the 
president, however, that the Saudis might be unwilling to use their production leverage if 
there was no consensus at Caracas. He also warned that both the Saudis and the Iranians 
were well aware of the American position and too much pressure could ―undercut the 
solid achievements‖ the U.S. had made thus far.26  
Carter also urged America‘s allies to find ways to conserve energy. The president 
felt that if the United States and its allies were ―susceptible to potential political 
blackmail from the oil-producing nations, our international policy might no longer be 
free from foreign forces. Some of the other consumer nations who had little or no energy 
of their own were especially vulnerable to this threat, and were inclined to modify their 
foreign policies accordingly.‖27 Anything less than collective action put the cohesion of 
the partnership at risk, and was not in America‘s national interests. The U.S. was the 
largest consumer of imported oil. Dependence on foreign sources had increased from 49 
percent before the Arab embargo to 60 percent in 1976. According to a White House 
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report, the world was ―watching to see if we can come to grips with our energy problem. 
. . . We cannot afford to fail.‖28 
A strong relationship between the Carter administration and allied leaders was 
essential to the success of his Carter‘s energy policy. At the outset of Carter‘s 
administration, the Japanese press indicated that they perceived ―U.S. willingness to 
engage in consultations with other nations on foreign policy and were generally 
favorable to the President‘s emphasis on moral principles in U.S. relations with other 
countries.‖ In his congratulatory message to the new American president, West German 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt ―stressed the great importance of strengthening the North 
Atlantic alliance‖ and continuing close consultations on matters important to all, but 
another commentator in Germany claimed that it was now up to Carter to demonstrate 
that his speeches about the alliance were not just campaign rhetoric.29   
The administration spoke of the necessity of working with U.S. allies in 
formulating energy policy. David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs, wrote that the OECD countries must work together ―more effectively to 
conserve energy, increase production, and intensify the search for alternative energy 
                                               
28 William D. Smith, ―OPEC Causing Rough Era of Adjustment,‖ New York Times, January 4, 1976, 
NES24, Proquest Historical Newspapers, http://proquest.umi.com. General Talking Points in Support of 
the Natural Gas Compromise; September 1, 1978; White House Central Files Subject File, Natural 
Resources, NR 6 8/1/78 – 9/15/78; Box NR – 10; JCPL. 
29 Special Memorandum; Foreign Media Reaction to Presidential Inauguration; January 25, 1977; Media 
Reaction to Carter Administration and Polls: 1/77 – 2/79, Foreign Broadcast Information Service; National 
Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 33, JCPL. 
 140 
sources,‖ adding that the ―Western Europeans and the Japanese must also make a major 
effort toward these ends if we are to reduce the West‘s dependence on OPEC oil.‖30 
Some in the Carter administration did not feel that America‘s allies were doing 
enough to pressure OPEC. Brzezinski wrote the president prior to the OPEC meeting in 
Caracas in 1977 that the administration‘s diplomatic moves in pressuring Iran and Saudi 
Arabia to agree to a price freeze and to honor that commitment in Caracas were 
generally received in the industrialized countries with total agreement; however, there 
was little evidence that any of those states were willing to jeopardize their relations with 
the oil producers by taking strong positions against OPEC. Instead, Brzezinski said, they 
seemed to be ―content to let the United States do the talking, while they applaud quietly 
from the sidelines.‖31   
 The IEA remained the primary agency charged with developing international 
energy policy. The allies believed that national energy policies would only be effective 
within the framework of a collective international policy designed to protect them in the 
event of further OPEC supply disruptions or price increases. Carter wrote to French 
president Giscard d‘Estaing that ―no one country – or even a group of countries such as 
those belonging to the European Community – can by itself bring about the major 
change in the world energy situation needed to safeguard our shared, long-term 
economic interests.‖ He continued that the United States would ―explore new 
cooperative measures with our friends abroad, to reinforce national energy efforts 
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through developing alternative fuel supplies and expanding cooperation on energy 
research.‖32 
 In spite of its goals, IEA policies during the Carter administration were 
ineffective in addressing supply disruptions. All of the member countries agreed on an 
oil sharing program by which each country would contribute to a fuel allocation system, 
and all would share in its use in case of an embargo. This program, however, would only 
go so far in alleviating the impact of an OPEC boycott. The agency members recognized 
this fact and adopted a separate objective of reducing the group‘s projected dependence 
on imported oil to no more than 26 million barrels a day by 1985. This compared to 
almost 29 million barrels per day in the first quarter of 1977 alone.33    
Carter believed that it was imperative that America‘s partners around the world 
continue to develop effective national policies that would bolster international efforts to 
solve the energy crisis, which had begun under Presidents Nixon and Ford. The 
Europeans and Japanese had to take steps to implement collective programs, but each 
country had different objectives and problems. In 1978 a U.S. government survey found 
that the overriding question facing European governments was unemployment, while 
inflation was the problem that most concerned the Japanese government. By comparison, 
the International Communication Agency Office of Research found that energy was 
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―very much a secondary concern in all four countries.‖34 As a result, Carter‘s efforts to 
encourage the development of national energy policies among the allies met with mixed 
results.  
 By 1977, Japan relied almost completely on oil imported from foreign sources. 
The Japanese had no domestic sources of energy. Oil from foreign sources accounted for 
73% and imported coal accounted for 13% of the nation‘s energy needs. Some estimates 
indicated that the Japanese would have to spend $340 billion by 1985 on developing 
alternative energy sources and effective conservation measures.35 Because of this, the 
Japanese were more sensitive to the fluctuations in oil prices than any other 
industrialized country. The drive, therefore, to develop strategies to deal with the energy 
crisis was strong.  
Japan was the third largest producer of nuclear power after the United States and 
Great Britain. According to a Japanese defense scholar, Japan‘s ―nuclear allergy‖ had 
largely disappeared by the 1970s, although polls consistently revealed that 70 – 75 
percent of Japanese harbored suspicions about the safety of Japan‘s nuclear program.36 
As of 1977, Japan had built 12 nuclear power stations. Eleven more power plants were 
under construction and the Japanese had plans to build five more. Because Japan had no 
major source of uranium, however, the Japanese were developing breeder reactors which 
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not only produced power, but also produced their own fuel.37 The Japanese exported 
their spent radioactive fuel to Great Britain and France for reprocessing which blunted 
resistance to the development of nuclear power from environmental groups. 
Others expressed opposition to Japan‘s plans to build breeder reactors inside the 
country‘s borders, negating the necessity of exporting the spent fuel. Carter‘s attempt to 
ban the spread of weapons-grade plutonium, thus hindering reactor projects, heightened 
the differences in energy approaches between the United States and Japan. His efforts at 
arms reduction came into open conflict with countries like Japan which relied on nuclear 
reprocessing plants for enriched uranium bought from the United States.38   
 Unlike Japan, Great Britain did not have to rely on nuclear power. In January 
1976, Great Britain solved a large portion of its energy crisis with confirmation that a 
significant oil field had been discovered in the North Sea. Although the supplies would 
not reach the British market until 1978 at the earliest, the promise of a domestic oil 
supply allowed the British to believe that the petroleum exporting countries would not 
hold them hostage as they had in 1973. Officials claimed that hopes of returning 
prosperity and ending the chronic balance-of-payments deficit lay in North Sea oil. They 
expected a million barrels of oil to be pumped daily from the British sector of the North 
Sea and would allow the British a ―seat at the price-fixing table‖ of OPEC. The fact that 
the find was nationalized as the British National Oil Corporation meant that it could ―do 
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all those things a large international oil company can do – explore, exploit, refine, 
market, and even operate in other countries.‖39   
In spite of the optimism, however, some Britons believed that this was a slim 
hope. The oil was buried deep in the stormy North Sea, so a huge investment was 
necessary to bring it to the surface; that would mean that the oil would be expensive, 
whether sold domestically or abroad. By contrast, the relatively shallow Saudi Arabian 
oil would always be inexpensive to produce. North Sea oil, therefore, was a ―slow reed 
to cling to.‖40  
Fears about energy shortages following the 1973 – 74 oil embargo caused the 
British government to subsidize the British energy industry. By 1976, as a result, Britain 
was in what one energy expert called a ―short-term energy glut which will last as far 
ahead as one can see.‖ This glut hit the coal industry particularly hard. After raising its 
price 2½ times in under two years, by 1976 the industry was faced with ―mountains of 
unsalable stocks.‖ It also hit the electricity industry. By 1976, demand was 23 percent 
below what forecasters had predicted in 1970. As a result, 47 power stations were closed 
or partly closed. This energy glut was only expected to increase with the supply of oil 
from the North Sea. This caused a problem for politicians who were anxious to get the 
votes of vested interests in the energy industry by continuing to provide subsidies. The 
solution the British government hit upon was to commission a report that claimed that 
the glut itself could cause investment in the industry to be low, causing a ―grave energy 
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gap in the 1990s when some conservationists think that North Sea oil and gas will run 
down‖ unless the government continued to subsidize the industry.41 
In France, political problems, brought about in part by the economic difficulties 
associated with energy crisis, beset the government during the last half of the 1970s. 
Unemployment was a major concern. From March 1977 through June 1978, just prior to 
an economic summit in Bonn, the unemployment rate in France hovered around 5.0%. 
The difficulty for Giscard was that any economic measures designed to reduce 
unemployment would likely accelerate inflation. He faced opposition from the Gaullist 
party on the right as well an alliance of the Socialists and Communists on the left. He 
made this clear in 1976, when he made a State visit to Washington following Carter‘s 
election, telling Brzezinski that he was ―heading what amounted to a minority 
government.‖ He hoped to convince his opponents to follow him by focusing on the 
economic issues that France was facing42   
In addition, he faced opposition from a growing environmental movement which 
opposed his nuclear power program. Unlike Britain, which had reserves of coal in 
addition to the discovery of North Sea oil and gas, or West Germany, which had coal 
reserves, France had to depend on imported oil for most of its energy supply. Alternative 
energy sources were only expected to supply three to seven percent of the total energy 
needed by the year 2000. Hydroelectric power represented six percent of France‘s 
energy requirements while oil and gas would provide the largest percentage with 68 
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percent.43 Not only were oil and gas projected to be scarcer, they would also 
subsequently increase in price. For these reasons, Giscard d‘Estaing committed France to 
the development of nuclear energy. The government preferred the breeder reactors 
because they produced more power than they consumed. In August 1976, the president 
said that he would ―press ahead with nuclear plants in order to help make France 
independent of oil imports and to maintain its independent nuclear military force.‖44 
In particular, French environmentalists opposed the building of two breeder 
reactors, the Phénix and the Superphénix, both on the Rhone River because of the large-
scale production of plutonium, which was highly toxic. In August of 1977, the 
environmentalists staged a protest at the site of the Superphénix reactor, which turned 
violent when about 100 young people armed with iron clubs and black anarchist flags 
broke away from the protesters and initiated the violence. One man was killed as people 
fled the area following volleys of tear gas which the police fired to break up the crowds. 
A police officer lost an arm in the riot. Significantly, the protesters were joined by 
several thousand young people from neighboring countries; the antinuclear movement 
was growing throughout Western Europe.45   
In response, the French government commissioned a study to address the 
concerns of 400 petitioners. The commission was composed of 37 representatives of 
industry, government, trade unions, and academics, but the subsequent report did not 
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recommend the dismantling of the plants or slowing the development of nuclear power. 
It advocated conservation measures along with the development of nuclear energy, such 
things as room-by-room heat control, the installation of district-wide heating systems 
using the waste heat from nuclear plants, and the development of solar energy.46   
In Germany, a weak economy hampered efforts at developing alternative energy 
policies. Real growth in Germany in 1977 was 2.4%, down from 5.7% in 1976. 
Industrial production was up only 0.6% in the first quarter of 1978 over the last quarter 
of 1977 and total real GNP rose only about 0.1%. Throughout 1977, strikes in the auto 
production industry and more severe than normal weather also hampered economic 
growth.47   
Helmut Schmidt committed West Germany to the development of a nuclear 
power program after the oil embargo of 1973. The German government poured billions 
of dollars in research and investment funds into the development of nuclear power but 
by the late 1970s, the government was facing opposition from an increasingly vocal and 
growing antinuclear movement at home and some allies abroad. Berlin‘s sale of nuclear 
technology to Brazil put the Chancellor at odds with the American president, who 
promoted nuclear nonproliferation. Carter‘s belief was that exporting nuclear technology 
to countries whose loyalty to Western Europe, the United States, or Japan was in 
question threatened national security. In 1977, Carter told the United Nations that, ―it is 
absolutely essential to halt the sale of such plants.‖ Some German officials believed, 
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however, that the U.S. position was arbitrary and sent the wrong message to the third 
world. They claimed that underdeveloped countries would get the ―impression that the 
industrialized countries don‘t want to share their technology.‖48   
American opposition to the sale of nuclear technology helped accelerate the 
growing antinuclear movement in West Germany. In spite of official assurances that the 
plants were safe, German citizens began to question whether the sale of nuclear 
technology to the third world was the wisest course even if that power was the answer to 
the energy crisis. The resistance was composed of intellectuals as well as students and 
the middle class. In 1977, environmentalists staged a demonstration at the site of a 
nuclear power plant in the northern German town of Grohnde. The government seemed 
unsure how to handle the rally. According to one protester, the police started throwing 
stones, but officials understood that if they opposed the demonstrations, it would only 
radicalize the movement. The citizens‘ resistance coupled with economic recession 
caused the government to reexamine its nuclear policy. The government‘s original goal 
was to have fifty nuclear power plants in operation by 1985. In 1975, ten had been built 
and thirteen were under construction. The plan was revised over the winter of 1976, and 
the next year German officials announced that only 29 nuclear plants would be built, 
generating only 30,000 megawatts.49   
Not all Germans opposed the building of nuclear sites. Labor unions, anxious to 
halt the unemployment problems that were creeping across Europe, saw nuclear power 
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as an answer to this problem. Labor opposed the demonstrations and supported the 
government‘s efforts to build the maximum number of power plants. According to the 
chairman of the German Labor Union Federation, German workers needed atomic power 
to insure jobs.50 
 In order to address the economic difficulties facing America and its allies in 
Western Europe and Japan, the Carter administration developed the locomotive strategy. 
This involved connecting economic growth in Japan, Germany, and the United States, 
the industrialized world‘s three largest economies, and developing collective policies 
designed to pull the rest of the industrialized economies along behind that locomotive. 
By the time Carter took office, the advanced countries had a composite economic growth 
of less than 3 percent annually. Joseph Kraft of the Washington Post wrote that while 
there was ―widespread recognition of the need for concerted action, the Carter 
administration is too burdened by problems of energy and inflation to play the leadership 
role customary for the United States. No other country is in position to get out front 
except, just possibly, West Germany.‖51  
 Carter informed Helmut Schmidt that the United States was doing all it could to 
foster economic growth, claiming that actions by the U.S. alone would not be enough. 
Faster growth abroad was necessary for world economic stability.52 Japanese Prime 
Minister Takeo Fukuda told Carter of his cautious willingness to ―accept the 
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responsibilities appropriate to the world‘s third – largest economic power, America‘s 
leading Pacific ally and its No. 1 trading partner.‖ The United States, however, was in an 
exceptionally poor position to help bring the other industrialized countries out of 
recession and was ―vulnerable to the charge that it is importing inflation and weakening 
the dollar by failure to control energy imports.‖53 Barely a year after the policy of the 
―locomotive strategy‖ was announced, it was discarded. 54  
As was the case with previous administrations, Carter believed that the Soviet 
Union would take advantage of the economic instability in Europe to make political 
inroads. The Soviets, administration officials claimed, were trying to create the 
impression that they are ―in complete unity with European communist parties on larger 
foreign policy matters involving détente and disarmament.‖55 The administration‘s 
perception was that the Soviets were playing on European concerns about political and 
economic upheaval in an effort to entice them to give up the pursuit of détente with the 
West and look to the Soviet Union for stability. Intelligence indicated that the Soviets 
were operating in Europe, particularly in France and Italy where communist parties were 
strong. They were using the issue of youth unemployment to demonstrate that capitalist 
societies are incapable of assuring secure employment. While the CIA acknowledged 
that the propaganda was aimed in part at the Soviet domestic audience, the agency 
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indicated that the Russians were targeting the youth in an economically and politically 
unstable Europe.56 
At the end of Carter‘s first year in office, the allies‘ attempts to develop energy 
policies to pressure OPEC, both on a national and international level, were unsuccessful. 
Collective action relied on programs the International Energy Agency developed, 
primarily involving the creation of reserves that could be tapped in the event of another 
embargo. Political and economic concerns hampered national efforts. Each of the allied 
countries faced internal problems and concerns that they had to deal with in concert with 
the development of these policies. In Europe, high unemployment and the specter of 
inflation took the time and attention of the leadership. Political concerns also took 
attention away from energy questions. The rising popularity of Communist parties in 
France and Germany posed problems for Giscard d‘Estaing and Schmidt. In spite of this, 
both countries were able to develop nuclear programs that began to reduce reliance on 
imported oil. These programs were not without their problems, however, for anti-nuclear 
groups in the countries protested the development of this form of energy. In the United 
States, the Carter administration opposed the sale of technologies to countries that might 
develop a nuclear arsenal. 
Japan also faced internal difficulties that prevented the leadership from 
developing effective energy policies that could serve as a counterweight to the power of 
the oil exporters. High inflation was a constant problem for the Japanese throughout the 
                                               
56 Central Intelligence Agency Memorandum; November 9, 1977; Declassified Documents Reference 
System; http://galenet.galegroup.com. 
 152 
late 1970s. In spite of this, they did develop a nuclear power program that decreased 
their dependence on imported oil. 
In spite of some successes, the specter of another supply interruption haunted the 
allies. Memories of the embargo in 1973 and the fears that major industrial engines 
would grind to a halt were never far from the minds of the Japanese, the Europeans, or 
the Americans. At an International Energy Agency conference in 1977, Ulf Lantzke, the 
secretary general, warned that as the ―1973 -74 energy crisis recedes from memory, there 
is a tendency to believe that the energy crisis is behind us. Nothing could be further from 
the truth.‖57 With this warning in mind, the allies continued to talk about the necessity of 
a collective energy policy as well as the development of effective national policies, and 
during the Carter years, the allies held a series of economic summits addressing the 
question of energy policy.
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CHAPTER VI 
 
THE MORAL EQUIVALENT OF WAR: 
 
THE SUMMITS 
 
Franklin Roosevelt told the American people in 1943 that ―this country faces a 
serious crisis. We are engaged in a war on the successful outcome of which will depend 
the whole future of our country.‖1 In that same year, three world leaders, Roosevelt, 
Joseph Stalin, and Winston Churchill gathered in Tehran. How would they deal with the 
mounting crisis? This was a showdown between good and evil. The decisions these men 
made would determine the course of history. If they could not come together to make 
important decisions, Adolf Hitler would win.  
The so-called Big Three gathered at two summits during the war. The first was in 
1943 at Tehran; the second was at Yalta in 1945. At these conferences, they met to lay 
out war aims and strategies to defeat the Germans and the Japanese and to determine the 
structure of the postwar world. They did not always see eye-to-eye on every issue. At 
Yalta, agreement on some important issues eluded the three. Stalin demanded at least 
$20 billion in war reparations, with Russia getting half. Stalin also refused to remove 
Soviet troops from areas they controlled in Eastern Europe. They disagreed over 
Germany. Roosevelt and Churchill wanted a unified Germany, which they considered 
essential for postwar reconstruction. Stalin was concerned that a unified Germany would 
allow for the resurgence of another Hitler-like threat. They agreed to table decision on 
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these issues for a later conference. In the midst of this crisis, the three understood that 
cooperation, not confrontation, was the only way to achieve their objectives.  
 In April 1977, Jimmy Carter issued a similarly dire warning to the American 
people. ―Our decisions about energy,‖ the President said, ―will test the character of the 
American people and the ability of the President and the Congress to govern. This 
difficult effort will be the ‗moral equivalent of war‘ – except that we will be uniting our 
efforts to build and not to destroy. If we fail to act soon,‖ he continued, ―we will face an 
economic, social and political crisis that will threaten our free institutions.‖2 Columnist 
James Reston wrote that Carter feared that ―we could loiter down, as we run out of fossil 
fuels, into a spectacular energy crisis which could threaten our economy, our influence 
in the world and even our national security. And he sees this not only as a problem but as 
a ‗historic opportunity‘ to find a ‗moral equivalent‘ for the martial virtues.‖3   
While this warning was intended to spur Americans to action, America‘s allies 
around the world also were listening because this speech was delivered just two weeks 
before the president was scheduled to leave for an economic summit in London. The 
address was intended to make clear to America‘s allies the ―steadfastness of purpose of a 
new Administration.‖4 Whereas the World War II summits succeeded in accomplishing 
the objectives enunciated by the world leaders, the summits of the 1970s failed because 
the collective interests of the group came into conflict with national interests. 
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 The President believed that more than pragmatism drove the search for 
an international energy policy. His conviction that the crisis had a moral dimension 
partly was shaped by his association with Admiral Hyman Rickover. Carter first came 
under Rickover‘s guidance when he was a naval officer, chosen to work on the 
development of the first atomic submarines. He worked for the admiral until 1953, and 
Carter wrote that Rickover demanded ―total dedication from his subordinates. We feared 
and respected him and strove to please him.‖5 The admiral had ―a greater influence over 
Carter than anyone except his father‖ and was the one who suggested to the president 
that the energy crisis represented the moral equivalent of war.6 This perspective caused 
some allied leaders concern. A Foreign Broadcast Information Service memorandum 
indicated that some European media reaction focused on the moralistic and idealistic 
tone of the President‘s inaugural address. Some journalists found the tone refreshing and 
saw it as a reassurance to the American people. Others feared that it might be carried too 
far.7 
Carter‘s concept of cooperation with America‘s allies on issues of common 
concern grew out of his work on the Trilateral Commission, a ―private body dedicated to 
the view that U.S. relations with Western Europe and Japan provide the strategic hard 
                                               
5 Jimmy Carter, Why Not the Best? Jimmy Carter, the First Fifty Years (Fayetteville: University of 
Arkansas Press, 1996), 55. 
6 Shirley Scheibla, ―Burst of Legal Salvos: The U.S. Navy and Shipbuilders Alike May be Casualties,‖ 
Barron’s National Business and Financial Weekly, July 26, 1976, 3, Proquest Historical Newspapers, 
http:// http://proquest.umi.com.  Carter, Keeping Faith, 96. 
7 Special Memorandum; Foreign Media Reaction to Presidential Inauguration; January 25, 1977; Media 
Reaction to Carter Administration and Polls: 1/77 – 2/79, Foreign Broadcast Information Service; National 
Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File; Box 33; JCPL. 
 156 
core for both global stability and progress.‖8 By 1978, conflicts about shared economic 
interests hampered the effectiveness of the Trilateral Commission. A Carter 
administration official advised the president ―Trilateralism at this point is not well 
founded in perceptions of shared economic interests. In general, both the West 
Europeans and the Japanese tend to see their basic economic interests in agreement with 
those of the U.S., while perceiving a clash of Japanese-European economic interests.‖9 
Paralleling the work of the Trilateral Commission was the summit process which 
grew out of French President Giscard d‘Estaing‘s experience as part of the Library 
Group of finance ministers. They first met in the library of the White House in 1973 and 
began with four members – France, Great Britain, Germany, and the United States – and 
eventually – Japan. The participants valued the group as a means of steering monetary 
negotiations, but ―they prized it even more as an opportunity for frank, unfettered 
discussion of their major problems and preoccupations,‖ and as an opportunity to ―build 
up strong mutual trust.‖10   
 The process became institutionalized in 1975, when Giscard brought together 
representatives from the five major industrial powers at Rambouillet. The French 
president believed that the format should be extended to the heads of state of the 
industrialized countries, and the five gathered the next year in Puerto Rico. The initial 
summits, rather than accomplishing anything of a significant nature, laid the foundation 
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for the summit process that followed. At subsequent meetings, the group discussed 
economic issues of concern to all, especially energy policy.  
 Carter attended his first summit during May 1977, and expectations among the 
American contingent were low. White House press secretary Jody Powell claimed that 
the aim of the meeting was to allow the leaders of the industrialized nations the 
opportunity to discuss in depth the problems facing both the developed and the 
developing nations.11 Brzezinski told the President that the ―summit meetings will not 
produce spectacular new initiatives or proposals for new institutions.‖ Instead, it would 
create a framework of industrial state concerns leading to coordinated action.‖12   
 These expectations were reflected in news reports of the event. The Wall Street 
Journal indicated that not much was expected to come out of the meeting, claiming that 
the leaders faced some serious problems but that the conference promised to produce 
more talk than action. Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal warned against high 
expectations for the conference; it was not expected to produce any ―fundamental, 
surprise decisions.‖ Despite preparatory meetings prior to the summit, the ―seven 
governments are far from agreement on what to do about the world‘s worst recession, 
inflation and unemployment since World War II. Their leaders are unlikely to reach 
agreement in two days of discussion.‖13   
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 The energy crisis occupied much of the allies‘ attention in 1977. Journalist 
Hobart Rowen wrote that the ―perplexing and interrelated problems that bring seven 
presidents and prime ministers together for an economic summit have a single root – the 
oil cartel‘s massive price increases after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. But the leaders will 
tiptoe all around it.‖ The Carter administration was fairly open in identifying OPEC as 
the main culprit, but the talk about OPEC at the summit would be muted because 
Western Europe and Japan were almost totally dependent on oil imports for their energy 
needs and Saudi Arabia was being ―implored to lend money‖ to the International 
Monetary Fund to finance the deficits they helped create.14   
A significant issue for the group was the development of nuclear energy for 
civilian purposes and the sale of that technology to less developed countries. All of the 
members understood the problem: the development of alternative energy, particularly for 
energy-poor countries in Europe and Japan, versus nuclear proliferation, particularly 
among countries that should not have the technology at their fingertips to build nuclear 
weapons. ―American Gathering for Summit Talks See Carter‘s Drive Against Nuclear 
Spread as Most Volatile Issue,‖ declared the New York Times. The newspaper added that 
Chancellor Schmidt was ―openly defying Mr. Carter‘s appeals,‖ and has called the 
president‘s initiative ―a disaster,‖ while other European spokesmen have privately 
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contended that the new American administration may be ―trying to reinforce European 
dependence on American supplies of nuclear fuel.‖15 
 Schmidt‘s position was that the necessity of developing nuclear technology was 
more important than the possibility of some undesirable countries developing bombs, for 
at this time Bonn was fulfilling a contract with Brazil for selling them nuclear 
technology. The treaty was signed in 1975 and involved the sale of uranium enrichment 
and reprocessing plants that had the potential for making plutonium for atomic bombs. 
The contract represented the biggest export agreement in Germany‘s history. In the ten 
to fifteen years after 1977, the sale could provide the German nuclear industry with as 
much as $5 billion in contracts for up to eight Brazilian nuclear power plants.16   
 Carter opposed the sale. To the president, nuclear nonproliferation was a guiding 
principle that would be trampled if the sale continued, and Brazil had been unwilling to 
sign the nonproliferation treaty. Brzezinski, however, indicated that relations with 
Germany should be paramount, writing that the ―deal with Brazil is not disrupting 
relations with Germany.‖17 Previously, Schmidt had sent his Foreign Minister to 
Washington for a ―round of urgent consultations‖ on the sale, and then Secretary of State 
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Cyrus Vance visited Bonn. Both visits accomplished little, and Germany went ahead 
with its negotiations with Brazil.18   
 Schmidt and other European observers saw the Carter position as the United 
States subordinating European countries by preventing them from developing the 
technology necessary to reduce their dependence on oil imported from the Middle East. 
Alouis Mertes, a conservative Christian Democrat, claimed that fulfilling international 
obligations was a ―moral foundation‖ of German foreign policy while the liberal weekly 
Die Ziet intimated that the United States ―wanted to have the deal canceled only to get 
the nuclear power plant contracts for its own industry.‖19   
 The London meeting, as expected, produced few results. Prime Minister Fukuda 
of Japan expressed his satisfaction at the cooperation among the industrialized nations to 
solve common problems but expressed ―mild disappointment at the lack of concrete 
results.‖20 The predictions journalist Hobart Rowen made at the outset of the summit 
came true; there was no mention of OPEC in the final communiqué.21   
 The allies held their second summit meeting during July 1978 in Bonn. Prior to 
the summit, the heads of state agreed that the energy situation remained unsatisfactory 
and that much more needed to be done. Carter‘s personal representative to the summit 
felt the attendees would probably be willing to agree to expanded research on energy 
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development in the industrialized world and energy development in the developing 
countries. Those were the issues upon which the American delegation should focus.
 The expectations of the summit attendees reflected the domestic and international 
problems and concerns each of the leaders was facing. From Washington‘s perspective, 
Schmidt was concerned with success, in part because of his position as host of the 
summit, but also because of his domestic political difficulties. His political base, a 
coalition of Free Democrats and his Social Democratic Party, was eroding, while he was 
being pressed by opposition from conservatives in the Bundestag as well as a growing 
Communist party. Schmidt was willing to pay for that success with some German 
economic expansion. In return, Schmidt expected the U.S. to limit its oil imports. He 
believed that continued American oil imports would hurt German economic growth. 
Bonn viewed a U.S. commitment to reduce oil imports as an essential condition for a 
German commitment to take further stimulatory measures.22 
 In France, Valery Giscard d‘Estaing, who had been facing domestic concerns 
during the London summit, had solidified his position and so was less concerned with 
his political position. Opposition on the left, both the Socialists and the Communists, 
were disunited as a result of their loss in the 1978 elections, and so could not mount an 
effective campaign against Giscard. Jacques Chirac, his chief opponent on the Gaullist 
side, had to deal with the president‘s efforts to undermine his position and gain adherents 
in that party. Giscard‘s position, however, relied on success on the economic front. 
Labor unrest, brought about by rising unemployment and inflation, posed a threat to his 
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leadership. Washington officials were concerned that these developments could ―impair 
the discipline and timing of the government‘s economic program and would give both 
the Gaullists and the parties of the left some ammunition to use against Giscard.‖ The 
Carter administration felt, however, that political concerns presented few immediate 
constraints on the Frenchman‘s summit position. Giscard believed that his country had 
made good progress in dealing with the energy crisis by developing alternative energy 
sources and promoting conservation. Although France was still unwilling to join the 
IEA, government officials claimed that they would work closely with allies on matters of 
energy conservation and research and development.23   
 Prime Minister James Callaghan of Great Britain was in a somewhat precarious 
position on the eve of the summit. His political strength was at a low ebb in 1977, and a 
decisive Labor defeat, according to one journalist, ―seemed as inevitable as the London 
fog.‖ His political fortunes were rising in 1978 based in part on the decline in the value 
of the dollar and the beginning of North Sea oil production; however, the prime minister 
was still vulnerable to attacks from the opposition on a weak economy, which would 
help the conservative opposition, led by Margaret Thatcher.24   
 Carter administration officials believed that British and U.S. views on summit 
aims on energy questions were very similar. Although both the Labor and Conservative 
parties were protective of their North Sea oil, Callaghan and other British government 
officials believed that emphasis should be on conservation and additional investment in 
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both oil and non-oil resources. Carter‘s advisers also believed that Callaghan would, in 
all probability, support drawing up new policy proposals by the IEA and working with 
the World Bank to develop energy resources for the developing world. The question was 
whether or not the prime minister would be willing to make financial commitments to 
those issues.25   
 Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda of Japan was in a fairly solid political position 
when the summit opened. His party, the Liberal Democratic Party, had been in power for 
much of the postwar period and was not in danger of losing power to any opposition 
party. The only threat to his rule came from within his own party. His main challenger 
within the LDP was the Secretary General, Masayoshi Ohira. Fukuda saw the Bonn 
conference as an opportunity to solidify his leadership position. His handling of Japan‘s 
economic recovery was reflected in his approach to many of the issues the summiteers 
would discuss, including energy. The Carter administration believed that the nuclear 
issue would not be as contentious for Tokyo at the Bonn summit in 1978 as it was in 
London in 1977. Washington officials believed, however, that Fukuda would want to 
discuss further nuclear cooperation between his country, the European Community, and 
the United States. In terms of oil imports, if Fukuda was going to press the United States 
to reduce oil imports, Carter should exact a promise from Tokyo for faster economic 
growth.26      
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At the 1978 Bonn conference, energy was one of Carter‘s priorities. In general, 
the allied leaders wanted what the United States wanted – action on the part of the Carter 
administration.27 If the President could not make a firm commitment to reduce oil 
imports, the whole package would come unraveled. The measure of the Bonn conference 
would be whether Carter‘s energy program prospered and whether the industrialized 
countries would meet their obligations to increase energy research and development and 
investment to developing countries. The administration believed that the stakes at Bonn 
were high. A National Security Council official wrote that if the summit should fail, the 
―consequences would be unfortunate for the dollar, the trade negotiations, and national 
security.‖ In order to assure the other heads of state that Carter was committed to 
reducing imports, the NSC suggested that Carter use the authority he had to gradually 
decontrol domestic prices to world levels.28     
As the allies arrived in Bonn, they perceived that U.S. commitment to reducing 
oil imports was weak. Schmidt claimed that the U.S. was neglecting its leadership role in 
world economics, and rebuked American congressional and business leaders for 
permitting an irresponsible oil import policy.29 The French felt that the United States had 
not done enough to remedy the energy dilemma. On the eve of the summit, the Paris 
newspaper Figaro asked, ―How can (President Carter) get concessions from his partners 
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if he does not want to give them real assurances on legislation or administrative action to 
cut U.S. oil imports?‖ An Oslo newspaper reported ―uneasiness . . . in Western Europe 
regarding the long-range consequences of the American President not being strong 
enough – and not exhibiting the leadership‖ to get ―necessary energy legislation 
approved by Congress.‖ Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda told Carter that all the world‘s 
economic troubles are traceable to the lack of U.S. action to cut its imports and the 
instability of the dollar. He urged the United States to ―put its house in order.‖ Even 
British Prime Minister Callaghan, generally supportive of U.S. policy, questioned 
Carter‘s ability to pass energy legislation in a timely manner, believing that a U.S. 
energy policy was essential to the health of the dollar.30 
 The Carter administration understood the importance of an effective energy 
policy. Dependence on imported oil created doubts among America‘s allies about the 
ability of the United States to maintain treaty obligations, particularly those that related 
to mutual security. Giscard said that a reduction in American oil imports was the 
necessary precondition for improvement in the world economy that, in his view, this was 
the ―most important single source of upheaval in the worldwide network of trade and 
payments.‖31 It led to questions about America‘s ―ability to sustain prolonged conflicts 
and assist our allies in an optimum way.‖ In the view of the State Department, this 
dependence on imported oil impaired its ability to achieve its foreign policy objectives, 
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both economic and political. The belief in the administration was that unless Congress 
acted soon to pass energy legislation, the ―world will remain convinced of our 
unwillingness to face the energy problem.‖ Washington officials believed that allied 
leaders would attribute a substantial part of the decline of the dollar to America‘s failure 
to adopt a national energy plan.32 
Before the close of the summit, the heads of state agreed on a comprehensive 
strategy to deal with a number of interrelated economic issues, including energy. The 
declaration committed the nations to reduce their dependence on imported oil, although 
no specific amount was given. It also stated that the United States had a ―particular 
responsibility in the energy field,‖ and committed the nation to having in place by the 
end of the year a comprehensive policy framework within which that effort could be 
―urgently carried forward.‖ In order to achieve the target energy savings, the declaration 
committed the United States to establish a strategic petroleum reserve of 1 billion 
barrels, to increase coal production by two-thirds, and to restrain the growth in energy 
demand. Carter also committed the United States to cut U.S. oil consumption by 2.5 
million barrels per day and to raise the price it paid for oil to world levels, which at the 
time stood at about $14 a barrel, by the end of the decade.33  
Critics felt that the United States was unwilling to go far enough in committing 
to reducing oil imports at the expense of the other governments. A journalist from The 
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Economist wrote somewhat tongue-in-cheek that at Bonn, a ―real trade was done: low-
inflation West Germany and Japan agreed to step up economic expansion in return for 
half-hearted and half-baked American energy measures supposed to steady the dollar.‖ 
The Toronto Globe and Mail said that the summit fell far short of the undertakings 
needed to put the world back on a stable path of non-inflationary growth.34   
 The third summit was supposed to be held in Tokyo on June 28-29, 1979, but 
before the allies could meet, OPEC triggered the second energy crisis. It played a major 
role in the Tokyo negotiations, so central that many began referring to it as the ―first 
energy summit.‖35 As will be examined in the next chapter, the Iranian revolution lent an 
urgency to this summit that was not present in the previous ones. In October 1978, the 
Iranian oil fields were shut down due to strikes associated with the unrest. The effects 
were felt immediately. Iran was the second-largest oil exporter after Saudi Arabia. 
Exports totaled about 4.5 million barrels per day. By early November, exports had been 
reduced to less than a million barrels per day. By December 25, Iranian petroleum 
exports had ceased altogether.36 Panic buying set in, and the oil shortage became a full-
blown crisis. The situation in Iran underscored the danger to national security of 
excessive consumption of oil and dependence upon imported petroleum.37 One journalist 
asserted that the Tokyo summit was the ―most important of the annual conferences since 
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they began at the Chateau of Rambouillet in 1975.‖ Another claimed that the upcoming 
conference was a ―crucial test of whether the major industrial democracies can work 
together to deal with the energy problem, which is threatening the growth and stability of 
the world economy.‖38   
The summit also followed by just two days a meeting of the thirteen OPEC 
countries who met in Geneva and once again raised the price of oil. These issues 
changed the focus of the summit from one which focused on trade issues to one which 
focused on the energy crisis – the ―biggest world energy crisis since 1973-74.‖ An 
American official claimed that there was ―no way that our leaders can leave Tokyo 
without taking concrete decisions on what to do about energy, especially oil.‖39   
These events placed foreign policy decisions at the forefront of the conference. 
Japanese Prime Minister Ohira voiced the concerns that many at the summit must have 
been feeling about the turmoil in the Middle East. ―What if the troubles in the Middle 
East spread,‖ he said, ―and the Saudis too have difficulties? The Americans have to 
rebuild their bridges to the Saudis after the debacle in Iran. They alone can prop up the 
Saudis as only the Americans have real power among us and can meet the Russians face 
on if necessary.‖40 The Japanese now voiced support for the Arab states in the Middle 
East. Japan tried for twenty years to diversify its source of energy imports but by 1979 it 
was importing 75 percent of its supplies from the Arab world. The disruption in Iran 
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brought home to the Japanese that they had no security of oil supply.41 Ohira offered a 
proposal for a joint declaration on the Middle East calling for recognition and respect for 
the rights of the Palestinians. Carter, arriving in Japan a few days before the summit, 
approved the plan, and Secretary of State Vance began work on a draft proposal with 
Japanese Foreign Ministry officials. The proposal had the support of the British, 
Germans, and Canadians, but Giscard objected to making this kind of political statement 
at an economic meeting. Apparently the French objected because the Japanese 
government praised the Egyptian – Israeli agreement as a good step toward a 
comprehensive peace plan. The plan had to be abandoned, but it did not have to succeed 
to be a benefit for the Japanese for it was enough for Japan to be able to ―present to the 
Arabs a plan proposed by Japan but torpedoed by the West.‖42     
 The nations gathered in Tokyo continued to place national interests above the 
collective interests of the allies. Prior to convening the Japan summit, the members of 
the European Community met in Strasbourg, and reached an agreement on oil policy. In 
the short term, the EC would restrict oil imports in 1979 and 1980 on a country-by-
country basis, and in the long-term the amount of oil imported by each country from 
1980 to 1985 would be less than the amount imported in 1978 by each nation.43 The 
Germans were concerned about the impact shortages would have on their industry and 
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that diminished oil supply might affect speed limits on their autobahns.44 France claimed 
to support concerted action. Although the Japanese had a larger economy than West 
Germany, they were totally dependent on imported oil and they promoted the creation of 
an international energy board – a ―consumers‘ cartel to match the OPEC cartel.‖ The 
British, now led by conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, were less concerned 
with OPEC because they would soon be self-sufficient because of the platforms in the 
North Sea. 45         
The Tokyo summit highlighted the ineffectiveness of the IEA‘s efforts to develop 
a plan to combat oil supply interruption and the accompanying high prices. After all, the 
agency was formed in 1973 following the first energy crisis but had been largely 
ineffective in preventing another one. One reason was that France had been unwilling to 
join the agency. The lack of cohesion was clear to outsiders like OPEC. Additionally, 
while the agency could develop strategies to deal with oil shortfalls, they remained only 
suggestions. Although all members acknowledged the collective nature of energy policy, 
national priorities often took precedence over collective action. No punitive measures 
were in place to coerce member nations to follow the strategies laid out by the agency. 
The U.S. ambassador to Japan, Mike Mansfield, advocated that the IEA should be 
―largely superseded‖ by new national energy boards in each of the countries and an 
international board that would be charged with developing alternative sources of supply. 
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He also promoted the creation of a consumers‘ cartel to match OPEC as a producers‘ 
cartel. Mansfield declared that the ―time to wring our hands is past‖ and that the ―energy 
problem stands out so glaringly that it just can‘t be avoided.‖46    
The overall strategy of the U.S. and America‘s allies for dealing with a supply 
interruption was the emergency oil sharing system created by the IEA. The belief was 
that reserves made available from member countries‘ oil supply would prevent 
competition among allies and would prevent oil producers from trying to use oil as a 
political weapon against IEA nations. The agency, however, was still trying to develop a 
collective policy by 1979 that would ―bring the oil market into balance without relying 
solely on upward pressure on prices‖ in case of supply interruption. In addition to the 
reserve, the IEA adopted a separate objective of reducing the group‘s projected 
dependence on imported oil by 1985. According to Secretary of State Vance, as of 1979, 
―owing in large part to projections of oil imports by the United States on the basis of 
current policies, achievement of that objective is endangered.‖ Nor was Congress keen 
on extending the legislation that would exempt oil companies from antitrust laws and 
allow them to collaborate internationally in sharing data and oil.  47  
Before the summit, officials in Washington claimed that success at the summit 
could be measured by the specific conclusions coming out of the conference that would 
move society in the direction of more intense conservation efforts and more intense 
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efforts to increase supply. In those terms, some Washington officials felt that the summit 
was a success. Observers in Tokyo claimed, however, that nothing that was decided 
there would have any real short-term impact on the supply of oil or on the political 
problems associated with gasoline shortages and gas lines. Each of the leaders would 
have to go home facing the certainty that ―our economies and our societies as a whole 
will have to undergo far-reaching changes.‖48   
 Moreover, the Tokyo summit was more acrimonious than those held previously. 
The news that OPEC had met in Geneva the day before the summit opened and raised 
official prices from $14.55 to $18 a barrel, a 25 percent increase, was a ―bitter blow.‖ 
The heads of state were deeply divided over oil import targets with each country facing 
the ―prisoner‘s dilemma‖ in attempting to provide a margin for itself in the hope that 
others would bear the greater sacrifice.49 Giscard exhibited his discontent with progress 
on the energy issue. Asked in a Newsweek interview whether the United States had done 
enough to conserve energy, Giscard replied, ―They haven‘t started.‖50   
Jimmy Carter was very discouraged about the course of the meeting. ―This is the 
first day of the economic summit,‖ he wrote, ―and one of the worst days of my 
diplomatic life.‖ He continued that the group had ―specific goals to reach for the 
conference to be significant‖ and because the Europeans had ―locked together‖ in their 
EC meeting at Strasbourg, they were ―adamantly against any sort of individual national 
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commitment.‖ To Carter, the price increases and uncertain supply were the greatest 
dangers the allies faced, and it was obvious to the president that the Europeans had 
decided in advance that ―in setting their import goals, they should be considered as a 
group by the United States, Canada, and Japan, and not as individual nations.‖ Carter 
believed that the purpose was obvious. The Europeans wanted the production of North 
Sea oil but did not want it to be counted in their own countries as imports from a foreign 
government. The atmosphere carried over to a private luncheon that same day. Carter 
wrote: 
We then had a luncheon that was very bitter and unpleasant. [German 
Chancellor] Schmidt got personally abusive toward me when I pushed  
the individual target position. For instance, he alleged that American  
interference in the Middle East trying to work for a peace treaty was what  
had caused the problems with oil all over the world. We stayed a long time,  
but [Japanese Prime Minister] Ohira eventually proposed a compromise  
which I thought everyone accepted – that the European Community later  
this year would assign individual quotas to each nation and would then  
monitor it. It seemed quite clear to me. But later Schmidt, [British Prime 
Minister] Thatcher, Jenkins and [Italian Prime Minister Giulio] Andreotti  
tried to wriggle out of it. Valéry [Giscard d‘Estaing] helped hold it together, 
pointing out that we had reached a superb agreement based on complete 
misunderstanding.  
 174 
The president concluded that, though much of the tension dissipated in the meetings on 
the following day, the initial gathering was ―acrimonious‖ with an ―exchange of some 
uncharacteristically harsh words.‖51 
 At the close of the conference, the leaders of the industrial nations issued another 
joint declaration that reflected their focus on energy questions. The communiqué 
committed each of the members to lower oil imports to specific targets. Carter pledged 
the United States to freeze oil imports to 1977 levels for the remainder of 1979 and 
1980. He also agreed to the goal of limiting oil imports to that level through 1985. The 
European members agreed to hold imports at 1978 levels through 1985, and Japan 
agreed to hold imports to levels it agreed upon in the IEA and to hold imports in 1980 at 
a level not higher than those of the previous year.52 The group committed themselves to 
specific national ceilings to hold down future imports. Margaret Thatcher boasted, the 
―message to the oil cartel is that we are determined to cut demand, and not to be so 
reliant on that source of energy.‖53      
Few believed her, and critics went on the attack. A journalist in The Economist 
labeled the summit process the ―myth of world economic management.‖54 One Japanese 
journalist wrote of the breakfast on the first day of the summit. The meal was topped off 
by servings of melons. At some of the better shops in Tokyo those melons would cost 
the equivalent of $50 U.S., and just to produce those melons in a hothouse it was 
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necessary to burn upwards of eight liters of heating oil. One explanation of the summit 
was that ―it was a meeting to decide how the people in the industrially advanced nations 
can afford to continue eating melons.‖55     
The allies gathered in Venice in June 1980 for the final summit of Carter‘s tenure 
in office. Because of the volatility in Iran and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, 
discussed in the following chapter, the administration placed more emphasis on the 
security implications of the energy crisis than on the economics of it. The heads of state 
acknowledged the interrelated nature of political and economic questions, and that the 
dependence of the industrialized nations on oil imported from the Middle East affected 
every aspect of the world economy. Brzezinski pointed out that foreign and domestic 
policies were more interrelated than at any other time in recent history.56 The mood in 
Venice, however, was cautious. Carter, Schmidt, and Giscard were all looking toward re-
election and all three were ―bent on skirting any controversial topics which could risk a 
split among the seven allied leaders.‖ In Germany and France, there was some public 
concern that the U.S. had already gone too far in punishing the Russians for their 
misdeeds in Afghanistan and that a new arms race was inevitable. The caution produced 
a declaration that was ―long on rhetoric and short on action.‖57  
Carter, however, declared the Venice conference a success and the communiqué 
―substantive.‖ The president claimed that the heads of state committed themselves to 
reduce the amount of energy used for a given amount of economic growth by making 
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conservation efforts more stringent. The leaders also adopted ―an ambitious agenda for 
trying in every possible way to break the OPEC stranglehold on the world economy. 
This program included many of the same decisions that had come out of previous 
summits, things such as developing nuclear power and increasing coal production.  58 In 
spite of the president‘s optimistic view, the energy crisis continued. 
One reason for the lack of success of any of the summits during Carter‘s 
administration was the perception that the president was unable to lead his own country 
or the allied countries in developing an energy program. The international community 
looked to the United States as the largest consumer and largest importer of oil to lead the 
way in solving the energy crisis. Reduction of energy consumption in the U.S. was seen 
by America‘s allies as the key to confronting OPEC. Europeans were looking to Carter 
to begin to solve the energy crisis. In an interview with the president, David Dimbleby of 
the British Broadcasting System brought up the administration‘s energy program. ―You 
talked about the energy program being the moral equivalent of war,‖ he said, ―but to 
some people it has given the impression of being rather strong on rhetoric and preaching 
and rather light when it actually comes to the measures.‖ He continued that an 
―American humorist actually took the four letters m – e – o – w and said the policy 
amounted to ‗meow,‘ that in other words it‘s all talk and there isn‘t very much there 
compared with what happens in Europe on controlling energy.‖59   
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The outcome of the summits could not have reassured America‘s allies that the 
United States was committed to leading by example in solving the energy crisis. The 
perception among the international community was that the United States was 
experiencing a crisis in leadership.60 The war in Vietnam and the Watergate affair 
imposed limits on the maneuverability of the American president. America‘s allies also 
understood that his sometimes acrimonious relationship with the U.S. Congress hindered 
his ability to pass effective energy legislation. The Japanese press wrote that the 
―tragedy of the United States is that neither its people nor its leaders can reach a 
consensus either on the nature of the energy crisis or on a suitable policy to deal with 
it.‖61  
In spite of the centrality of the energy question to the summit agendas, the 
agreements did not provide any real solutions to the problems the group were facing. 
The fact that OPEC raised prices the day before the last summit opened spoke volumes 
about the power of the industrialized nations to confront the oil producers. The 
Economist indicated dissatisfaction with the way in which the allies were dealing with 
the OPEC threat, claiming that ―governments – in particular, America‘s – are morbidly 
afraid to counter OPEC tactics by the oldest device in the book: price.‖62 Even in Tokyo, 
in the midst of the worst energy crisis since the first one in 1973 – 74, little was said 
specifically about OPEC. There was no strong language that indicated that the heads of 
government intended to break OPEC‘s chokehold on the international oil supply. Most 
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of the commitments were vague and left much open to interpretation. For the Tokyo 
summit, the ―first energy summit,‖ to be so concerned with the energy crisis, few 
specific targets came out of it.   
Cooperation among the allies also seemed to declining from 1976 to 1979. In 
spite of indications that they might be more willing to cooperate on energy questions at 
the international level, the French continued to operate outside the International Energy 
Agency. In addition, it appeared that the French and the German views on economic 
issues, including the energy crisis, were converging at the expense of the United States. 
Journalist James O. Goldsborough observed that under Carter, the ―traditional United 
States leadership role has begun to shift.‖ During the leadership of Valery Giscard 
d‘Estaing and Helmut Schmidt, ―it has become increasingly clear that certain 
fundamental European and American interests are diverging.‖63  
The real test for those attending the summit would be how to promote the agreed 
upon objectives at home. In this respect, Carter was faced with a daunting task. Both 
Congress and the American people had proved unwilling to accept Carter‘s energy 
package. Energy Secretary James Schlesinger believed that the only way to solve the 
energy dilemma was decontrol, but Carter was unwilling to remove price controls that 
would quickly raise the price of domestic oil to world levels.64 This logjam at home 
convinced both the French and the Germans that the United States was unwilling to live 
up to its commitments in increasing conservation measures and lowering oil imports. 
                                               
63 James O. Goldsborough, ―The New Entente Cordiale,‖ The New York Times, Aug. 26, 1979, 190, 
Proquest Historical Newspapers, http://proquest.umi.com. 
64 ―Tokyo Tempests,‖ The Wall Street Journal, June 29, 1979, 12, Proquest Historical Newspapers, 
http://proquest.umi.com.  
 179 
In the last years of Carter‘s presidency, international events overtook the efforts 
of the allies to develop collective energy policies. In 1978, the discontent that had been 
simmering in Iran boiled over and the shah was forced to flee his country. The next year 
radical Islamic fundamentalists turned their anger on Americans, and stormed their 
embassy in Tehran. Only one month later, the Soviet Union shocked the world by 
ordering the Red Army south into Afghanistan. The allies‘ dependence on oil imported 
from the Middle East represented an increasing threat to national security. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
TROUBLE IN THE ARC OF CRISIS 
 
In the early morning hours of November 4, 1979, President Carter received a 
phone call that was to sound the death knell of his presidency. On the other end of the 
line was Zbigniew Brzezinski. He was calling to tell the president that the embassy in 
Tehran had been overrun by militants. The National Security Adviser told Carter that 
fifty or sixty Americans had been taken hostage. Reports were sketchy at first, so it was 
difficult to obtain details. Carter wrote that the he was ―deeply disturbed, but reasonably 
confident that the Iranians would soon remove the attackers from the embassy 
compound and release our people.‖1   
The taking of the hostages was the culmination of a series of events that had 
begun with the outbreak of revolution in 1978. By November of that year, there was a 
growing concern in Washington that the shah‘s government was ―in danger of losing its 
grip on Iran, vital for its oil and strategic location abutting the Soviet Union and 
alongside the Persian Gulf.‖ The United States imported 900,000 barrels of Iranian oil 
per day, about 10 percent of total U.S. imports of 8.5 million barrels.2 As events in Iran 
in 1978 and 1979 worsened, Iranian oil production was periodically interrupted by 
strikes in that country‘s oil fields. Representative John Dingell (D-Mich), chairman of 
the House power and energy subcommittee, said in an interview that ―harsh government 
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action – including gasoline rationing – may be needed‖ if Iranian production was not 
restored.3 
Just one month after the hostages were taken, another crisis set off shock waves 
in Washington. Soviet expansionism, always a concern during the cold war, appeared to 
become a reality when Soviet tanks rolled into neighboring Afghanistan. Afghanistan 
was a part of what National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski called the ―arc of 
crisis‖ from Southern Africa via the Horn to the Middle East. The invasions set off 
another wave of speculation about the security of the oil supply flowing out of the 
Persian Gulf. Carter felt that Soviet control of Afghanistan would give the Russians a 
"deep penetration between Iran and Pakistan, and pose a threat to the rich oil fields of 
the Persian Gulf area and to the crucial waterways through which so much of the world‘s 
energy supplies had to pass.‖4 The invasion of Afghanistan, coupled with the perception 
that the Soviets had a hand in the Iranian revolution, were clear signs that the stability 
the administration sought was quickly slipping away. These events highlighted the 
failure of the Carter administration and its allies to develop long-term, viable energy 
alternatives.  
Congressman Dingell‘s concern was echoed by America‘s allies around the 
world. The British Secretary of State for Energy, Anthony Wedgewood Benn, attempted 
to allay British fears that the revolution in Iran would lead to oil shortages. He stated that 
existing stocks of crude and refined petroleum were sufficient to meet present 
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consumption levels for 72 days. This statement was necessary because British Petroleum 
and Shell, two of the members of the consortium that handled Iran‘s output, warned that 
if disruption continued due to the revolution, cutbacks would be necessary. In Japan, the 
government began calling for a voluntary 30 mph speed limit and lower heating levels. 
France announced an increased nuclear power program.5 
The revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were not the only 
issues the Carter administration was forced to confront. A number of sticky issues 
demanded the attention of the U.S. president. Some he had made campaign issues, others 
developed after he entered the White House.  
One of the first issues the new president addressed was human rights abuses in 
countries around the world. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance said that the administration‘s 
human rights policies, which he believed were ―well conceived and managed, provide 
the philosophical core of our approach to the world.‖6 Just after becoming president, 
Carter addressed an audience at the University of Notre Dame where he was speaking on 
American foreign policy. In this speech, he indicated the priorities of his administration. 
He said that Americans lived in a new world in which they could no longer separate war 
and peace from the ―new global questions of justice, equity, and human rights.‖ He went 
on to say that Americans should not fear this new world but should help to shape it. It 
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was a ―new world that called for a new American foreign policy – a policy based on 
constant decency in its values and on optimism in our historical vision.‖7 
Early in his presidency, Carter turned his attention to human rights abuses in the 
Soviet Union. The cold war relationship between the United States and the Russians 
underwent a transformation during the Carter administration. According to one scholar, 
the détente of the Nixon and Ford administrations was replaced by a ―policy that 
zigzagged‖ between cooperation and confrontation.8 Early in his administration, Carter 
said he believed in détente, but that he hoped to persuade the Soviet Union that ―one 
country cannot impose its system of society upon another.‖9 The Russian system led to 
abuses of basic human liberties, and Carter was vocal in denouncing those abuses.  
The president based his support of human rights in part on the 1975 Helsinki 
Declaration signed by the United States and the Soviet Union following the conclusion 
of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This declaration recognized 
fundamental human rights. Carter claimed that in the years since the signing of the Final 
Act, the world ―has witnessed conscientious efforts on the part of many signatory states 
to fulfill, fully and completely,‖ their obligations. Progress had been made in the ―freer 
flow of people and ideas. Flagrant abuses of human rights no longer go unnoticed and 
unchallenged.‖ He warned, however, that there was work still to do in preventing human 
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rights abuses. He pointed to the Soviet Union in which organizations established to 
monitor compliance with the Final Act were harassed and even jailed.10  
Eastern Europeans agreed that the declaration had raised hopes behind the Iron 
Curtain for reform. Dissident ferment in Eastern Europe ―clearly was the result of the 
Helsinki Declaration.‖ Without  Helsinki, none of the agitation for increased rights 
would have happened.11 Carter claimed that, based on news articles and direct 
communications from the American people in the first months of his presidency, human 
rights had become the ―central theme of our foreign policy in the minds of the press and 
the public.‖ Carter claimed that the administration faced criticism over the application of 
human rights policy when it seemed to be lax in one region and strict in another. Once 
again, Carter heeded the words of his mentor, Admiral Rickover. The admiral told the 
president that if he would stick to his principles on human rights, Carter would ―come 
out all right,‖ thought he might not be reelected.12          
Carter confronted the Soviets over the issue of the imprisonment of dissidents. 
Vladimir Bukovskiy, who saw himself as an ―envoy of the human rights movement in 
the Soviet Union,‖ told Vice President Walter Mondale that the administration had made 
an ―excellent start‖ on human rights but that only a ―persistent and consistent policy on 
human rights can lead to concrete results in the long run. While pressure on the Soviet 
Union by the West might initially lead to a worsening of East – West relations, such 
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pressure in the long run is the only way to produce improvements in the Soviet Union.‖ 
He was concerned that lack of progress on human rights in the Soviet Union could lead 
the U.S. to retreat from its policy.13   
The administration also became involved in the ongoing case of exiled physicist 
Andrei Sakharov. Gerald Ford attempted to secure the release of the scientist but without 
success. Just after Carter‘s inauguration in 1977, four Soviet dissidents sent a letter to 
the president, the Pope, and other world leaders, pleading that they defend the scientist. 
They claimed he was in ―mortal danger‖ from Soviet authorities and if he was silenced 
there would be a ―real danger to world peace.‖ 14    
The focus on human rights scuttled hopes for improved arms reduction talks. The 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union began during the Nixon 
administration when Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev agreed on arms limitations in 
1974 at Vladivostock. The SALT I Interim Agreement signed by the two leaders expired 
in 1977, and Carter hoped to continue the cooperation on arms reduction through the 
passage of SALT II. Vance felt that the Soviets were concerned about Carter‘s 
commitment to reductions in nuclear weapons and uncertain about his position on 
détente, along with his ―outspoken defense of Soviet dissidents.‖15 In spite of Russian 
concerns, the two sides came to an agreement on arms reductions but the Senate never 
ratified the treaty. The appearance of a brigade of Soviet troops in Cuba and, more 
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significantly, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 gave the opposition, including 
the Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan, enough ammunition to shoot 
down the treaty. 
Carter‘s human rights crusade also ran into trouble in his relations with Iran. In a 
New Year‘s Eve toast to the shah, the president declared Iran an ―island of stability in 
one of the more troubled areas of the world.‖16 This was in spite of the fact that most 
people knew that SAVAK, the shah‘s secret police, often acted as thugs, silencing 
dissent by brutal means. A columnist for the Boston Globe criticized Carter‘s claims that 
the shah was a wise leader whose friendship was ―irreplaceable.‖ It was important to get 
oil, but Carter was paying too high a price, ―sweet-talking the head of a police state.‖17 
Like his predecessors, Carter also had to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Following Kissinger‘s shuttle diplomacy and the Sinai Accords, little progress had been 
made in that region. Questions remained about Palestinian refugees and Israeli-occupied 
territory on the West Bank and Gaza, as well as full Arab recognition of Israel. The 
situation began to change in 1977 when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat made an 
historic trip to Israel to explore peace negotiations with Israeli Prime Minister 
Menachem Begin. When the two could not come to agreement on any of the outstanding 
issues and the talks broke down, Carter invited the two leaders to Camp David. For two 
weeks, the three world leaders met and hammered out the Camp David Accords. Sadat 
agreed that Egypt would recognize the state of Israel and Begin agreed to the return of 
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territory in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Although critics claimed that some very 
important issues had not been resolved, the historic nature of the agreement marked one 
of the few foreign policy victories of the Carter administration.   
Yet an international energy policy proved even more difficult than an Egypt-
Israeli agreement. In September 1979, two Democratic senators, Henry Jackson and Bill 
Bradley, drafted a letter to Brzezinski. They were apprehensive about the interruption of 
supply and what the administration intended to do should this situation occur. Searching 
for answers, they presented the administration with a list of questions and issues they felt 
needed to be addressed. The first involved the administration‘s plans for dealing with a 
―sudden, major foreign oil production cutback.‖18 Others dealt with specific responses to 
the risks associated with a supply interruption. In addition, the senators wanted to know 
what administration plans assumed about cooperation with America‘s allies, in particular 
the Europeans and Japanese, to further collective energy security. Had there been 
consideration of reinforcing and giving more thought to recognition and visibility to our 
mutual interest in enhancing our energy security? Would the United States be able to 
satisfy its obligations under the International Energy Agency oil allocation program?19 
Peter Tarnoff, Executive Secretary of the State Department, replied with a long 
letter to the Senators, laying out the contingency plans the administration had developed. 
Tarnoff wanted to assure the senators that the strategic petroleum reserves in Elk Hills, 
California and on Alaska‘s North Slope were an important part of U.S. energy policy 
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and that purchases of oil to fill the reserve had been suspended only temporarily due to 
tight market conditions and that purchases would continue as soon as market conditions 
permitted. He tried to reassure the senators that the administration‘s energy policy, both 
national and international, was still on track, and that the department also was examining 
the preparedness of the America‘s allies to deal with supply interruption.20 
The senators‘ concerns were prompted by the ongoing revolution in Iran. Carter 
continued supporting the shah. The administration saw the leader as an important ally to 
contain both Soviet expansionism and the growing pan-Arab sentiment in the Middle 
East as the president worked to develop an agreement between Egypt and Israel. In 
1978, in spite of increasingly strident demonstrations and protests against the shah‘s 
government, the Carter administration expressed its support, assuring the shah‘s son that 
the U.S. friendship and alliance with Iran was ―one of our important bases on which our 
entire foreign policy depends.‖21   
Some American officials were less positive about the shah. William Sullivan, the 
U.S. ambassador to Iran, had begun voicing his concerns about the growing resentment 
towards the repressive tactics of SAVAK, the shah‘s secret police. Their harsh tactics 
designed to silence opposition stood in stark contrast to the Carter administration‘s 
declarations of human rights. In November 1978, following months of protest, Sullivan 
sent Vance a message entitled ―Thinking the Unthinkable‖ in which he urged the 
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administration to consider what it should do if the regime collapsed.22 There was 
disagreement in the administration about what the response should be. There was a 
―brooding fear‖ in the White House that any action the U.S. took that implied that the 
shah was incapable of ruling would stimulate the opposition to greater violence. On 
November 22, Vance cabled Sullivan that the U.S. must offer the shah ―frank advice in 
helping him try to put together a new civilian government‖ but make ―crystal clear‖ to 
the opposition that the U.S. continued to fully support him.23 In spite of Sullivan‘s 
concern, however, Carter continued to voice his support for the shah‘s reforms, which he 
labeled a move toward democracy. To Carter, the shah headed a ―progressive 
administration‖ which was ―very valuable, I think, to the entire Western world.‖24   
As 1978 came to a close, the situation in Iran deteriorated. In November, David 
Mark, a State Department official, concluded that ―only drastic measures by the Shah 
hold any promise for staving off a descent into chaos.‖25 Waves of demonstrations broke 
out across Iran one month later. On January 2, the shah informed Sullivan that he had 
decided to appoint Shapour Bakhtiar as prime minister. Two weeks later, pressured by 
protests and sporadic fighting in the streets and by moderates and military generals who 
questioned the ability of the shah to maintain a viable government, the shah left Iran for 
Egypt.  
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Ayatollah Khomeini returned to a hero‘s welcome in Tehran and assumed the 
position of head of the Revolutionary Council. He replaced Bakhtiar with Mehdi 
Bazargan as prime minister. Before the end of the month, Washington announced that 
the United States would maintain normal diplomatic relations with the new regime. 
Vance wrote that the administration believed that over time Iranian and U.S. interests in 
a ―strong, stable, non-Communist Iran‖ would permit a ―cooperative, if far less intimate, 
relationship to emerge.‖26 Upon his return, Khomeini warned that the new Islamic 
regime would not allow the shah to return Iran to a monarchy. ―We will not let the 
United States bring the shah back,‖ the religious leader declared. ―This is what the shah 
wants. Wake up. Watch out. They want the country to go back to what it was 
previously.‖27 In early 1979, Khomeini began demanding that the shah be returned to 
Iran to be tried for crimes against the people. 
The events in Iran caused many to voice their concern about the security of oil 
supply to the industrialized world, memories of the Arab oil embargo of 1973, and the 
gas lines that plagued many American cities. In May 1979, The Christian Science 
Monitor reported that spot shortages and Sunday closings of service stations, already 
familiar in parts of the U.S., could spread as prices spiraled upward.28  
Allied support for the shah was cool. Carter wrote in his diary that in discussions 
about world affairs at the Guadeloupe meeting, he found little support for the shah. 
Neither was there support among the world leaders for Khomeini or the revolutionaries. 
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They were unanimous, however, in their agreement that a civilian government should be 
established and that the shah should leave as soon as possible. They agreed with Carter, 
though, in maintaining a strong military.29   
In October, Jimmy Carter made a fateful decision. The shah was suffering from 
cancer and the president allowed him to enter the United States for medical treatment. 
Friends in the United States, among them John D. Rockefeller and Henry Kissinger, put 
pressure on the president to allow the shah to receive treatment in New York. Brzezinski 
supported this, believing that it was important to continue the U.S. partnership with the 
ailing shah. In his memoirs, Brzezinski wrote that the president noted that ―Kissinger, 
Rockefeller, and McCloy had been waging a constant campaign on the subject and that 
‗Zbig bugged me on it every day,‘ the president stated. ‗No, sir,‘ I interrupted, and 
Carter relented, ‗Well, not every day but very often.‘‖30    
Carter‘s decision had a dramatic result – militants overran the American embassy 
in Tehran taking fifty Americans hostage. The militants demanded that Carter return the 
shah so that he could stand trial for crimes against his fellow Iranians. Hamilton Jordan, 
Carter‘s Chief of Staff, recalled that the same series of events had occurred in February 
1979 when the American embassy was temporarily seized by leftist guerrillas that 
opposed the revolutionary government. Their aim was to ―provoke just the kind of 
trouble at the embassy which Ayatollah Khomeini does not want.‖31 Prime Minister 
Bazargan‘s government stepped in and evicted the subversives. Jordan was confident 
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that, as before, the Iranian government would step in and the hostages would be released 
quickly.32   
This situation was quite different. Carter declared that the U.S. ―would never 
yield to blackmail.‖33 The government would not give in to the demands of the hostage-
takers, and the president was going to have to make some difficult choices. In countries 
like Iraq, the shah, armed with modern and effective weaponry supplied by the U.S., 
kept Soviet expansionism under control and, by doing so, maintained Iranian access to 
the oil-strategic Shatt-al-Arab region.34 With the shah out of the country and an anti-
Western religious fundamentalist leading the country, American interests in the region 
were not guaranteed. Khomeini‘s Iran ―threatened to be subversive of existing rule – be 
it monarchies or republics, autocracies or democracies – in many countries in the Middle 
East.‖35  
The administration feared that the Soviets would take advantage of the 
instability, and America‘s perceived weakness in stopping it. Carter claimed that 
America‘s ―overwhelming and excessive dependence‖ on foreign oil made the nation 
vulnerable to those kinds of tactics.36 State Department officials laid out several actions 
the administration should consider. One option was to ask U.S. allies to follow 
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America‘s lead in taking economic measures against Iran. This included embargoes on 
goods to Iran such as military equipment and spare parts and pumps and drilling rigs.37 
Carter‘s response was intended to send a strong signal to both the revolutionary 
government in Iran and the Soviets. America would not hesitate to take decisive action. 
The president expelled Iranian students in the U.S. who did not have legal visas, forbade 
Iranian demonstrations on federal property, and ordered the end of oil purchases from 
Iran. He also appealed to the international community. He went to the United Nations 
and to the World Court where he urged the international community to pressure the 
Iranian government to release the hostages. The Iranians were calling for a U.N. Security 
Council meeting to establish a commission to investigate the shah‘s crimes and return 
his assets to Iran. The American ambassador to the U.N., Donald McHenry, was directed 
to ―attempt to turn off the request‖ because a formal debate was ―undesirable.‖ If a 
debate was unavoidable, the U.S. would take the position that there would be no 
discussion of returning the shah until the hostages were released.38 He also went directly 
to the heads of state of allied governments for support. He requested that they take part 
in an embargo of Iranian oil. 
In the midst of the ongoing hostage crisis in Iran, the Soviet Union stunned the 
world by invading Afghanistan. A coup in 1978 removed Mohammed Daoud from 
power. Daoud‘s modernization program, involving the development of agriculture and 
communications as well as a centralized state, had alienated some Afghanis. He was 
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criticized by some in his own government for not moving fast enough and by local 
power holders, including the clergy, for failing to honor religious and ethnic customs.39 
While the administration recognized that the Soviet Union was not directly involved in 
ousting Daoud, the leaders did have leftist tendencies and members of the Afghan 
Communist Party were associated with the coup leaders.40   
In last month of 1979, the situation deteriorated in Afghanistan. On December 
21, Brzezinski shared his views with the president that growing Soviet involvement in 
Afghani affairs was leading to a wider regional crisis.41 His fears were realized the day 
after Christmas when Soviet troops crossed into Afghanistan and installed a Communist 
government. The president, Hafizullah Amin, who, the Soviets claimed, had asked them 
to take control, was removed from his position and immediately lost his life. In his place, 
the Soviets installed an Afghani Communist of their own choosing, Babrak Karmal.   
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan posed strategic and security concerns for 
America and its allies in Western Europe and Japan. The invasion would jeopardize the 
West‘s access to oil supplies since Afghanistan‘s geographic location put the Soviets one 
step closer to the oil fields of the Iran. Carter wrote that the ―threat of this Soviet 
invasion to the rest of the region was very clear – and had grim consequences.‖ The 
invasion of Afghanistan gave the Soviets a ―deep penetration between Iran and Pakistan, 
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and pose a threat to the rich oil fields of the Persian Gulf area and to the crucial 
waterways through which so much of the world‘s energy supplies had to pass.‖42  
The Carter administration wondered about the motivation behind the invasion. 
The administration‘s perception was that the Soviets were looking for the opportunity to 
expand, and Afghanistan provided it. As early as 1976, Afghanistan‘s Foreign Minister 
Mohammad Naim voiced his concern over Soviet covert activities in the region, 
stressing that the security of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran were interlinked and 
developments in Afghanistan would ―affect its neighbors, regional stability, and U.S. 
interests.‖ Also that year, the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Walter J. Stoessel 
wrote:  
the Soviet Union, as a result of an amalgam of historic and ideological  
impulses, is impelled toward expansionism, a constant effort to enhance  
its influence wherever it can, and a compulsion to counter the US and  
China at every turn. It is opportunistic in the pursuit of advantage and  
will push into situations where it feels openings exist and the risk of  
serious confrontation with the US is low.43  
Brzezinski agreed, raising the issue of the Soviets‘ ―creeping intervention in 
Afghanistan.‖ He also told the president that the Soviets historically had been interested 
in the south and reminded Carter of Molotov‘s proposal to Hitler in late 1940 that the 
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Nazis recognize Soviet preeminence in the region south of Batum and Baku.44 Although 
the two situations were not remotely similar, it was convenient for the purposes of 
making the case that the Soviets would move to protect themselves in a region that was 
crucial. The specter of Hitler suggested appeasement, and allowing Russian expansion 
into Afghanistan was tantamount to appeasement. Where, then, would they stop? 
Russian and Soviet desires for a warm-water port had dominated that nation‘s foreign 
affairs. Brzezinski pointed out that the administration was now facing a ―regional crisis.‖ 
If the Soviets were successful in Afghanistan, the ―age-long dream of Moscow to have 
direct access to the Indian Ocean will have been fulfilled.‖45   
Whichever explanation was correct, the fact remained that the administration 
feared that the Soviets would exploit the instability in Iran and take advantage of what 
they perceived to be American weakness to expand first into Afghanistan and then into 
Iran, establishing their control of the area. Carter declared in his State of the Union 
speech in January 1980 that the region threatened by Soviet troops contained more than 
two-thirds of the world‘s exportable oil. Soviet troops were only 300 miles from the 
Persian Gulf. The ―crises in Iran and Afghanistan have dramatized a very important 
lesson: Our excessive dependence on foreign oil is a clear and present danger to our 
Nation‘s security. The need has never been more urgent,‖ he claimed. ―At long last, we 
must have a clear, comprehensive energy policy for the United States.‖46        
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The administration had another concern: the fear that the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan would prove to be a rallying point that would ignite smoldering Arab 
nationalism and anti-Western sentiment in the Middle East. In some ways, the conflict in 
the region was a proxy for the two sides in the ongoing cold war. Both the United States 
and the Soviet Union saw opportunities to encourage supporters in the region. Countries 
like Egypt and Iran under the shah supported U.S. efforts to bring stability to the region 
through an Arab-Israeli peace agreement. Those Arab countries that opposed peace 
negotiations between the Israelis and the Arabs, or who opposed Western influence in 
the Middle East, supported the Soviets‘ efforts to counter Western influence in the 
region. 
After the invasion, Carter fired off a message to the Soviet premier, Leonid 
Brezhnev. To the president, Soviet actions represented an ―unsettling, dangerous and 
new stage‖ in the use of the Red Army. Carter indicated that Soviet actions were a 
violation of the Basic Principles on Relations, signed by the Soviet Union in 1972 and a 
―legitimate matter of concern to the international community.‖ He demanded the 
removal of Soviet troops and the end of ―interference in Afghanistan‘s internal affairs.‖47    
Effective measures against Afghanistan and Iran would require the cooperation 
of America‘s allies, but leaders in Western Europe and Japan were hesitant to support 
America‘s efforts to end these crises. The chairman of the House Armed Services 
Committee wrote that it had become clear that the Soviets were attempting to exploit 
America‘s dependence on foreign energy supplies and to ―impair the continuing viability 
                                               
47 Correspondence; Carter to Brezhnev; December 29, 1979; U.S.S.R. – Carter/Brezhnev Correspondence 
[9/79 – 2/80]; Office of Staff Secretary Handwriting File; Box 161; JCPL. 
 198 
of such sources.‖ Assisting the Soviets to ―accelerate the development of their own new 
supplies of petroleum cannot be counted on to induce a turnabout in their present policy 
of gaining control of vital free world energy supplies in the Persian Gulf and other 
areas.‖48 When Soviet tanks rolled into Afghanistan, those supplies were at risk.  
National Security Council officials advised the president that the Soviet invasion 
required a ―firm, measured and forceful response.‖ Carter ―must take the initiative and 
show leadership in coordinating a response with our allies and the non-aligned.‖49 
Advisers developed a number of measures the president should consider to ―teach 
Moscow that aggression does not pay.‖ They included significant increases in arms sales 
to Pakistan, covert arms supplies to the Afghan insurgents, encouraging third party 
countries to take the issue to the United Nations, encouraging France to sell military 
equipment to the People‘s Republic of China, quietly encouraging dock workers to 
disrupt the loading of grain on ships going to Russia, and toughening export controls to 
the Soviet Union. The State Department also took a hard line, and Secretary Vance 
urged the president to consider a deep cut in grain sales to the U.S.S.R. along with 
registration for the draft. 50              
In a televised address on January 4, Carter announced the measures the 
administration would take in dealing with the Soviet Union. He declared a ban on the 
transfer of advanced technology to the Soviet Union along with a grain embargo. The 
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president declared this was the only sanction that would ―significantly affect the Soviet 
economy.‖ Additionally, Soviet fishing privileges in American waters were to be 
severely curtailed, and the U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union was recalled. In an 
effort to stabilize the region, the U.S. would provide military and economic assistance to 
Pakistan.51 In an interview on the television news show ―Meet the Press‖ on January 20, 
1980, Carter announced the administration‘s decision about a boycott of the Olympic 
Games. Unless the Soviets removed their troops from Afghanistan within a month, the 
president would not support the sending of an American team to Moscow. Further, he 
would request that the International Olympic Committee move the games from Moscow 
to an alternate site or be cancelled altogether. Carter wrote that the boycott was the 
decision that would cause him the most trouble both at home and abroad, but it was also 
the action that would put the most pressure on the Soviets. 52 
Carter also announced the doctrine that outlined the U.S. effort to shape a 
regional security framework for the Persian Gulf region. The Carter Doctrine, as it came 
to be called, stated that any attempt by ―any outside force to gain control of the Persian 
Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of 
America and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military 
force.‖53 At home, the response to this policy was that it was a significant change in the 
direction of U.S. foreign policy but that the ―essential political underpinnings of a 
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reassertion of American influence have not been prepared, either at home or abroad.‖54 
In Europe, it was also perceived as somewhat premature but necessary. A columnist for 
The Economist wrote that the negotiations that would be such a necessary component of 
this doctrine had not taken place. Not all the ―necessary advice had been gathered in or 
the analyses and projections made, still less the appropriate consultations gone through 
with presumptive allies.‖ The conclusion was, however, that something had to be said.55  
Carter undertook a campaign to convince leaders in Western Europe and Japan of 
the gravity of the situation. He contacted the heads of state to impress upon them that the 
invasion had profound strategic consequences for the entire region and that they, as a 
group, must make the invasion costly for the Soviet Union. To that end, the U.S. 
approached a number of governments, particularly non-aligned and Muslim nations, 
encouraging them to speak out. Administration officials also believed the North Atlantic 
Council should "meet immediately to assess the matter and to coordinate allied 
strategy.56   
The Soviet action met with condemnation in Western Europe. The German 
government spoke of its ―momentous and grave‖ view of the events. The French told the 
Russians that their actions were likely to start ―legitimate worries about peace and 
stability in the region,‖ which was their ―velvet-wrapped equivalent of a punch in the 
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face.‖ British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher told Brezhnev that she was ―profoundly 
disturbed.‖57     
The allies were hesitant to offer full support of U.S. security goals in the Middle 
East in response to both the Iran hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
In December, Carter sent Secretary of State Vance to Europe to convince the allies to 
assist U.S. efforts. Vance found a great deal of sympathy for the hostages, but 
commitments were slow in coming. ―Europeans were anxious about going out on a 
limb,‖ he concluded, as both West Germany and France imported ten percent of its oil 
from Iran. The Germans and French could be ―corralled into concerted action,‖ he 
believed, even though no European leader gave approval to go ahead with a trade 
embargo. The Japanese appeared even less willing to commit to sanctions, and in fact 
they neglected U.S. sanctions and continued to buy Iranian oil. The United States also 
accused Japanese banks of helping Iran to circumvent the freeze on their American-held 
assets. The Japanese prime minister maintained that his government would do whatever 
it needed to do to ensure access to the oil imports.58   
Nor was there much allied support for actions against the Soviets. Giscard told 
the administration that he would not undercut punitive actions by the United States 
against the Soviet Union but that France would continue its bilateral relations with 
Moscow in order to keep the channels of communication open to the East. German 
Chancellor Schmidt claimed that he was willing to go along with sanctions, but he did 
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not want it to be just a German – U.S. affair, and advocated a united stand that would 
include the EC and Japan. Carter penned a handwritten note to Brzezinski and Vance 
that indicated his disappointment with allied support; overall, he saw nothing 
encouraging. The FRG ―opposes any sanctions against Iran or Soviets, are continuing 
business as usual with SU, refuse to commit publicly to Olympic boycott, & privately & 
in press are very critical of us. However, we need each other.‖59    
The Carter administration clearly believed that the Western Europeans and 
Japanese had as much at stake in the Persian Gulf region as did the United States. Access 
to the oil that was the lifeblood of industry around the world was being threatened. 
Moscow seemed to be on the move. These were grave threats to world peace and yet 
America‘s partners around the world only offered mild support for U.S. actions. Carter 
wrote that by February 1980, the French had taken at least five different public positions 
on the Soviet invasion. In a meeting with Chancellor Schmidt one month later, Carter 
asked what the Germans had done to help the U.S. with Afghanistan, and what they had 
actually done to pressure the Soviets and then answered his own question: ―Nothing.‖60  
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 Jimmy Carter was tense as he sat at his desk in the Oval Office. The date was 
January 20, 1981, the Inauguration Day of his successor in the White House. As Ronald 
Reagan was preparing to be sworn in as the 40th President of the United States, Carter 
was waiting on word that the hostages in Tehran had been released and were out of Iran. 
The clock inched slowly and painfully toward noon, the hour of Reagan‘s swearing in. 
Shortly after Reagan took the oath, Carter received word that the hostages were on their 
way home, freed not during his presidency, but during the presidency of his Republican 
rival. Carter‘s presidency ended in much the same way it had progressed during his four 
years in the White House, filled with crises that he seemed unable to overcome. 
 Ronald Reagan, the one-time actor turned politician, campaigned on a platform 
that focused on two main issues. One was the perceived threat from an expansionist 
Soviet Union. Communist activities in the Middle East, particularly the invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1980, made the Soviet Union a target of anti-Communist rhetoric during 
the campaign. Reagan wanted to confront the ―evil empire‖ and return the United States 
to its position of prestige, lost, he claimed, during Carter‘s four years in office. The 
second was restoring America‘s economic power. His main focus was getting an 
intrusive government out of the lives of the American people. Government is not the 
solution to our problem,‖ he claimed, ―government is the problem.‖ With these two 
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ideals squarely in front of the American people, he wanted to make the United States a 
―shining city on a hill.‖426  
 One issue conspicuously absent from the campaign of 1980 was the energy crisis. 
The same crisis that Nixon declared was ―the most acute shortage of energy since the 
Second World War,‖ of which Ford said that America‘s ―vulnerability is getting worse 
every day to foreign sources of oil,‖ and Carter called the ―moral equivalent of war‖ was 
hardly mentioned during the campaign.427 The energy crisis, it seemed, was put on the 
back burner. How was it possible that the crisis which had loomed so large in the 1970s 
was forgotten in 1980? 
The events of 1979 brought an end to discussions of energy consumption and 
helped to reignite the Cold War. The early foreign policy objectives of the Carter 
administration that placed emphasis on cooperation among the allies to address global 
concerns were supplanted by objectives that placed the Soviet Union at the center of 
policymaking decisions. A recession in 1981 and declining oil prices worldwide also 
placed on hold the question of energy and OPEC. The price of a barrel of oil had 
dropped from $36 to $12 per barrel in just a few years, so low that people were no longer 
concerned about shortages or supply disruptions. Americans returned to the wasteful 
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ways that had characterized the decades before the energy crisis, trading in their Toyotas 
for new Minivans, the vehicle of the 1980s. 
 The election of Ronald Reagan brought an end to the tumultuous decade of the 
1970s. It had been a decade of conflict and crisis that seemed to shake the foundations of 
American democracy and power to the core. The civil rights movement of the 1960s 
spawned other movements that expanded the power of people that previously had little 
voice in the democratic process. Women, gays, Native Americans and other groups 
fought for equality through protests, demonstrations, and sit-ins. As a result of 
America‘s involvement in Vietnam and the Watergate affair, American prestige at home 
and abroad suffered. America‘s allies in Western Europe and Japan seemed intent on 
forging their own political, economic, and diplomatic road, separate from the United 
States. The Japanese were beginning to work out their own relationship with neighboring 
China and their ―economic miracle‖ carried them from the ashes of World War II to a 
position as the second leading economy in the world. The nascent European Community 
was less willing than they had been in the immediate postwar decades to allow the 
United States to take the lead in making decisions that affected Europeans directly; the 
internal politics of the group, however, inhibited cooperation on many issues.  
 While America‘s allies were intent on following their own paths in many areas, 
they continued to look to the United States for leadership on several critical issues. One 
of these was the energy crisis sparked by the oil embargo of 1973. Henry Kissinger‘s 
call for interdependence seemed to fall on fertile ground. America and its allies 
originally understood the need to work together to solve this issue. As American policies 
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in the Middle East and the Soviet Union came into conflict with the policies of 
America‘s allies, however, the initial cooperation began to unravel. The Gaullist attitude 
adopted by the French was in part a reflection of their concerns for their own national 
interests. They believed that the appropriate forum for determining energy policy was 
the European Community and often stubbornly refused to follow America‘s lead. Other 
Western Europeans were caught in the middle, ―anxious not to antagonize‖ the United 
States, but also ―anxious to avoid an open breach inside the already-strained unity of the 
Common Market.‖428   
 Kissinger‘s Middle East policies put America‘s allies in a position in which they 
had to choose to follow the U.S. lead and endanger their own interests or go it alone and 
protect their oil interests but tear the alliance apart. The Secretary failed to acknowledge 
the economic dimensions of the oil embargo. For him, foreign affairs were determined 
by political and geopolitical interests. Economics fell outside the parameters of the 
foreign policy framework. His aides admitted that ―Kissinger still doesn‘t feel that 
economics is the proper, much less prime, concern of foreign policy.‖ The problem with 
that attitude is that it ―ignores the new realities of foreign affairs. More and more 
countries tend to define their national interests in economic as much as in political or 
military power.‖429 
 Détente was also an issue that pulled at the threads of the alliance fabric. 
Kissinger claimed that the threat of nuclear war and the nuclear arms race that was a 
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central part of it was so great that the only way to avoid it was to work with the Soviets 
to bring stability. That did not necessarily preclude economic competition among the 
two superpowers. The economic competition continued, but the stability that Kissinger 
pursued through his policy of détente with the Soviet Union was nullified by the oil 
embargo. Financial instability caused by inflation and uncertainty in the oil market led to 
political instability. Fears about the increased popularity of Communist parties across 
Europe and Japan haunted the democratically elected governments in those areas. There 
also were fears in the United States about the possibility that the Soviet Union would 
take advantage of America‘s preoccupation with the economic uncertainty associated 
with the oil embargo and attempt to expand into areas that would give them a 
geopolitical advantage.  
 Non-state actors in industrialized countries played an important role in shaping 
public opinion about national and international energy policy in the 1970s by creating an 
environment in which public concerns about social and economic issues came up against 
and often took precedence over political and geopolitical considerations. Conflict over 
energy policy was brewing between the multinational oil companies and the 
environmental movement. The multinationals were forced out of the Middle East as the 
oil kingdoms took more control over production and marketing of their most important 
commodity. As those corporations‘ role in the Middle East diminished, they turned to 
the petroleum potential at home, eager to move into areas that had previously been off-
limits to drilling. The environmental movement was determined to protect the pristine 
wilderness from what they considered to be the oil companies‘ rapacious appetite for 
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profits. The two sides met in a showdown over the Alaska pipeline; the pipeline, a 
central part of Nixon‘s energy program, was stalled time and time again. The oil industry 
and the environmental movement clashed over every aspect of construction. Both the 
Nixon and Ford administrations were unable to impose their will. Oil did not begin 
flowing from Alaska until Jimmy Carter was in office, and the pipeline did not solve the 
oil problem, only supplying the lower 48 with about 400,000 barrels in 2005.430 If the 
U.S. could not come together on solving the energy crisis at home, American allies 
asked, how could they lead the industrialized world?  
 Carter‘s efforts to work with America‘s allies met with increasing resistance, 
particularly among the leadership of the Western Europeans. The summit process, begun 
during Ford‘s presidency, was formalized during Carter‘s presidency, but many of the 
summit meetings were contentious, particularly over the issue of energy policy, and little 
was done to resolve the ongoing crisis. 
 Throughout the decade of the 1970s, the United States and its allies failed to 
come to any consensus about how to bring an end to the energy crisis. All of the 
opportunities seemed to be part of another agenda that focused on Cold War concerns. 
Both sides by this time were searching for cooperation rather than confrontation. The 
political and economic instability associated with the oil embargo in 1973 overlay the 
developments that were transforming the decade of the 1970s. The collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system, the emergence of petrodollars on world currency markets, and 
the emergence of the environmental movement all threatened the stability that 
                                               
430 Mark Davis, ―The Alaska Pipeline,‖ The American Experience (Boston: WGBH Educational 
Foundation, 2006), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/pipeline/peopleevents/e_consumption.html.  
 209 
presidential administrations were searching for. Rather than focusing solely on the 
energy crises as unique problems, Washington officials throughout the decade tied the 
crises to other issues which they viewed as more important. Whether it was Kissinger in 
the Middle East, détente, or the environmental movement, the energy crisis never 
seemed to get its own dedicated focus. Nixon officials indicated their concern that the 
foreign policy goals pursued by Kissinger with regard to the Middle East not be 
endangered by U.S. response to the oil embargo. ―If we threaten to delay our peace 
efforts unless the embargo is lifted,‖ one official claimed, ―we put our own highest 
priority foreign policy concern at hostage.‖431 Even the Carter administration viewed the 
crisis in the late 1970s within the framework of the hostage crisis in Iran and Soviet 
misdeeds in Afghanistan.     
 The dilemma about energy policy posed almost forty years ago continues to 
bedevil world leaders. During George W. Bush‘s tenure in the White House, oil soared 
from $10 per barrel in 1998 to $100 per barrel by 2009. The price of gasoline increased 
to almost $4 a gallon in some areas, a price that was unthinkable in the 1970s. As the 
price of oil and gas soared, Bush‘s approval ratings slumped. To provide some relief for 
Americans, Bush approached a traditionally moderate voice in OPEC, Saudi Arabia. The 
administration‘s unwillingness to force Israeli leader Ariel Sharon to pull his country‘s 
forces out of the West Bank in 2002 caused a rift between the two traditional allies. 
While Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah denied reports that his country was willing to 
disrupt oil supplies if the administration refused to shift its policy towards Israel, 
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tensions clearly existed between the two.432 The two leaders issued a communiqué 
pledging to continue their cooperation so that the ―oil supply from Saudi Arabia will be 
available and secure.‖433 In spite of this apparent cooperation, oil prices continued to 
fluctuate wildly.  
 On March 30, 2011, President Barack Obama addressed Americans in a speech 
that called for making America energy independent by reducing dependence on imported 
oil and developing alternative sources of energy. ―We have been down this road before,‖ 
the president said, claiming that the United States would ―keep on being a victim to 
shifts in the oil market until we finally get serious about a long-term policy for a secure 
and affordable energy future.‖434 The words were hauntingly similar to the speeches 
made by Nixon in 1973.  
 Obama‘s speech came at a time of uncertainty in the energy market. In 2010, an 
explosion on an offshore oil platform owned by British Petroleum caused a massive spill 
in the Gulf of Mexico. The damage prompted Obama to declare a moratorium on 
offshore drilling. In early 2011, protests rocked the Middle East. The discontent involved 
not the typically unstable areas in the region, Israel and Palestine, but the relatively 
stable country of Egypt. The president, Hosni Mubarak, was forced out of office; the 
unrest spread to Libya, an oil exporter. U.S. troops, as part of a United Nations force, 
went into the country to aid rebels attempting to overthrow the Libyan leader, Moammar 
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Qaddafi. This came at a time when the price of oil was over the $4.00 mark in Hawaii, 
Alaska, and California. The instability at home and abroad was once again causing 
uncertainty in America‘s oil supply and that was being reflected in the marketplace.  
 Obama‘s speech also came at a time of crisis in Japan. In March 2011, an 
earthquake and tsunami destroyed cities and killed thousands and damaged several of 
that country‘s nuclear reactors. This disaster reignited discussions about the safety of 
nuclear power plants in Japan and the possibility of increased development of nuclear 
energy for use in the United States. The nuclear crisis that followed the earthquake and 
tsunami forced the Japanese government to review a plan to build fourteen more nuclear 
reactors; the nation already had eighteen plants.435 In spite of the nuclear crisis in Japan, 
the United States continues to talk about expanding nuclear plant construction and 
viewed nuclear power as a key aspect of efforts to develop clean energy. The nuclear 
industry had largely stalled in the U.S. since 1979 when the Three Mile Island accident 
convinced many Americans that nuclear power was unsafe. President Obama vowed that 
he would ―further improve the safety of U.S. atomic facilities.‖436  
 Answers about secure energy sources continue to evade world leaders. While 
America and its allies have made attempts over the last four decades to replace oil with 
other energy sources and to work together to develop policies that give them some 
leverage in the energy marketplace, they continue to be dependent on oil for much of 
their energy supply. The oil weapon that OPEC employed so successfully in 1973 could 
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be turned on America and its allies at any time. Uncertainty around the world in places 
that supply the industrialized world with a commodity upon which it is so dependent 
makes countries vulnerable to the vicissitudes of small, otherwise weak countries that sit 
on large supplies of oil. As long as Americans and others around the world remain 
dependent on such a valuable commodity, they will continue to be held hostage by 
OPEC.  
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